his land by a bad title, enfeoffed a friend of his land to the use of himself, that when the rightful owner of the land brought an action against him, he might plead non tenet, that he was not the owner of the land; and by this plea defeat the demandant's action.

But fear was a more universal motive. This conveyance to a friend, to protect lands from forfeiture for Treason, must have operated far more frequently; perhaps the practice became almost universal during the long period of dispute between the two Houses of York and Lancaster. No man could be certain of the success of that party which he joined. He, therefore, enfeoffed a friend to uses, that in case of his being unfortunate, his family might be protected from forfeiture.

There was a third motive to induce men to adopt this practice of feoffment to uses. By the common law, a freehold interest in land could not be devised by will; but if a man had, in his life-time, limited his land to uses, these uses could be devised by his will.

From these motives, almost all the lands in England had become vested in Feoffees to Uses; and as by this practice, the Lords had lost the Feudal profits they were entitled to from their lands, either those Feudal payments were forgotten, or were released, or fell into disuse.

Henry VIII. by the statute which he procured to be passed towards the close of his reign, preserved these Feudal payments to the Crown, by re-uniting the seisin, or legal estate, to the use. On the restoration of Charles II., the King consented to abolish Feudal services, and to receive a compensation in lieu of them. But in the statute, which provides this compensation to the Crown, no compensation is provided for any subject of whom lands were held by knight's-service. The inference is, that at the Restoration, there were no lands in England held by knight's-service of a subject. Yet most certainly, in all Feudal Governments, tenure of the alienor, and attendant services, were consequent on every alienation, except there was either an express or implied provision to the con

trary. This rule was so fully established by the common law of England, that before the statute of Quia Emptores, if B. had held lands of A. by knight's-service, and had aliened those lands to C. and his heirs, without expressing the services by which C. should hold, the law said that C. should hold the lands of B. by knight's-service, and the same payments as B. paid to A.

Perhaps the great proportion of the lands in England, which had been conveyed in mortmain, contributed to the abolition of Feudal services; for when land was conveyed in mortmain, the Feudal services were suspended; or, to speak more accurately, no Feudal services were receivable. And when that land, by confiscation of Convent property, in the time of Henry VIII., had passed into the hands of a layman, from whom the Feudal service might have been demanded, either the Feudal services were forgotten, or the demand neglected to be made. But from whatever circumstance it happened, I believe, that at the restoration of Charles II. there were no lands in England held of a subject by

knight's-service. In France, down to the time of the Revolution, Feudal services of different natures, and to different extents, seem to have prevailed through the whole country.

CHAP. VII.

Reform of Parliament.

I WILL now consider that most important question, the Reform of Parliament. A decision on this question must, ere long, take place. The general attention of the nation has been called to it. The people must be subdued, or the subject must be fully examined, and some Reform consented to. Let me first state the sense in which I use the words Reform and Revolution.

I consider Reform to be a correction of abuses without destroying the existing Constitution. I consider Revolution to be a correction of abuses, accompanied with the destruction of the existing Con stitution.

In England, in 1688, the nation removed the existing dynasty, and established a new one. As the dynasty is considered as the most prominent part of the Constitu