1777. CONVENTION OF SARATOGA. 191 of surprise and panic were allowed to glide away, there remained in operation the two great obstacles which the wisest heads on both sides of the Atlantic had all along foreseen. In the first place there was not, and from the principles at strife in a free country there could not be, what Lord North, so early as 1770, lamented that he sought in vain; "if but," he cried, "there had been an "union of Englishmen in the cause of England!”* There never would cease to be in Parliament a considerable party forward in denouncing and obstructing the measures of injustice by which, as they conceived, their American fellow-subjects were oppressed. Secondly, the inherent difficulty of an American campaign was such, as no degree of skill in the General, or of spirit in the troops, could always overcome. After crossing three thousand miles of sea, they would still find in many districts their course arrested by deep swamps and tangled forests, rivers to pass of a breadth and force altogether unknown in England, -extremes both of heat and cold to which they had hitherto been strangers, and to profit by such difficulties, the first weeks of panic once past, a race of men sprung from their own loins, and inheriting their own determination. Surely then, as in after years the case of Lord Cornwallis still more clearly proved, to complete the desired reduction of these States, there must have been, first or last, other expeditions undertaken like to that of Saratoga, other expeditions exposed to the same obstacles, and tending to the same results. In all the actions which preceded the surrender of Saratoga, the American troops, though in part consisting of raw levies, showed themselves in a high degree intrepid, firm, and ready. To Gates, as to their General in-chief, the same amount of praise can scarcely be awarded. So far as the result depended at all on military prowess, its merit, as I conceive, belongs mainly to the subordinate commanders; a large share to Stark, and a larger still to Arnold. Nor is this anomaly, if anomaly it can be termed, the only one connected with the Generals that may be re * Cavendish Debates, vol. i. p. 486. marked in this campaign. Of all the events in the American War, the greatest and most important, in its results, at least, was Saratoga. Of all the men in the American War, the greatest and most important, beyond all doubt or parallel, was Washington. Yet these two appear wholly unconnected. Washington had nothing whatever to do with Saratoga. This I do not here note down in disparagement, or as lessening, even in the smallest degree, the hero's most just renown, but as evincing one of those apparent contradictions one of those deficiencies in stage effect-on which, more than on any other point, real life will be found to differ from fiction an epic from a history. So far, indeed, was Washington from taking any part in the events of this campaign, that they were at the time almost studiously concealed from him. As Commanderin-chief of all the American armies, he had, beyond all question, a right to expect constant reports from Gates. But Gates belonged to the faction of his ill-wishers and detractors, or, perhaps, might be regarded as the chief of them. Every one of his communications was addressed to Congress, not one to Washington. Full seventeen days after the signature of the Convention he wrote to Washington upon another subject, adding, as though it were a matter of small moment, "Congress having "been requested immediately to transmit copies of all my despatches to them, I am confident your Excellency "has long ago received all the good news from this quarter." Now, if even these despatches had been transmitted by Congress, which they were not, there would still have been great delay attending such transmission, from the relative positions of the Congress at York and of Washington in camp. 66 In another manner, also, was the unfriendly spirit of Gates displayed. Early in the campaign, though ill able to spare troops, Washington had consented to reinforce him by a corps under Colonel Morgan. After the battle of the Brandywine, and with the loss of Philadelphia in view, Washington addressed a letter to Gates, declaring his own urgent need of Morgan and his men. "sent him up," writes Washington, "when I thought you materially wanted him; if his services can be dis "I 1777. MADAME DE RIEDESEL. 193 pensed with now, you will direct his immediate return. "You will perceive I do not mention this by way of "command, but leave you to determine upon it according to your situation." This letter was received by Gates while the British were still encamped before him on Behmus's Heights. Quite properly, and according to the latitude allowed him, he retained the men in question until the surrender of Burgoyne. But after that surrender he seemed in no haste to part with them; he despatched them at last unwillingly and tardily, thus having kept then when they could no longer be of service to him, and when he knew that their assistance was anxiously required elsewhere. Under these circumstances Washington evinced his usual magnanimity. He felt, he could not but feel, the slights put upon him at this period both by his superiors and by his subordinate-by the Congress and by General Gates. But he allowed no word of unworthy complaint to fall from him. To a personal friend he observed, “It "is to be hoped that all will yet end well. If the cause "is advanced, indifferent is it to me where or in what quarter it happens."† To Gates himself we find him write in language of manly and frank congratulation on the great event of Saratoga. He adds only these words: “At the same time I cannot but regret that a matter of "such magnitude, and so interesting to our general operations, should have reached me by report only, or through the channel of letters not bearing that authen"ticity which the importance of it required, and which it "would have received by a line under your signature "stating the simple fact."+ 66 The generous treatment of the British troops surrendering at Saratoga did not long endure; it ceased on their reaching New England. On this point Madame de Riedesel appears an unexceptionable witness. speaks in the warmest terms of the care and kindness which, on the day of the capitulation, she and her young She *Writings, vol. v. p. 74. See also the note at p. 125. of that volume. Letter to Patrick Henry, November 13. 1777. children received from General Schuyler. At that time she did not know him, but could not forbear exclaiming, "You are so very good to us, that I am sure, sir, you "must be yourself a husband and a father!" Similar hospitality continued to be shown her through all the State of New York. In that country, as she observes in another passage of her narrative, it would be deemed almost a crime to shut the door upon any stranger. But on entering Massachusetts the scene was wholly changed. There rancour against the Royalists seemed to have absorbed every other feeling. It is stated by Madame de Riedesel, that whenever she passed in the streets of Boston the female part of the population cast upon her angry looks, and, in sign of their disdain, spat on the ground before her. A far worse token of their rancour is recorded by the same authority. There was a Captain Fenton, of their town, who had gone to England, but had left behind his wife and daughter, the last a beautiful girl of fifteen. At the news that Captain Fenton continued faithful to the King, some women of the lower orders seized on these unhappy ladies, tore off their clothes, and tarred and feathered them, in which condition they were dragged as a show around the town!* With this state of popular feeling in the capital of Massachusetts, the British troops under the Convention found themselves exposed to various forms of insult or ill-usage. One American commander, Colonel Henley, was, at the instance of Burgoyne, brought to trial for his outrageous conduct, having, on two separate occasions, stabbed English soldiers with his own hand, and made himself, said Burgoyne, in his own person, party, judge, and executioner! In summing up the case, the Judge Advocate, Mr. Tudor, declared, "I am an American, warmly attached to my country, and known to be a "friend to the prisoner. Yet," he adds, "it must be ac"knowledged that Colonel Henley acted in this affair "with a degree of warmth which his best friends cannot * Dienst-Reise, pp. 192-202. ed. 1801. See also p. 238. Translated into English, this little volume has been published in America, and is highly praised by Mr. Jared Sparks. (Note to Washington's Writings, vol. vi. p. 94.) 66 ૮ 1777. THE CONVENTION TROOPS. 195 "defend." Nevertheless Colonel Henley was acquitted by the Court-Martial of his countrymen, and was even for a few days reinstated in his command. The English officers complained to their General, that six or seven of them were crowded together in one small room, without regard to their respective ranks, whereas the Seventh Article of the Convention said expressly, "The officers are to be quartered according to their rank." Burgoyne, finding that he could obtain no redress upon the spot, forwarded this complaint to Gates, with a remonstrance, in which he observed, that by such treatment the public faith was broken. This expression was eagerly seized upon by Congress. They declared that much more was meant by it than met the ear. Here," they said, “is a "deep and crafty scheme-a previous notice put in by "the British General to justify his future conduct; for, beyond all doubt, he will think himself absolved from "his obligation whenever released from his captivity, "and go with all his troops to reinforce the army of "Howe." Burgoyne, when informed of the strange construction put, or pretended to be put, upon his words, hastened to explain their true intent and meaning, and pledged himself that his officers would join with him in signing any instrument that might be thought necessary for confirming the Convention. Nevertheless, the Congress would not recede from their first objection. Another cavil was founded on the hesitation of Burgoyne to send them, as they required, though the terms of the Convention did not, a descriptive list of the non-commissioned officers and privates belonging to his army. Perhaps, however, a still superior ingenuity was shown in their assertion that the Convention had been already violated by the captive troops. The Convention stipulated that the arms should be given up: now it appeared that certain cartouch-boxes and other accoutrements had been retained. The Resolutions which the Congress passed on this occasion assume, in the first place, that cartouchboxes must, of course, be held included in the technical word ARMS; and, secondly, that their retention by the British troops was a breach of faith so flagrant as to justify the American Government in not fulfilling its share in the treaty. The result of all these devices was |