eminent talents in the service of the state, but for the purpose of rendering those who have united their influence in raising an individual to power, then may the patriot tremble for the perpetuity of our institutions. But when the applicant for office shall himself no longer plead the value of his public services, the purity of his principles, or his capacity to discharge the duties of the office which he seeks and boasts, only, the importance of his influence, in securing the election of the individual Chief Magistrate, then may we fear, that the body politic has become corrupt, and that the whole system is rotten to the heart.. "It is plain, that, the Government can be administered in purity no longer than those who administer it continue to be actuated by pure and disinterested motives., If a President of the United States, from the moment of his coming into office, use his power solely for the purpose of rewarding those who have placed him there, it is evident that the purity and freedom of elections would soon be destroyed. Politicians would not seek to exalt the most upright, the most capable man to office—but him who would reward them most liberally. "It is with such apprehensions as these, that we have witnessed the late appointments of President Jackson. It would seem, as if he had inquired for no other merit in the applicant for office, than the merit of having helped him to the Presidency. He has not sought for talents: men notoriously destitute of talents have been called to distinguished offices: He has not looked for principles; men, of all principles, and without principle, have found favour at his hands: He has not regarded previous public services; the grey hairs of the veteran have been thrust aside, to make room for tyros, whose names are new to the country: He has not regarded virtue or morality; he has removed officers of unsullied character, and given their places to those whose lives have been a scandal to the age. In short, devotion to his interests seems to have been the only quality sought for, or valued. Well may we tremble at the future prospects of the country, when such is the course of an American President." 168. But this duty of reform, imposed by "public sentiment," disdained the trammels which the Constitution had provided to prevent excess. Though the Senate remained in session, approving the nominations made by the President, until informed by him that he had no further nominations to make, they had scarcely adjourned, when several appointments were made without their advice and consent; some of which had been determined on before the Senate adjourned, though withheld from that body. This use of power to create vacancies, that the President might fill them, may not be against the letter of the Constitution, but it is most hostile to its spirit. Extend the practice a little farther than it was here carried, extend it as far as the President has since carried it, and all the officers of the Government become the creatures of the President, ́alone, for a year at least. And in this respect, one of the plainest provisions of the Constitution, that requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to appointments, has been violated. Of this, also, more hereafter. 169. The example of Mr. Jefferson has been unwarrantably cited to justify this party proscription. But his toleration is especially and admirably contrasted with this system of persecution. In a letter to Mr. Gerry, of 29th March, 1801, he says 66 Officers who have been guilty of gross abuses of office, such as marshals, packing juries, &c. I shall now remove, as my predecessor ought, in justice, to have done. The instances will be few and governed by strict rule, and not by party passion. The right of opinion shall suffer no invasion from me. Those, who have acted well, have nothing to fear, however they may have differed from me in opinion." 170. His letter to Governor Hall, of Delaware, shows the firmness with which he maintained this pure intention, and throws into deep shade the inconsistency between_General Jackson's professions and practice. Col. Allan McLane, father of the late Secretary of State, had been an active and zealous soldier of the Revolution; but he was, in 1802, quite as much distinguished for his activity and zeal as a federal partisan, and had rendered himself extremely obnoxious to the democratic party, in the State of Delaware. He held the office of collector of the customs, at Wilmington, from which his removal was solicited by a democratic republican meeting at Dover, and by the grand and general juries of the Circuit Court of the United States, held at that place. In reply to the letter of the Governor, covering remonstrances, Mr. Jefferson said; (July 6, 1802.) "When I first came into the administration, complaints were exhibited against Col. McLane, and an inquiry imme-` diately directed to be made into his conduct. Every opportunity which could be desired was given, on both sides, to the producing of testimony; and on a very full investigation, he was finally acquitted. He had a right to consider that acquittal as a bar to every thing anterior, and certainly, according to sound principles, it must be so considered. I am persuaded that the republicans who have concurred in these addresses would be as incapable of wishing me to do any thing which would bring a just censure on the administration, as should be from yielding to such a wish. We have no interests nor passions different from our fellow citizens. We have the same object, the success of representative government. The eyes of suffering humanity are fixed on us with anxiety as their only hope; and on such a theatre, and for such a cause we must suppress all smaller passions and local considerations. The leaders of federalism say, that, man cannot be trusted with self-government. We must not, by any departure from principle, dishearten the mass of our fellow citizens, who have confided to us this interesting cause. If, since the date of the acquittal, Col. McLane has done any new act inconsistent with his duty as an officer, or as an agent of the administration, this would be legitimate ground for new inquiry, into which I should consider myself as free to enter. No particular fact of this kind is charged in the addresses; but only that he is disagreeable to the citizens of the place. This would be among the proper considerations on the appointment of an officer, and ought before appointment to have weight; but after many years possession of an office, and an exact discharge of its duties, removal for this reason would not be approved by those beyond the pale of his unpopularity." 171. But the administration is not content by the abuse of the appointing power to dishearten the mass of their fellow citizens who had committed to them the people's cause of self-government, but they mock this people, whilst in the very act of corruption, and in the enjoyment of the ill-gotten gains of their sins, by a parade of principle which by contrast make their crimes most flagrant. Thus they do not Compound for sins they are inclined to But with an audacious hypocrisy of another sort, openly preach against the sins, which they as openly practice. Of this, the following extract from the President's Message of December, 1830, is a disgusting proof. "It was a leading object with the framers of the Constitu * * * tion to keep as separate as possible the action of the Legislative and Executive branches of the Government. To secure this object, nothing is more essential than to preserve the former from the temptations of private interest, and, therefore, so to direct the patronage of the latter, as not to permit such temptations to be offered." "The agent most likely to contravene this design of the Constitution is the Chief Magistrate. In order, particularly, that his appointment may, as far as possible, be placed beyond the reach of any improper influences; in order that he may approach the solemn respon.sibilities of the highest office in the gift of a free people, uncommitted to any other course, than the strict line of constitutional duty; and that the securities for this independence may be rendered as strong as the nature of power and the weakness of its possessor will admit, I cannot too earnestly invite your attention, to the propriety of promoting such an amendment to the Constitution, as will render him ineligible after one term of service." Nothing can more strongly illustrate the corruption of the Jackson administration than the preceding extract. The evils flowing from the abuse of power are clearly perceived, yet deliberately pursued, whilst a remedy for the disease, which they are labouring to spread is proposed, which cannot be prepared, if seriously proposed to be prepared, until the patient has grievously suffered under insidious treatment. There is a remedy, however, which Congress can supply, by stripping the President of the power of removal. This leads us to consider the nature of that power, for which we will take a separate chapter. CHAPTER VII. VIEW OF THE PRESIDENTIAL POWER TO APPOINT TO, AND REMOVE FROM, Office. 172. At the present day, in all governments not absolutely despotic, political power is distributed into three branches; Legislative, Judicial and Executive: Where they are blended, absolute despotism prevails. When the Legislative and Executive powers are united, there can be no liberty; because, the same persons may enact tyrannical laws and execute them in a tyrannical manner: Nor can there be liberty where the Legislative power is united with the Judicial; for the life and liberty of the citizen, is exposed to arbitrary control, and the law may be made for each and any occasion: Nor where the Judicial is blended with the Executive; for the Judge may modify his sentence, in its execution. 173. These principles were duly apprehended by American statesmen, when preparing the American Constitutions; but they were not easily reduced to practice, by making the departments wholly distinct in their functions. In most of the State Governments the principle of separation was emphatically declared, and in some, was laid down in unqualified terms; but in none, was the division fully preserved. The result of the experience of the country, upon a very extended scale, is, that, for the assurance of the degree of separation indispensable to freedom, the departments must be so blended, that each may check the assumption of power by the other. Power was, therefore, given to each department, by constitutional means and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others; whilst care was taken to prevent either from having an overruling influence on the others. 174. These counter checks were supposed to have been applied in the Constitution of the United States. To restrain the legislative power, it was divided into two branches, and the assent of both made necessary to a legislative act; the Judges were made independent in their salaries, and in the tenure of their offices; and the Executive was armed with the veto on the laws, and further strengthened by a qualified connection with the weaker branch of the legislature. No conception seems to have been formed of a case, in which |