the progress of the country must depend, not upon the will of the people, as expressed by their representatives, but upon the executive judgment of expediency. And we have just seen, that, according to that judgment, it is expedient to appropriate money to improve the navigation of a creek, whose waters float only a few canoes, but it is inexpedient to improve the navigation of the Ohio, which bears on its broad bosom, hundreds of steamboats, and the produce of mighty States.

212. But, the expediency upon this subject is to be determined by a rule which at once cuts off a large proportion of the most populous regions of the country, from the benefit of the acknowledged right of appropriating the public treasure. This rule is furnished in the following passage of the executive message of December, 1834. "Although," he says, "I have expressed to Congress my apprehension that these expenditures have sometimes been extravagant, and disproportionate to the advantages to be derived from them, I have not felt it to be my duty to refuse my assent, to bills containing them, and have contented myself to follow, in this respect, in the footsteps of my predecessors. Sensible, however, from experience and observation, of the great abuses to which the unrestricted exercise of this authority, by Congress, was exposed, I have prescribed a limitation for the government of my own conduct, (and we say, in effect, for the government of Congress, too) by which expenditures of this character are confined to places below the ports of entry and delivery."

We forbear to comment upon the arrogance of the individual who thus reproves and condemns the long course of former legislatures, and prescribes a rule of action to the present and future ones, which he himself declares imperfect and unsatisfactory. But we call the attention of our fellow citizens to the fact, that, this avowed policy of the present administration, and doubtless of its proposed successor, is in effect, to exclude all the great waters of the West, and consequently all the great countries of the West, and also the great rivers of the East, from the benefits which they should derive from the Union. The surplus funds of the nation, unless distributed among the States, are not to be used in the improvement of the country, unless upon the seaboard. How, let us ask, can the great States of Pennsylvania and New York submit to a policy, which excludes the navigation of their magnificent Susquehannah from the aid of the national purse, when its improvement for steamboat navigation would,

increase the prosperity of every State upon the Atlantic slope?

213. We have admitted, that, the true rule for applying the national funds to internal improvement, is the public and general character of the improvement, the use and purpose to which it is designed and adapted, not its locality or extent. Thus, the Louisville canal, though located in Kentucky, and having a length of but two miles, is a national object; since it accommodates a trade, in which the whole Union is interested. So, too, the Delaware and Chesapeake canal, the vote upon which the President condemns, is eminently a national object, forming a link of coast navigation most advantageous in peace and inestimable in war: So, too, was the Maysville road, which facilitates the transportation of the mail to important sections of the Union, promotes internal commerce among several States, and may tend to accelerate the movements of armies and the distribution of the munitions of war: So, too, was the bill in aid of the Frederick and Rockville turnpike road,—such road being, in fact, a continuation of the great Cumberland road; for whose formation, more than twenty acts have passed Congress, one of which was, even now, approved by the President. Yet, that officer, in contempt of the judgment of Congress has, in his wisdom, decreed, that these objects are all of a local character.

214. But we should do the President great injustice, did we omit to consider, two other reasons assigned by him for the exercise of his veto. They were, first, that he felt himself unwarranted in sanctioning appropriations for internal improvements, until the national debt was paid; and second, that, it was his duty to repress the disposition which Congress displayed, to squander the public treasure. The reader will be qualified to, judge of the force of the first, when instructed, that, had the proposed important improvements, which the President negatived, been perfected, the final payment of the national debt would have been procrastinated ten days. The force and propriety of the second can be felt, only, by those, who believe, that the President is endowed with greater wisdom and more profound knowledge of the public interests, than the representatives of the people in general Congress . assembled.

215. The com. of the House of Representatives, Mr. Hemphill chairman, a Jacksonman, to whom so much of the President's message as relates to internal Improvements was referred, reported in direct and full reprobation of his principles, and

remarked in reference to the Washington and Frederick road and Louisville and Portland canal, that "there was little tle, if any doubt, as to the nationality or expediency of the object, and the principles of the policy alone governed the members. They presented the fairest test of the opinions entertained by the representatives of the people concerning the propriety of subscribing for stock in private companies. And they, therefore, deny that there was any change in the public mind on this interesting subject. To render the exercise of the veto still more extraordinary, whilst a narrow circumvallation was drawn around the system of internal improve ment, to be straightened, or enlarged at the President's pleasure, he did, in 1831 and 1832, and subsequently, sanction appropriations similar to those he had rejected; mocking himself and deriding the country by his inconsistency. He approved "an act making appropriations for carrying on certain roads and works of Internal Improvements, and providing for surveys," which, in despite of the veto, had passed both houses by large majorities receiving in the Senate 26 votes to 10. And in July, 1832, he approved and signed, "An act making appropriations for certain internal improvements for the year 1832, including appropriations for almost every sort of public work coming under that definition, from the sum of $270,000 for the Delaware Breakwater to the pittance of $250 for removing obstructions on the Berwick branch of the Piscataqua river. The whole sum appropriated by that bill exceeds a million of dollars, and yet, with the most reckless inconsistency, he rejected a bill at the same instant, embracing the features, and the features only, of one that he approved.

An attempt, indeed, has been made to get over this inconsistency, by claiming for the President the new and higher power to dispense with the laws, even, with those which he himself has sanctioned.

Thus the Globe of the 11th of July, 1832, in the very presence of the General, declares, in an authoritative manner, that," with respect to the Missouri, the Mississippi above the mouth of that river, and the Monongahela above Pittsburg, if, on inquiry, HE (the President) becomes satisfied, that these streams from their importance are within the principles laid down in the Maysville veto, HE will go on to extend the improvements to them; if HE is satisfied they are not, HE WILL NOT EXERCISE THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN HIM!!"

Ours is designed to be the government of the majority, but

it has been our fate, under the Jackson administration, to have failed in the most interesting objects of that design, to have the voice of the majority controlled and annulled by an individual, and the whole welfare of the country made dependent upon one man. Is this the design of the Constitution? If it be, then have our forefathers most vainly fought for freedom, and we have most grossly flattered their wisdom, which instead of framing a system of rational liberty and popular government, has formed an intricate, but nevertheless, an absolute despotism. To determine this problem we must ascertain what is the true character of the legislative power of the President.

216. By the Constitution, every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, must be presented to the President; if he approve, he signs it, if not, he returns it, with his objections to that House, in which it originated, which enters the objections, at large, upon its journal, and proceeds to reconsider it. If, then, it receive the sanction of two-thirds of both Houses, it becomes a law. If the President do not return the bill within ten days, (Sundays excepted) after it has been presented to him, it be comes a law, as if he had signed it; unless Congress, by adjournment, prevent its return, in which case, it is not a law.

217. The power of rejection thus given to the President, is called his veto, from the latin verb to forbid. It was adopted from the British Constitution, where the King possesses the absolute power to negative every legislative act; but, it was qualified by our Convention, in the form above stated. It is a most high power, and designed for extraordinary occasions. The exercise of it, in England, is wisely forborne; and its repose has probably been the preservation of its existence. There has been no instance of its use, since the year 1692; and for this, the absolute nature of the power is, perhaps, the best reason. It was given to defend the crown against the encroachment of the parliament, in England, and it was given, here, to the Executive, for the purpose of self-protection.

218. The veto power, however, was not bestowed by the Convention without objection. It was urged, that, though it might be used to protect other powers conferred upon the Executive, and to hinder the enactment of bad laws, it might be perverted to prevent the passage of good ones. It was replied, that, the superior weight and influence of the Legisla ture, and the hazard to the Executive, in a trial of strength

with it, afforded undoubted security, that the negative would generally be employed with great caution, and with timidity, rather than rashness; that, if a King of Great Britain, with his train of sovereign attributes, and with influence drawn from a thousand sources, would not venture to negative the resolution of parliament, how much more reserve might be expected from a President of the United States, clothed for four years only, with the executive authority of a government purely republican; that there would be greater danger of his forbearance, when the power was necessary, than of his using it too often, or too much.

219. The country has no longer any apprehension of this kind. For the removal of such chimerical fears, it is indebted to the present Chief Magistrate. It has seen him, upon questions, admitted to be purely of expediency, oppose his veto to the voice of the representatives of the people, again and again; and, boldly, under the pretence of an appeal to the nation, arraign those representatives before the tribunal of a party, and compel them, from a dread of party punishment,— from the fear of losing caste, and from exclusion from executive favours, to record the imperious rescript, General Jackson has proven, for a thousandth time, that a popular demagogue may safely dare encroachments on popular rights, which would cost a monarch his life, as well as his crown.

220. The Executive was armed with the veto for self-protection, and for arresting unconstitutional legislation. But. as vigorous as the exercise of the privilege should be, in such cases, so reserved should it be in all others; the use, in the first, tending to sustain the equipoise of powers established by the Constitution, and in the second, to destroy it. We cannot assume, with the shadow of propriety, that, the representatives of the people, unbiased by the Executive, will, voluntarily, abuse their powers by corrupt legislation. Of the number and expediency of the laws, they are the proper and the best judges. From the engrossing nature of all power, they may invade the province of other departments, and, in human fallibility, may mistake their constitutional authority. In either case, the veto will be properly interposed. But, such transgression must be rare; and is not more probable, than that, the Executive may, ignorantly, presume its existence, and, arrogantly, attempt to repress it. When employed, by the President, in the sincere desire to preserve the Constitution, he nobly, though, perhaps, erringly, fulfils his duty; but, when used, under that pretence, for other purposes, or apolied to cases of