19. Every kind of commercial dealing or intercourse, whether by transmission of money or of goods, or orders for the delivery of either, between two countries at war, directly or indirectly, or through the intervention of third persons or partnerships, or by contracts in any form looking to or involving such transmission, is void. Montgomery vs. United States, 15 Wallace, 395, [400.] 20. What constitutes trading with public enemy. United States vs. Lapéne, 17 Wallace, 601. 21. The Government of the United States has clearly the power to permit limited commercial intercourse with an enemy in time of war, and to impose such conditions thereon as it sees fit. is incident to the power to declare war and carry it cessful termination. This power on to a suc Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wallace, 73. 22. It seems that the President, who is constitutionally invested with the entire charge of hostile operations, may exercise this power, but there is no doubt that with the concurrent authority of Congress, he may exercise it at his discretion. Ib. 23. It must be considered as a settled principle of maritime and national law, that all trade with the enemy, unless with the permission of the sovereign, is interdicted, and subjects the property engaged in it to the penalty of confiscation. Nor is this as a modern principle. It may not be found laid down in terms in Grotius, Puffendorf, or Vattel, but it irresistibly flows from the current of their reasoning. Indeed, the treatises of these great writers upon national law are admitted to be imperfect on many maritime questions. The schooner Rapid and cargo, 1 Gallison, 295, [303.] 24. I lay it down as a fundamental proposition, that, strictly speaking, in war all intercourse between subjects and citizens of the belligerent countries is illegal, unless sanctioned by the authority of the government, or in the exercise of the rights of humanity. I am aware that the proposition is usually laid down in more restricted terms by elementary writers, and is confined to commercial intercourse. Independent of all authority, it would seem a necessary result of a state of war to suspend all negotiations and intercourse between the subjects of the belligerent nations. The Julia and cargo, 1 Gallison, 594, [601.] 1. The indemuification awarded by the Emperor of Russia, to be paid by Great Britain for having violated the treaty of peace, in taking and carrying away slaves and other property, involves not merely the return of the value of the specific property, but a compensation also, for the subsequent and wrongful detention of it, in the nature of damages; and since this will be a work of great labor and time, interest accordingly may be taken as a necessary part of the indemnification awarded. Award of the Emperor of Russia, 2 Op., 28 Wirt, (1826.) INJURIES. See Claims. Diplomatic Interference. 1. By the law of nations, if the citizens of one State do an injury to the citizens of another, the government of the offending subject ought to take every reasonable measure to cause reparation to be made by the offender. But if the offender is subject to the ordinary processes of law, it is believed this principle does not generally extend to oblige the government to make satisfaction, in case of the inability of the offender. The Mercator, 1 Op., 106, Lincoln, (1802.) INSURRECTION. 1. The act of despatching an American vessel, in ballast, from a port of the United States with an immediate destination to a neutral port, and an ulterior destination, with cargo taken in at such neutral port, to a blockaded port, is an offense against the United States under section 2 of the act of 1862, (12 Stat., 590; R. S., § 5334.) Case of blockade runners, 10 Op., 513, Coffey, ad int., (1863.) 2. The United States, in the enforcement of their constitutional rights against armed insurrection, have all the powers not only of a sovereign, but also of the most favored belligerent. Lamar vs. Browne, 92 U. S. R., S. C., 187. 138 INTEREST-INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONERS. INTEREST. 1. In general, the government, which is always to be presumed to be ready and willing to discharge its obligations, pays no interest; yet from considerations of State policy, it has sometimes allowed it, as in the case of claims under the act of 1814, (6 Stat., 139.) Claim of Henry de la Francia, 5 Op., 105, Johnson, (1849.) 2. Although interest, as a general rule, will not be paid upon claims against the Government, there are instances in which the Government, from considerations of policy allows it. Claim of the heirs of Thomas Ewel, 5 Op., 138, Johnson, (1849.) 3. Cases in which interest on claims should be allowed. Galphin's case, 5 Op., 227, Johnson, (1850.) 4. As a general rule, the United States does not pay interest on any debts of the Government. Colmesnil's case, 7 Op., 523, Cushing, (1855.) 5. The only exceptions are where the Government stipulates to pay interest, as in public loans, and where interest is given by act of Congress expressly, either by the name of interest or by that of damages. Ib. 6. Acts of Congress authorizing the settlement of claims according to 66 equity" or "equity and justice," do not give interest; for, as between private individuals, there is no material difference in this respect between equity and law, and that expression does not change the result as regards the government. This opinion reviews former opinions on same subject. Ib. 7. Semble, that the court does not sanction the allowance of interest on claims against the Government. Gordon vs. United States, 7 Wallace, 188. INTERNATIONAL COMITY. See Claims. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONERS. 1. According to the public law of the monarchies of Europe, the authority of ministers, and perhaps of international commissioners, expires on the death, deposition, or abdication of the prince; but not so as between the American republics, in which the executive power is permanent and continuous, without regard to the governing person, and there is no interruption of the authority or renewal of the credentials of their public ministers, on a change of President for whatever cause, provided such President continues to represent and exercise the appointing power of the Government. Case of Commissioners under treaty with Mexico, 7 Op., 582, Cushing, (1855.) 2. The United States observe, as their rule of public law, to recognize governments de facto, and also governing persons de facto, without scrutiny of the question of legitimacy of origin or accession. Ib. INTERNATIONAL LAW. 1. The arrest of servants of public ministers is regulated by act of Congress; entering a public minister's house to serve an execution will either be absorbed in the arrest as being necessarily associated with it, or, if an arrest be admissible, must be punished, if at all, under the law of nations. Case of Van Berckel's servant, 1 Op., 26, Randolph, (1792.) 2. Entering a public minister's residence to make an arrest which might lawfully be made elsewhere is an offense under the law of nations. Ib. 3. The law of nations does not allow reprisals, except in case of violent injuries directed and supported by the State, and the denial of justice by all the tribunals, and afterward by the prince. Pagan's case, 1 Op., 30, Randolph, (1793.) 4. To attack an enemy in a neutral territory is absolutely unlawful. The arrest of a British vessel within the capes of the Delaware and before she went to sea is a seizure within our territory, and vessel should be restored. The Grange, 1 Op., 32, Randolph, (1793.) 5. A foreign consul is not a public minister within the meaning of the act of April 30, 1790, (1 Stat., 117; R. S., § 4063,) because he is not in any degree invested with the representative character. Case of British consul at Norfolk, 1 Op., 41, Bradford, (1794.) 6. The law of nations invests the commander of a foreign ship of war with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the country into which he comes. A writ of habeas corpus may be awarded to produce an Ameri can citizen unlawfully detained on a foreign vessel. Case of American citizen on British ship, 1 Op., 47, Bradford, (1794.) 7. In the case of a foreign public minister, the municipal law of libel is strengthened by the law of nations, which secures the minister a peculiar protection not only from violence, but also from insult. Such a publication may be made the subject of legal prosecution. Case of British minister, 1 Op., 52, Bradford, (1794.) 8. A citizen of a neutral state who, for hire, serves as a mariner on a neutral ship, employed in contraband commerce with either of the belligerents, is not liable to any prosecution or punishment for so doing by the municipal laws of his own state; nor is he punishable personally according to the law of nations, though taken in the act by that belligerent nation to whose detriment the prohibited trade would operate. Sale of ships to the British, 1 Op., 61, Lee, (1796.) 9. It is an offense against the law of nations for any persons, whether citizens or foreigners, to go into the territory of Spain with intent to recover their property by their own strength, or in any other manner than that permitted by its laws. William Jones's case, 1 Op., 68, Lee, (1797.) 10. A consul is not privileged from legal process by the general law of nations. Letombe's case, 1 Op., 77, Lee, (1797.) 11. It is a rule established by the law of nations that a captured vessel must be brought within the jurisdiction of the country to which the captor belongs before any regular condemnation can be awarded. British ship John, 1 Op., 78, Lee, (1797.) 12. According to the general rule established by the writers on the law of nations, every ship, even a public ship of war of a foreign na. tion, in a port of one of the States of the Union, adjacent to a wharf, is within the territory of such State and subject to the service of judicial process. It is lawful to serve either civil or criminal process upon a person on board a British man-of-war under such circumstances. The Chesterfield, 1 Op., 87, Lee, (1799.) 13. By the law of nations, if the citizens of one state do an injury to the citizens of another, the government of the offending subject should take every reasonable measure to cause reparation to be made by the offender; but if the offender is subject to the ordinary processes of law, it is believed that the principle does not generally extend to oblige the government to make satisfaction in case of the inability of the offender. The Mercator, 1 Op., 106, Lincoln, (1802.) |