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civil war most horrible, and most dangerous to the perpetuity of the Republic. Already have these questions arrayed one gallant, rich and intelligent State against her fellows. The material for war was gathered, the troops marshalled, but, happily, the clarion for the onset has not been yet sounded. The dangers, however, which may flow from this source are suspended, not annihilated-the snake is scotched, not killed. We tread upon the ashes of unextinguished fires.

52. These questions are so important that they should be universally understood, and would be very improperly onitted from a review of the political state of the country. The power to protect, by restrictive duties upon commerce, all the interests of the nation, and to promote its prosperity by internal improvements, belongs to the General Government, and will not be less properly exercised, when clearly defined and fully comprehended by the people.

53. The power to lay taxes for other purposes than revenue, was long undisputedly exercised; the doctrine and the prac tice being co-nascent with the first revenue law of the country. Until after the year 1817, the debt which weighed upon the nation required and justified a high tariff of duties. It might have, occasionally, been questioned, abstractedly, whether, if such duties were not so required, they might be laid, even to encourage the manufacture of ships, and the indispensable material of military defence. But as the revenue was indispensable, those most fastidious in limiting federal powers, were content, that the tariff should be so formed as to subserve such domestic interests as most needed protec tion; since it was only a question out of what pocket they should pay their money.

54. But when the debt was about to be extinguished, it became a question, whether the sum whencesoever drawn, might not be diminished; and whether any right existed to take money from the pockets of all, to protect the immediate interest of some, upon the allegation, true or false, that the whole body politic would be ultimately benefited. Upon such a question, considered in regard to expediency, there would, necessarily, be three parties; one receiving immediate benefit from the protective tariff; another, immediate injury; and a third, who would be beneficially or maleficially affected, only, as the restrictions proved, eventually, useful or inju rious to the country. Judgment could scarce exercise its functions properly in assigning the respective positions of the two first classes. Instinct alone might array them against

each other. But the third class held, as it ought, the balance of power, which it inclined, in the construction of the tariffs of 1824 and 1828, in favour of the protective system; and its favourable anticipations have been, abundantly, realized.

55. That system seemed the settled policy of the nation; and its friends saw, in its product, an accumulating mass of treasure, which, properly applied to the improvement of the country, would create rapid and unparalleled prosperity. From ten to fifteen millions a year were anticipated for this purpose: and fortifications, artificial ports, roads and canals, universities and general education,-stupendous efforts of every kind, far beyond Grecian or Roman fame, were beheld in the vista. Various schemes for rendering this treasure active were concocted. Among them was that proposed to the Senate in December, 1823, by Mr. Dickerson, a distinguished member of the present administration, which looked to a permanent, annual distribution of the surplus revenue among the States, in the ratio of direct taxation, and which has been repeatedly recommended by the present administration. How wisely we shall consider hereafter..

56. This disposition to extend and perpetuate the "American System," as it was now termed, awakened the fears and and stimulated the energies of its opponents. A stand was taken against the constitutionality of the power; and the battle which had been often before, and which must be often again, fought, was contested in 1824 and 1828, with unparalleled ardour, if not with unparalleled skill. The following is a succinct view of the position of the parties.

57. The right is derived from the first clause of the 8th section of the Constitution, which provides that "Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States." Upon the most satisfactory construction given to this clause, the power of taxation extends to objects of a national character, for the common defence and the general welfare; and is limited by such objects only.

58. But, it is contended, by the adversaries of the power, that, the General Government, being one of specific powers, can rightfully exercise such, only, as are expressly granted, and such as may be necessary and proper to carry them into effect; all others being reserved to the States, or to the People:-That the power to lay impost duties is given for the

sole purpose of revenue, and is, in its nature, essentially different from a power to impose restrictive duties:-That, the two are incompatible, as the prohibitory system tends to destroy the revenue from imposts;-That, the power being granted for revenue only, is abused when converted into a mean for rearing up the industry of one section of the country on the ruins of another :-That, it is a case of the violation of the Constitution by perversion; a case of the greatest danger, because the most insidious and difficult to resist. 59. A modification of this view has assumed the following form: Congress may impose such duties as they deem necessary for revenue, and so arrange them, as, incidentally, and to that extent, to protect the manufacturer; but may not convert this incidental, into the principal, power, and impose a duty substantially, and exclusively, for such protection: Congress may countervail regulations of a foreign power, hostile to our commerce; but may not, permanently, prohibit importation for securing the home market, exclusively, to the domestic manufacturers; destroying a power they were entrusted to regulate, and fostering an interest, with which they had no right to interfere. The admission, here, of a power to, tax for other purposes than revenue, seems an abandonment of the question.

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60. It has been admitted, also, that under the power to regulate commerce, Congress is not limited to the imposition of duties for the sole purpose of revenue; that it may impose retaliatory duties on foreign powers; but they must be for the regu lation of commerce, not for the protection of manufactures. But this argument rests upon the assumption, that the power to lay imposts was given for the purpose of revenue. is the very point in controversy, and must be proved, not assumed. The language of the Constitution is, " Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises." If the clause had rested here, as it did when first reported to the Convention, there could not have been a doubt upon the subject, for the power would have been unrestricted; and would have been applicable to all purposes in which nations have been accustomed to use it. Those purposes embrace, unquestionably, among a vast variety of others, the protection of domestic produce and industry. If then, it is asked, the power of taxation be general, how can it properly be restricted to one object? But is the power general, or is it limited? If the latter, what is the limitation?

61. Upon this subject there have been three opinions:

1. That, the power is unlimited; that the subsequent clause, "to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare, giving a substantive, independent power, cannot be restricted to purposes of revenue, merely; 2nd. That, the power is restrained by the subsequent clause, and is given, in order, to pay debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare; and 3d. That, the power is further restrained, to such specific objects as are contained in the other enumerated powers of the Constitution. It is unnecesf sary to dwell upon the first two opinions. Either gives all that the advocates of the American System require. Since, by no rational construction, can the power for laying taxes for the public welfare, be restricted to the purpose of revenue, as the public welfare may, unquestionably, be promoted by taxes other than for revenue.

62. But with regard to the third opinion, we may remark, that, if revenue be not the sole and exclusive mean of giving effect to the enumerated powers of the Constitution, the advocates of this doctrine must maintain, with those of the second opinion, that the power of taxation is not limited to purposes of revenue. Now, it is perfectly clear, that such enumerated powers have other means to effectuate them than revenue. Thus, the power "to regulate commerce" is rendered effective by taxes which countervail foreign monopolies, and adverse commercial restrictions; the power to coin money and regulate its value may be operative by a tax on foreign coin;-the power to provide for organizing, arming and discipling the militia, by a tax upon foreign arms, to encourage the domestic manufacture;-and the power to declare war, with its auxiliaries, may be effectuated by a tax prohibiting foreign, in order to secure a permanent domestic, supply of the munitions of war. If taxes may be laid in these, and like cases, then the enumerated powers require the power to lay taxes, to be more extensively construed than for purposes of revenue. It is no answer to this argument to say, that the power of taxation, though in its nature only a power to raise revenue, may be resorted to, as an implied power to give effect to the enumerated powers. That would be to aver, that an express, is not co-extensive with an implied, power to lay taxes, that when the power is expressed, it means a power to raise revenue, only; but when implied, it has no regard to this object. How then, is a case of mixed nature, where, in the law, revenue is blended with other objects, to be dealt with?

63. If, then, the power to lay taxes be restricted to cases within the enumerated powers, still it is not confined to revenue, but extends to all other objects within the scope of such powers. Where the power is expressly given, we are not at liberty to say it is implied. Being given, it may certainly be used to effectuate all the powers to which it is appropriate; not because it may be implied in the grant of such powers, but because it is expressly granted as a substantive power, and may be used, of course, as auxiliary to them. Thus, whatever construction be given to the power of laying taxes, we attain the conclusion, that such power is not confined to purposes of revenue, but that it is, at the discretion of Congress, to be exercised for promoting the common defence and general welfare.

64. The expediency of exercising this power, depends upon many and various considerations. Whilst all must admit the wisdom of its exercise in the protection of the general interests of the country, as commerce and agriculture, and such branches of manufacture as are indispensable in war; all must recognize the impolicy of its use, when it subserves the interests of the few, but oppresses the many. In the case of manufactures, there seems to exist a tolerable safe rule. If the manufacturer can now, or at a proximate time, supply the demand of the country in competent quantity and quality, and at a price as advantageous as the foreigner, there can be no substantial reason opposed to protecting him, by discriminating duties, against the foreign artist. In such case, domestic competition will soon remove the evil of monopoly. But if the manufacturer cannot comply with these requisites, it would be an act of oppression upon the community, to tax them for his benefit. He would have a monopoly as odious as unjust. In the application of the foregoing rule, some latitude may be allowable in determining what proximation to the qualities above stated as pre-requisite, may warrant the protection. This is a case solely for the wisdom of Congress; and if it were the only one, the subject would possess little difficulty.

65. But a small minority of the Union have, or think they have, interests in relation to it, irreconcilable with those of the majority; and taking the ground, that, the power claimed by the majority is not only inexpedient, but is unconstitutionally and unwarrantably assumed, they refuse, or may refuse, obedience to the general law. When such a case is seriously made and resolutely prosecuted, our citizens must calculate the value of the Union. If it be worth preserving, we

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