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tinues our author, 'to suppose that the notions of right and wrong are perceived by the understanding, is contrary to all analogy. The source of all abstract general ideas is found in our observation of resemblances. An object is admirable because it agrees with other objects in exciting in our minds a certain emotion termed admiration, not because the mind first perceives its admirable qualities.'

So far as relates to the manner in which we acquire the notions of right and wrong, our author appears exactly to coincide with the views of Dr. Thomas Brown; though he greatly differs from that distinguished writer as to the question-what is virtue in itself? Both maintain that the bare contemplation of certain actions, apart from all express or even tacit reference to general rules or principles, is sufficient to give us, by means of the attendant emotions, the notions of virtue and vice. 'We call an object red which produces in us a certain sensation. Exactly in the same manner, we call an action right or wrong which produces in us a certain emotion,' an emotion of moral approbation or the reverse. It is evident that although the author admits that an 'intellectual perception, or conception,' precedes all our emotions, both moral and others, (without which indeed the mind could no more have an action in its view, than the blind eye could see a material object,) he supposes no such mental operation as would amount to that cognizance of relations in which the pure or elementary acts of reason appear to consist. The moral emotion is consequent on the mere isolated view of the conduct of others. Some action of theirs, viewed as detached from all its bearings, is immediately followed by our approval or disproval: we contemplate the action with no more exercise of the power of perceiving co-existing relations, than though we, for the first time, saw a body fall to the earth, and took cognizance only of the bare event. theory borne out by facts? It would certainly seem that, in children, the moral sensibilities, both in reference to their own conduct and that of others, are developed in proportion to their power of perceiving certain relations in which actions can be viewed; that is in proportion to the growth of reason. Consciousness, also, in after years, appears, we think, to testify that we can hardly frame to ourselves the conception of a moral action as a mere abstract antecedent to emotion: the action always presents itself to our contemplation, in connection with surrounding circumstances, and relations. Whether the notion right, and the notion wrong, be completely formed, or not, before emotion has been felt, either in the form of complacency or aversion, it appears to us, at all events, that reason (we do not say a process of reasoning) cannot be excluded from some share in producing the result.

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That there is some operation of the rational faculty in the formation of our moral notions, appears to be very generally admitted, and is the doctrine of several of the best recent writers. By some, reason is supposed to comprehend the relations in which moral agents are placed, and, when these relations are contemplated in connexion with certain actions, or dispositions of these agents, we feel moral approbation or disapprobation, by an ultimate law of the mind. Thus, we comprehend by reason, it would be said, the relation subsisting between a recipient of benefits and a voluntary disinterested benefactor; and, in contemplating ingratitude in the recipient, we cannot help feeling an emotion of dissatisfaction or disapprobation. And, generally, a conception of various relations of moral beings, in connexion with that of certain actions, is immediately followed by an emotion, after feeling which we pronounce the action good or bad. On this principle, reason and emotion seem to run, as it were, into one point to produce the result. This is the view of Dr. Wayland, whose work on 'Moral Science' we hope to take an early opportunity of noticing. The difference between this theory of the moral faculty and that of our author, is, that the former makes a perception of the relations of moral beings to precede the emotions, which perception the latter discards. Both theories, however, find the origin of the idea of moral obligation in our emotions. Dr. Payne advocates the doctrine that reason takes cognizance of relations; but he speaks of 'moral judgments,' as giving us the notions of right and wrong previously, in the order of nature, to the emotions arising. Wayland would object to this view, on the ground that when we unite a subject and predicate together in a judgment, we already have the notions which are signified by these two terms: for if we say 'this action is right,' we have already the notion right; as we have the notion green, when we say 'the grass is green.' Jouffroi, with the phraseology of another school, places the notion of moral distinctions in a light not very different from that of Wayland; namely, as arising from a certain blending of reason and moral sensibility, in reference to the idea of universal order.'

The following are Mr. Spalding's views with respect to conscience; whose operations he regards as requiring previous notions of right and wrong derived from a view of the conduct of others.

'It is admitted that it is utterly impossible to gain our notions of virtue and vice from the emotions of moral self-approbation and remorse; because neither virtue nor vice can exist where there is no notion of either; and as these emotions are always consequent on virtue and vice, they must also be consequent on our notions respecting the same. But these remarks will not apply to those moral emo

tions which arise from our consideration of the conduct of others. It is to these emotions that we must look for our primary notions of virtue.'

If we rightly understand these and other remarks of the author on the subject of conscience, he is of opinion that its emotions cannot give us ideas of good and evil, unless in so far as these emotions are dependent on our moral ideas already formed by contemplating the conduct of others. Our spontaneous moral approbation and disapprobation of the actions of our fellow-beings give us primary notions of right and wrong; but we never could, by any possibility, have these notions in connexion with any feeling of self-approbation or self-condemnation, unless we had first obtained them from the above source. Now on this principle, it would follow that a solitary human being, whatever intelligence he might possess, could never, by means of his own moral nature, acquire the notion of moral obligation. This is certainly opposed to the general opinion of ethical writers: who have considered one department of morals to be the relation of man to himself, from which they deduce rules of personal morality, such as would belong to one shut up in a desert island. Those who doubt that there is such a branch of natural ethics, should read the writings of Epictetus, or Marcus Aurelius. A human being supposed to be situated as described, would, moreover, sustain relations to his Maker, which would not be altered by the fact of his isolated existence; and which, it is not difficult to suppose, might be perceived without the contingent that there should be more than one human being. If the conception of certain actions as belonging to another, gives rise to approving or condemning emotions in us, what reason is there why the conception of actions as our own, should not be followed by self-approving or self-condemning emotions? Otherwise, if we imagine a perfect creature alone in the creation, and intelligently adoring his Creator, we must conclude that he could feel no such consciousness of doing right as should encourage him to continue in this his path of duty.

On the subject of natural ethics, we are glad to find that Mr. Spalding dissents from the opinion that the introduction of moral evil into the world has affected the intellectual powers and the moral constitution of man, to an extent which renders almost useless any attempt to discover a correct theory of morals from an examination of the human mind. We quote the following remarks :

'If it had not been for the depravation of man's nature, all subjects would have been considered worthless in comparison with ethics. The knowledge of the laws of matter would have been considered as nothing in comparison with that subject which teaches

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man the original dignity of his nature, its capacities for virtue, its relationship to God, and its capabilities of continued and eternal development in moral power. The most obvious effect, then, of the fall, is to turn men's minds away from the contemplation of the subject man does not like to retain God in his knowledge.' It is important, however, to distinguish between general and particular consequences. The real question is, not what have been its effects on man in general, but what effect it has had on the minds of those whose attention has been specially turned to the subject; those whose aversion to the subject has been counteracted, from whatever source that counteraction has arisen. That in general their conclu. sions have not been vitiated by depravity, or other causes, may be argued on many grounds, and especially from the great majority of the lessons which they inculcate. In fact, ethical writers with but very few exceptions, either in ancient or modern times, do not contend for any state of mind as virtuous, which is not, in one relation or other, represented as virtuous in the Bible. That they have not agreed on some higher parts of the system, must be admitted. The reason is that the subject is one of immense difficulty. It is not surprising that in the higher parts of the science there is a diversity of opinion. There is no such diversity of opinion, however, on what is most important to the interests of man. There is, indeed, a striking difference as to the source of our notions of virtue and vice; but as to the notions themselves, there is a striking conformity. Men in different ages, in different countries, with various temperaments, of opposite character, while differing with regard to the rank of particular virtues, all agree upon the broad distinction between moral good and evil. This striking agreement, therefore, on so important a subject, is a sufficient proof that God has written the broad line of duty in deepest characters in the human mind. If, indeed, man could cease to know the distinction between virtue and vice, he would be reduced to the condition of a brute, and his responsibility would be at an end.'

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The question, however, to which Mr. Spalding proposes more particularly to apply himself, is that which relates to the nature of virtue. Our readers will be aware that this is an inquiry which has for its object to discover that state of mind, in a moral agent, to which we apply the epithet virtuous. problem is, of course, quite distinct from the former, in which the question was, by what faculty or faculties of the mind do we acquire the notion of virtue? Our author admits that there is truth in the statements; virtue is that which tends to produce the greatest personal happiness; it is a mean between two extremes; it is that which causes moral approbation of ourselves or of others; it is useful to mankind: but he justly regards these facts as only partial and inadequate answers to the question, what is virtue? In advancing towards the exposition

of his own views on the subject, he properly distinguishes between outward actions and the state of mind with which they are performed. For it is evident that the same actions, merely as to what we may term the matter of them, are compatible with very different subjective conditions or states of mind in the agents.

'The mother who sacrifices her child to false gods, may feel the highest complacency when she reflects on her conduct, because it is considered by her as the decisive evidence of her consecration to those idols which she vainly adores. The inhabitant of Europe feels the greatest horror and indignation at such crime; but it is only because to him such an action is the index to a very different state of mind. He understands, in some measure, the relations in which he is placed; he knows that God abhors such sacrifices; he sees in the natural and instantaneous tenderness of a mother's bosom towards her hapless offspring, not only the expression of the Divine will, but also the overflowing goodness of the Divine mind itself, toward the same object; and therefore he cannot but regard such an action as a certain indication of the want of that love from which perhaps, in some instances, it actually proceeds. The Hottentot

does not therefore approve of what is wrong. Man, whether civilized or uncivilized, approves of devotion to God; the judgment respecting the manner in which it is to be displayed is different; the one conceives it to be evinced in a mode which is uniformly the effect of vice in the country to which the other belongs, and the latter cannot but hold it in detestation and abhorrence.'

The above just remarks illustrate the obvious importance of distinguishing between what the agent does, and the agent himself: an action, viewed objectively, may be conformable to the highest relations in which man is placed; while the agent's state of mind may be deficient, or wrong. On the other hand, the agent's intention may be right, while the action itself is not conformable to the moral order of the universe, that is, to the relations of the agent. Again: for an agent to be moral, he must be rational, and voluntary to be virtuous in the highest sense, both his intention, and his action itself, must be in harmony with the various relations in which he is placed. An agent may act from a right motive, while he may err in the manner in which he carries his intention out into act. On this distinction, which, in some of its bearings, involves considerations which have always been perplexing and painful to reflective minds, it will be allowed that, at all events, Mr. Spalding makes some luminous and discriminating remarks, founded on an instance recorded by Dr. Adam Smith, and on the case of infant immolation among pagans. In his chapter on ancient systems of morals, our author reviews the definitions of virtue given by Aristotle, Epicurus, and the school of Zeno. He regards their theories that virtue con

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