Cambridge University Press, 27.11.2003 - 483 Seiten
Is there a public good? A prevalent view in political science is that democracy is unavoidably chaotic, arbitrary, meaningless, and impossible. Such scepticism began with Condorcet in the eighteenth century, and continued most notably with Arrow and Riker in the twentieth century. In this powerful book, Gerry Mackie confronts and subdues these long-standing doubts about democratic governance. Problems of cycling, agenda control, strategic voting, and dimensional manipulation are not sufficiently harmful, frequent, or irremediable, he argues, to be of normative concern. Mackie also examines every serious empirical illustration of cycling and instability, including Rikers famous argument that the US Civil War was due to arbitrary dimensional manipulation. Almost every empirical claim is erroneous, and none is normatively troubling, Mackie says. This spirited defence of democratic institutions should prove both provocative and influential.
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A long dark shadow over democratic politics
The doctrine of democratic irrationalism
Is democratic voting inaccurate?
The Arrow general possibility theorem
Is democracy meaningless? Arrows condition of unrestricted domain
Is democracy meaningless? Arrows condition of the independence of irrelevant alternatives
Strategic voting and agenda control
Unmanipulating the manipulation the election of Lincoln
Antebellum politics concluded
More of Rikers cycles debunked
Other cycles debunked
Plebiscitarianism against democracy
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17th Amendment 62nd Congress agenda control agenda-setter aggregation approval voting arbitrary argument Arrow theorem assumption Bell bill Borda count Breckinridge candidates claim coalition committee condition Condorcet criterion Condorcet method Condorcet paradox Condorcet winner Congress Congressional constitutional convention cycle cyclical decision democracy dimension direct election disequilibrium distribution of preferences Douglas electoral college empirical equilibrium example faction favored Group House IIA(A individual preferences inference irrelevant alternatives issue space legislators legislature liberal Lincoln voters Magnuson meaningless normative northern Democrats number of voters outcome pairwise comparison Pareto party percent plurality rule plurality runoff political science population possible Powell amendment Powellites preference orders preference rankings problem proposal rational choice theory rejection Republicans result Roll-Call says school aid Senate sincere slavery social choice theory Social Democrats South southern status quo strategic voting three alternatives tion violate vote strategically voting rules Weingast Whigs Wilmot Proviso
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