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must, in the spirit of compromise, ever essential to our safety, yield a portion of the general advantages, or, in other words, submit to the evil of insufficient restriction, or we must ens force obedience to the law. If the Union be not worth preserving, the refractory State must fall from our brilliant galaxy, and be converted, like other fallen stars, into a loathsome mass; and its citizens, as the citizens of every other foreign State, be enemies in war, in peace, friends. But Cain was not so accursed, as will he be, who shall consummate this work. The brand of infamy burnt not so brightly upon the brow of him who mocked his Saviour, as it will upon the front of him who shall thus impair a Union, in which centres the world's hope of political happiness.

66. III. The right of the General Government to appropriate monies raised by taxation or otherwise, would seem to be as clear as the right to levy taxes for the common defence and general welfare. Both depend upon the same clause of the Constitution; the second part giving the right to appropriate the public money. If it be not given by it, it is not given at all; there being no other grant in the Contitution which gives it directly, or which bears upon the subject, even by implication, unless it be the prohibition to appropriate money for the support of armies for a longer term than two years, or the prohibition to draw inoney from the treasury, without an appropriation made by law. This part of the grant gives no distinct and original power. It is manifestly incidental to the objects of the first part, giving the power to lay taxes. If both parts be taken together, it seems impossible to give to the latter any other construction than that contended for; inasmuch as that enumerates the objects to which the public money may be appropriated.

67. If such be not the true construction of the words, to provide for the common defence and general welfare, they have either no import, or one much greater, in extent, than the first words of the clause. Either presumption is unwarranted; the first, because no part of the Constitution can be deemed useless or unmeaning; the second, because such construction makes the second part of the clause an original grant, embracing the same objects with the first, but with greater power; which is absurd. The order observed in the grants made by the Constitution, is to give the power in the fullest manner, and then to qualify it, when necessary. Again, if the clause be not an authority to appropriate the public money, it conveys indefinite and unlimited power; dispensing with the special powers to raise and support armies and a navy; to call forth

the militia, or even to lay and collect taxes. An unqualified power "to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare," if a distinct and separate grant, would extend to every object of public interest. The power to provide for the common defence would give to Congress the command of the whole force, with all the resources of the Union; but an unqualified right to provide for the general welfare would go much further; would break down the barriers between the States and the General Government, and consolidate the whole under the latter.

63. But, if the clause be construed to mean nothing more than a grant of power to appropriate the public money, every word has an important meaning and effect; and all grants of power by the Constitution have full operation. The great scheme is consistent in all its parts. We have a government instituted for national purposes, vested with adequate powers, commencing with the most important, that of revenue, and proceeding in order to all the others all formed with the utmost care and circumspection. How much more consistent is this inference with the great objects of the institution, and with the wisdom of those who framed and those who ratified it, than one which subverts every sound principle of construction, and throws all things into confusion!

69. The power being settled, as in the General Government, it becomes necessary to determine what is its extent. It is contended, on one side, that the National Government, being one of limited powers, has no right to expend money, except in cases authorized by specific grants, according to a strict construction of them. That the clause relied on does not, in either of its branches, give to Congress discretionary power of any kind; but is merely an auxiliary to effect the other grants. But the power to raise, and the power to appropriate monies, flowing from the clause, is alike general and unqualified. Each branch was, obviously, drawn with a view to the other; the import of each illustrates that of the other: and all the powers given by the Constitution without qualification, must be exercised without other check than the responsibility of the representative to his constituents.

70. So intimately connected with, and dependent upon, each other are the two branches of this clause, that the limitation of one would have been a limitation of the other. Had the power to raise money been restricted to special purposes, so would have been the power of appropriation. So, if the power of appropriation had been restricted to definite objects,

it would have been useless and improper to raise more funds than would be adequate to those purposes.

71. It cannot be doubted that this correspondence and dependence was the result of design. For it would have been impossible to have subjected the grant in either branch to restriction, without serious embarrassment to the Government. Thus, had the exercise of the grant depended on the States it would have been in the helpless, hopeless condition of the confederation: Had the assent of the Supreme Court, or other tribunal, been requisite, the operations of the Government might have been suspended, and the system disorganized.

72. Many weighty considerations support the construction which has been adopted: Under it, the words "to provide for the common defence and general welfare," have a definite, safe and useful meaning: The idea of their giving unlimited power, superceding every other, is abandoned: They will be considered as granting a right of appropriation indispensable to that of raising revenue, and necessary to every species of expenditure: By it, no new power will be taken from the States; the money to be appropriated being raised under a power already granted: By it, too, the motive for strained construction to other and specific grants, will be greatly diminished; an effect which cannot be too highly appreciated, when we consider that to whatever extent any specific power may be carried, the right of jurisdiction pursues it in all its incidents. The important agency of this grant in effecting every other, is a powerful argument in favour of our construction. All other grants are limited by the nature of the offices they respectively perform; cach conveying a special power only; this is co-extensive with the scheme of the Government itself.

73. If, then, the right to raise and appropriate the public money, be not restricted to the expenditures under the other specific grants, according to a strict construction of their powers, respectively, is there no limitation to it? The answer is affirmative: That, the limitation is in the purposes for which the nation was organized, and those purposes only. Congress cannot apply money for the exclusive benefit of a State or district: But, any measure which has an aspect of national benefit, however small in itself, as a pier in a river, the improvement of the navigation of a petty stream pertaining to some general system, is within their power. It may be that the office of discriminating between local and general im

provements is difficult; but it is the office of the legislature, and the difficulty is common to every exercise of judgment.

74. The practice of the Government has been conformable to the principles we have laid down. Appropriations have never been limited to cases falling within the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution, whether such powers be taken in their broad or narrow sense: but have been made to a vast variety of objects, showing a conviction of an almost indefinite power for this purpose. Thus, in aid of internal improvements, appropriations have been made for roads, rivers, and canals; for military pensions, to the annual amount of millions; for charity, as in the cases of the St. Domingo refugees, in 1794, and the citizens of Venezuela, who suffered from an earthquake in 1812, on motion of Mr. Macon; and for the relief of the inhabitants of the Canary Islands, on motion of the consistent John Randolph; and for the encouragement of domestic industry, as in boun ties upon the cod fishery. Every President of the United States, Mr. Madison not excepted, has concurred in this construction.

75. Although the power of Congress over appropriations for internal improvements may be ample for all purposes, many such improvements might be founded on the enumerated powers. And from such powers are deduced the right claimed for Congress actually to engage in making such improvements, as are incidental thereto. The exercise of such right has been long submitted to, in most cases without objection. Thus Congress may make a canal as incident to the power to regulate commerce: may build light-houses, piers, buoys and beacons for the purposes of navigation; custom-houses, revenue cutters, and ware-houses, as incident to the power to lay and collect taxes: may purchase land, erect forts, arsenals, dock yards, navy yards, and magazines, as incidents to the power to make war, and may, as incident to the same power, make a military road.

76. The expediency of using the power of the General Government in aid of internal improvements, depends on the nature of the case for which aid is requested. Whilst there are objects, such as the great chain of internal coast navigation, which all admit to be of national interest, there will be thousands of projects presented for consideration, which partake little of such character, and which can be carried through Congress, only, by a system of reciprocation, well known in our legislatures by the name of "log rolling," a most dangerous species of corruption, because the actors in it conceal its depravity from

themselves. Another circumstance is well worthy of consideration in exercising this power. The patronage of the Government has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished. The danger to the Constitution from this source grows daily more imminent. If the Government engage in the execution of projects of internal improvement, it will have, necessarily, many agents, and as many dependents as agents, under its control, subservient to the will of the Executive. The danger from this source has become greatly increased from the new construction given by the President to the power of appointinent to, and the removal from, office. This we shall have occasion to consider hereafter. By appropriating money to undertakings commenced by individuals, corporations, or States, this evil may be, in some measure, avoided. But in the exercise of the veto power, a new source of patronage is discovered, not less extensive nor less dangerous than the direct.appointment of individual agents. Thus, the President, setting his sense of expediency over and against that of both houses of Congress, may, and will approve such appropriations for internal improvement as enure to the direct benefit of his own friends, and of them only.

77. But a power so essential to the national greatness and happiness cannot remain unemployed. The objections we have stated to its use will be removed. The power of the President, to convert the public agents into personal dependents, will be restrained or we shall have, again, good men and true at the head of public affairs, who will not pervert their powers to these illegitimate ends. New modes will be devised of exerting this beneficial power, freed from the evils which are accidentally connected with it. To this course a full treasury, which our greatest ingenuity can scarce keep down, will be a powerful and perpetual stimulus.

78. Of the remaining objects we have designated as the prominent ones of Mr. Adams' administration, we may observe, here, that, his views of foreign policy, generally, are those of the Jackson administration, and that, the Indian relations will be duly considered hereafter.

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