An inconveniency is always to be suffered, when it cannot be removed without introducing a worse.

I proceed, in the next place, to inquire into the nature of the English laws in relation to libelling. To acquire a just idea of them, the knowledge of history is necessary, and the genius and disposition of the prince is to be considered, in whose time they are introduced and put in practice.

To infuse into the minds of the people an ill opinion of a just administration is a crime, that deserves no indulgence; but to expose the evil designs or weak management of a magistrate is the duty of every member of society. Yet King James the First thought it an unpardonable presumption in the subject to pry into the arcana imperii, the secrets of kings. He imagined, that the people ought to believe the authority of the government infallible, and that their submission should be implicit. It may therefore be reasonably presumed, that the judgment of the Star-chamber concerning libels was influenced by this monarch's notions of government. No law could be better framed to prevent people from publishing their thoughts on the administration, than that which makes no distinction, whether a libel be true or false. It is not pretended that any such decision is to be found in our books, before this reign. That is not at all to be wondered at; King James was the first of the British monarchs, that laid claim to a divine right.

It was a refined piece of policy in Augustus Cæsar, when he proposed a law to the senate, whereby invectives against private men were to be punished as treason. The pill was finely gilded and easily swallowed; but the Romans soon found that the preservation of their characters was only a pretext; to preserve inviolable the sacred name of Cæsar was the real

design of the law. They quickly discovered the intended consequence; if it be treason to libel a private person, it cannot be less than blasphemy to speak ill of the emperor.

Perhaps it may not appear a too refined conjecture, that the Star-chamber acted on the same views with Augustus, when they gave that decision which made it criminal to publish truth of a private person as well as a magistrate. I am the more inclined to this conjecture from a passage in Lord Chief Justice Richardson's speech, which I find in the trial in the Star-chamber against Mr. Prynne, who was prosecuted there for a libel. "If subjects have an ill prince," says the judge, "marry, what is the remedy? They must pray to God to forgive him. Mr. Prynne saith there were three worthy Romans, that conspired to murder Nero. This is most horrible."

Tremendous wickedness indeed, my Lord Chief Justice! Where slept the thunder, when these three detestable Romans, unawed by the sacred majesty of the diadem, with hands sacrilegious and accursed, took away the precious life of that imperial wolf, that true epitome of the Lord's anointed, who had murdered his own mother, who had put to death Seneca and Burrhus, his two best friends and benefactors; who was drenched in the blood of mankind, and wished and endeavoured to extirpate the human race? I think my Lord Chief Justice has clearly explained the true intent and meaning of the Star-chamber doctrine; it centres in the most abjectly passive obedience.

The punishment for writing truth, is pillory, loss of ears, branding the face with hot irons, fine, and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court. Nay, the punishment is to be heightened in proportion to the truth of the facts contained in the libel. But, if this monstrous

doctrine could have been swallowed down by that worthy jury, who were on the trial of the seven bishops, prosecuted for a libel in the reign of James the Second, the liberties of Britain, in all human probability, had been lost, and slavery established in the three kingdoms. This was a cause of the greatest expectation and importance that ever came before the judges in Westminster-hall.

The bishops had petitioned the king, that he would be graciously pleased not to insist upon their reading in the church his Majesty's declaration for liberty of conscience, because it was founded on a dispensing power, declared illegal in Parliament; and they said, that they could not, in prudence, honor, or conscience, so far make themselves parties to it. In the information exhibited by the attorney-general, the bishops were charged with writing and publishing a false, malicious, and seditious libel (under pretence of a petition), in diminution of the king's prerogative, and contempt of his government.

Sawyer and Finch were among the bishops' counsel; the former had been attorney, the latter solicitor-general. In these stations they had served the court only too well. They were turned out because they refused to support the dispensing power. Powis and Williams, who stood in their places, had great advantages over them, by reflecting on the precedents and proceedings, while those were of the king's counsel. "What was good law for Sidney and others, ought to be law for the bishops; God forbid, that in a court of justice any such distinction should be made."

Williams took very indecent liberties with the prelates, who were obliged to appear in court; he reproached them with acting repugnant to their doctrine of passive obedience; he reminded them of their

preaching against himself, and stirring up their clergy to libel him in their sermons. For Williams had been for many years a bold pleader in all causes against the court. He had been Speaker in two successive parliaments, and a zealous promoter of the bill of exclusion. Jeffreys had fined him ten thousand pounds for having licensed, in the preceding reign, by virtue of an order of the House of Commons, the printing of Dangerfield's Narrative, which charged the Duke of York with conspiracies of a black complexion. This gentleman had no principles, was guided by his own interests, and so wheeled about to the court. The king's counsel having produced their evidences as to the publication of the petition, the question then to be debated was, whether it contained libellous matter or not.

It was argued in substance for the bishops, that the matter could not be libellous, because it was true; Sir Robert Sawyer makes use of the words false and libellous, as synonymous terms, through the whole course of his argument; and so does Mr. Finch; accordingly they proceeded to show by the votes and journals of the Parliament, which were brought from the Tower to the court, that the kings of England, in no age, had any power to dispense with or set aside the laws of the land; and, consequently, the bishops' petition, which denied that his Majesty had any dispensing power, could not be false, nor libellous, nor in contempt or diminution of the king's prerogative, as no such power was ever annexed to it. This was the foundation laid down through the whole course of the debate, and which guided and governed the verdict.

It was strongly urged in behalf of the king, that the only point to be looked into was, whether the libel be reflecting or scandalous, and not whether it be true or false; that the bishops had injured and affronted the

king by presuming to prescribe to him their opinions in matters of government; that, under pretence of delivering a petition, they come and tell his Majesty he has commanded an illegal thing; that, by such a proceeding, they threw dirt in the king's face, and so were libellers with a witness.

Previous to the opinions of the judges, it will be necessary to give the reader a short sketch of their characters. Wright was before on the bench, and made chief justice, as a proper tool to support the dispensing power. Rapin, mentioning this trial, calls Holloway a creature of the court; but that excellent historian was mistaken in this particular. Powell was a judge of obstinate integrity; his obstinacy gained him immortal honor. Allibone was a professed Papist, and had not taken the tests; consequently he was no judge, and his opinion of no authority. Wright, in his charge, called the petition a libel, and declared that any thing which disturbs the government is within the case de libellis famosis, (the Star-chamber doctrine.) Holloway told the jury, that the end and intention of every action is to be considered; and that, as the bishops had no ill intention in delivering their petition, it could not be deemed malicious or libellous. Powell declared, that falsehood and malice were two essential qualities of a libel, which the prosecutor is obliged to prove. Allibone replied upon Powell, that we are not to measure things from any truth they have in themselves, but from the aspect they have on the government; for that every tittle of a libel may be true, and yet be a libel still.

The compass of this paper would not admit me to quote the opinion of the judges at length; but I have endeavoured, with the strictest regard to truth, to give the substance and effect of them as I read them.

It has been generally said, that the judges on this