possession of said property and franchises, determined to form a new corporation, in accordance with the laws of the state of North Carolina (1 Code N. C. §§ 697, 698, 2005). In compliance with these sections, on the 20th of June, 1894, he executed, under his hand and seal, a declaration constituting a new corporation, to be invested with all the rights, powers, privileges, and franchises of the Charleston, Cincinnati & Chicago Railroad Company in this state. For the purpose of effecting a complete working organization, he gave this new corporation the name of Ohio River & Charleston Railroad Company of North Carolina, appointed six directors, and designated the amount of capital stock, and the num ber of shares into which the capital stock should be divided, and caused a certificate of such organization to be duly filed in the several counties of North Carolina in which the said railroad was situated. On the 13th of November, 1894, the said Charles E. Hillier executed and delivered a deed to the Ohio River & Charleston Railway Company of North Carolina, conveying to said company so much of the property and the rights, privileges, and franchises of the Charleston, Cincinnati & Chicago Railroad Company as were conveyed to him, as purchaser, by the special master, which are situated in the state of North Carolina, or were derived from the laws of said state. The granting of the rights, privileges, and powers which constitute the franchises of a corporation are matters under the control of the legislature, and, within the limits of constitutional power, the legislature may adopt, by statute, any mode of conferring and investing such corporate franchises, or continuing the existence of those franchises previously granted, which had been acquired by a purchaser under execution sale, or under sale made by the decree of a court having authority by virtue of the laws of the state to order sales. Reasons of public policy require the continuance of railroads in a condition of useful and efficient operation, and statutes enacted for such beneficial purposes should be liberally construed in ascertaining the intention of the legislature for preserving the full accommodations and advantages arising to the public from such corporations. After careful consideration, I am of opinion that the said proceedings of Charles E. Hillier were regular, sufficiently specific, and in accordance with the laws of this state; that the former charter of the Charleston, Cincinnati & Chicago Railroad Company has been dissolved in accordance with state laws, and that said company no longer has corporate existence in this state; that the Ohio River & Charleston Railroad Company is a separate and independent domestic corporation, and has no other connection or relation with the dissolved Charleston, Cincinnati & Chicago Railroad Company, except it is legally invested with the property and franchises that formerly belonged to the said dissolved corporation. There can be no doubt as to the power of the legislature, under the present constitution of North Carolina, to repeal and dissolve railroad charters granted since the adoption of said constitution. Railroad Co. v. Rollins, 82 N. C. 523; Young v. Rollins, 85 N. C. 485; Marshall v. Railroad Co., 92 N. C. 322. I have carefully examined and con sidered the cases cited by counsel of defendant, and have the opinion that the principles announced do not conflict with the legal views I have expressed in relation to the facts of the case before the court. I will cite only one case mentioned in briefs, as it refers to other cases relied upon by counsel of defendant: Goodlett v. Railroad, 122 U. S. 391, 7 Sup. Ct. 1254. I concur with counsel of defendant in their opinion that the legislature of this state has, in sections 1932 to 1934 of the Code, manifested a clear and positive intention that railroad corporations shall not be created by the action of associated persons otherwise than as provided in such sections. Those sections refer only to the mode and manner or creating railroad corporations, and not as to the methods of continuing the existence and operation of railroad franchises in the hands of purchasers at judicial sales. The property of railroads. must be kept in association with their franchises, to preserve value, to give credit to such corporations, to secure creditors, and keep railroads in operation for the benefit of the public, which was the primary object of the legislature in bestowing such corporate franchises. Such legislative purpose is clearly manifested in the Code of North Carolina, in sections 697, 698, 2005, and other sections. Gooch v. McGee, 83 N. C. 59. The defendant, in its petition for removal, claimed to be a citizen and resident of the state of South Carolina. It could not found this claim upon any relation which i had to the Charleston, Cincinnati & Chicago Railroad Company, for all of the title, estate, interest, and equity of redemption of this company to the mortgaged premises, rights, property, assets, and franchises were barred and forever foreclosed by the decree for sale and foreclosure made in the circuit court, which was duly executed by the special master. In the briefs of counsel, residence and citizenship in South Carolina are founded upon the alleged facts that Charles E. Hillier, after his purchase, "obtained a charter by special act of the legislature of Virginia approved February 12, 1894, and filed certain articles of incorporation with the sec retary of state of South Carolina, under the laws of said state; he, the said Hillier, having conveyed the property and franchises of his said railroad purchase to the Ohio River & Charleston Railway Company." Conceding these alleged facts to be fully estab lished, I am of opinion that the foreign corporation organized under that act has never been recognized and adopted by the legislature of this state, and has not superseded or destroyed the domestic corporation organized by the said Hillier under the laws of this state, or absolved the Ohio River & Charleston Railway Company of North Carolina from the discharge of the functions, duties, obligations, and responsibilities which were assumed by its domestic organization. The said Hillier had no authority or power to dissolve such domestic corporation, or transfer its franchises and property, without the consent and approval of the legislature of North Carolina. As the proceedings for removal of this case were defective and ineffectual, and the case is now rightfully pending in the state court, I cannot make an order to remand. It is therefore consid ered and ordered that the proceedings in this court for removal be dismissed, with costs to be taxed against the petitioner, the defendant in this case. BAKER v. AULT et al. (Circuit Court, D. Washington, N. D. February 5, 1897.) FEDERAL COURTS INJUNCTION AGAINST PROCEEDINGS IN STATE COURT - INSOLVENT When a valid judgment has been obtained in a state court against a national bank, and the lien thereof has attached to its property, before the appointment of a receiver, Rev. St. § 720, applies to prohibit the issue of an injunction by a federal court, at the suit of the receiver, to restrain the enforcement of such judgment. Stratton, Lewis & Gilman, for complainant. HANFORD, District Judge. This is a suit for an injunction to restrain the defendants from proceeding to obtain satisfaction of a judgment in their favor against an insolvent national bank by a sale of real estate under a writ of execution. The judgment was rendered by the superior court of the state of Washington for Snohomish county, and became a lien upon real estate owned by the bank situated in said county, prior to the closing of the bank. The plaintiff, as receiver of said bank, claims the land as part of the assets in his custody as receiver, and that there will be a loss to the trust estate if the defendants are permitted to sell the property under an execution. Section 720, Revised Statutes of the United States, provides that: "The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a state, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." This is a mandatory law, prohibiting the exercise by the federal courts of the power to issue injunctions to stay proceedings in any court of a state except in special cases, when authorized by some other law. I find it unnecessary to consider the other questions argued by counsel, for the reason that this statute is applicable to this case, and it must control the decision. Where a judgment has been obtained by fraud, or rendered by a court having no jurisdiction, a United States circuit court may exercise its power to restrain a party from taking any benefit from a judgment so obtained, or rendered in his favor. Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 589-601, 12 Sup. Ct. 62. But in the case at bar the validity of the judgment is not brought into question, and it is admitted that a judgment lien attached to the property before the receiver was appointed. I can find no ground for excepting this case from the rule prescribed by the statute. the receiver wishes to save the property from being sacrificed by an execution sale, he must discharge the lien by satisfying the judgment, or else apply to the court which rendered the judgment to stay proceedings. Let there be a decree of dismissal, with costs. BLANKS et al. v. KLEIN et al. STARCKE et al. v. KLEIN et al (Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. No. 464. APPEALABLE Decrees-DECREE FOR COSTS. December 1, 1896.) An appeal from a mere decree for costs of the court below must be dismissed, as a matter within that court's discretion. But, where one item included in the decree is for clerk's fees in making and certifying the transcript on a former appeal, the appellate court may review the same on the merits. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Southern District of Mississippi. Wade R. Young, for appellants. M. Dabney, for appellees. Before PARDEE and MCCORMICK, Circuit Judges, and MAXEY, District Judge. PARDEE, Circuit Judge. This appeal is from a decree of the cir cuit court taxing costs in two equity causes which were decided in the circuit court July 16, 1891. Both causes were afterwards appealed to this court, where Blanks v. Klein was affirmed (3 C. C. A. 585, 53 Fed. 436), and Starcke v. Klein was dismissed for failure to file the record within the proper delay (14 C. C. A. 672). The contested items of costs, with one exception, are costs incurred in the circuit court in the trial of the causes, and were approved by the judge who rendered the decrees, apparently in compliance with section 983, Rev. St. U. S. The proceeding in which the decree under consideration was rendered appears to have been provoked by a motion of the appellants to retax costs. Proceeding under this motion, the court, on the application of movers, referred the matter to a special master, with directions to tax the costs of said suits due by movers, and to make report to the judge of the court in vacation. The special master made an investigation, hearing evidence of sev eral parties by way of deposition, and reported that the items complained of were properly and lawfully taxed. Exceptions were filed to this report, complaining of the special master's findings both of fact and of law. The decree of the court overruled the exceptions to the master's report, confirmed the same in all respects, and declared as follows: "And it is further considered by the court that inasmuch as nothing is involved in said motion and report except costs in said causes, and that both of said causes have heretofore been appealed to the court of appeals, and said appeals finally disposed of in that court, no appeal lies from this decree." It seems to be settled that no appeal will lie from a mere decree for costs. Clarke v. Warehouse Co., 10 C. C. A. 387, 393, 62 Fed. 328; Du Bois v. Kirk, 158 U. S. 58, 67, 15 Sup. Ct. 729. If this case covered only the costs incurred in the circuit court in an equity cause, which costs are unquestionably within the sound discretion of the court (Canter v. Insurance Co., 3 Pet. 307; Kittredge v. Race, 92 U. S. 120), we are clear that this appeal should be dismissed. As, however, one item included in the decree is for making and certifying the transcript in the appeal to this court, and incidentally, therefore, an item of costs incurred in this court, we are disposed to consider the merits of the same. The contention of appellants is that, owing to the circumstances attendant upon making up the transcript, the clerk agreed to accept a less sum than the fee allowed by law for such services. The master finds, in respect to this matter, that the clerk was entitled to his full fee for the preparation of the transcript, unless the agreement claimed by complainants (appellants) to have been made with him for compensation was established by the testimony, and then, upon a review of the evidence, finds that such agreement is not established. It is doubtful, under the system of compensation to, clerks of the circuit courts of the United States, whether in any case the clerk may remit fees allowed by law, without making himself liable for the full amount, because the United States are interested in the fees of such clerks, and entitled to the overplus after deducting the compensation fixed by law. However this may be, we have examined the evidence found in the transcript, and we reach the same conclusion as did the master, that the agreement on the part of the clerk to remit any part of the lawful charges for making and certifying the transcript is not established. The decree appealed from is affirmed. UNITED STATES v. GLEASON. (Circuit Court, E. D. New York. January 30, 1897.) NATURALIZATION-ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE-CONCLUSIVENESS. The administration of the oaths and issuing of a certificate to an applicant for naturalization by a court having jurisdiction of such applications constitute a judgment of admission to citizenship, which is conclusive as to the existence of the necessary facts and the status of the applicant; and such certificate cannot be set aside upon the ground that the facts were falsely represented to the court. James L. Bennett, U. S. Atty. F. H. Van Vechten, for defendant. WHEELER, District Judge. This cause has been heard on demurrer to the bill, which alleges, in substance, that the defendant was born prior to April 6, 1841, at Fishmoyne, in the parish of Down and Inch, and county of Tipperary, Ireland, and was an alien; that he remained there till 1882, when he came to this country, and arrived at New York about May 13th of that year, when over 18 and about 20 years old; that on October 22, 1867, without having made any declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States, he presented a petition for naturalization to the superior court of the city of New York, setting forth, among other things, that he had resided in the United States 3 years next prior to arriving at the age of 21 years, knowing this to be false; that thereupon the required oaths were taken, and a certificate in due form was issued out of, and under the seal of, that court, showing that he had complied with the stat |