an interdiction on this reproachful trade; but an immediate advantage is alfo obtained, for a tax or duty may be impofed on fuch importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each perfon; and, this fir, operates as a partial prohibition; it was all that could be obtained, I am forry it was no more; but from this I think there is reafon to hope, that yet a few years, and it will be prohibited altogether; and in the mean time, the new states which are to be formed, will be under the control of congrefs in this particular, and flaves will never be introduced amongst them. The gentleman fays, that it is unfortunate in another point of view; it means to prohibit the introduction of white people from Europe, as this tax may deter them from coming amongft us; a little impartiality and attention will discover the care that the convention took in selecting their language. The words are, the migration or IMPORTATION of fuch perfons, &c. fhall not be prohibited by congrefs prior to the year 1808, but a tax or duty may be impofed on fuch IMPORTATION; it is obfervable here, that the term migration is dropped, when a tax or duty is mentioned; fo that congrefs have power to impofe the tax, only on thofe imported.

TUESDAY DECEMBER, 4, 1787, A. M.

Mr. WILSON.

I fhall take this opportunity, of giving an answer to the objections already urged against the conftitution; I fhall then point out fome of thofe qualities, that entitle it to the attention and approbation of this convention; and after ha ving done this, I fhall take a fit opportunity of ftating the confequences, which I apprehend will refult from rejecting it, and those which will probably refult from its adoption. I have given the utmost attention to the debates and the objections, that from time to time have been made by the three gentlemen who fpeak in oppofition. I have reduced them to fome order, perhaps not better than that in which they were introduced. I will ftate them; they will be in the recollection of the houfe, and I will endeavour to give an answer to them-in that anfwer, I will interweave fome remarks, that may tend to illucidate the fubject.

A good deal has already been faid, concerning a bill of rights; I have stated, according to the best of my recollec

tion, all that paffed in convention, relating to that bulinefs. Since that time, I have fpoken with a gentleman, who has not only his memory, but full notes, that he had taken in that body; and he affures me, that upon this fubject, no direct motion was ever made at all; aud certainly, before we heard this fo violently fupported out of doors, fome pains ought to have been taken to have tried its fate within; but the truth is, a bill of rights would, as I have mentioned already, have been not only unneceffary but improper. In fome governments it may come within the gentleman's idea, when he fays it can do no harin; but even in these governments, you find bills of rights do not uniformly obtain; and do thofe ftates complain who have them not? Is it a maxim in forming governments, that not only all the powers which are given, but also that all those which are referved, fhould be enumerated? I apprehend, that the powers given and referv. ed, form the whole rights of the people, as men and as citizens. I confider, that there are very few, who understand the whole of these rights. All the political writers, from Grotius and Puffendorf, down to Vattel, have treated on this fubject; but in no one of thofe books, nor in the aggregate of them all, can you find a complete enumeration of rights, appertaining to the people as men and as citizens.

There are two kinds of government; that where general power is intended to be given to the legislature, and that, where the powers are particularly enumerated. In the laft cafe, the implied refult is, that nothing more is intended to be given, than what is fo enumerated, unless it refults from the nature of the government itfelf. On the other hand, when general legislative powers are given, then the 1ople part with their authority, and on the gentleman's principle of government, retain nothing. But in a government like the propofed one, there can be no neceffity for a bill of rights. For, on my principle, the people never part with their pow

er.

Enumerate all the rights of men!-I am fure, fir, that no gentleman in the late convention would have attempted fuch a thing. I believe the honorable speakers in oppofition on this floor, were members of the affembly which appointed delegates to that convention; if it had been thought proper to have fent them into that body, how luminous would the dark conclave have been! So the gentleman has been pleafed to denominate that body. Ariftocrats as they were, they pretended not to define the rights of those who fent

them there.. We are afked repeatedly, what harm could the addition of a bill of rights do? If it can do no good, I think that a fufficient reafon, to refuse having any thing to do with it. But to whom are we to report this bill of rights, if we fhould adopt it? Have we authority from thofe who fent us here to make one?

It is true we may propose, as well as any other private perfons; but how fhall we know the fentiments of the citizens of this ftate and of the other states? are we certain that any one of them will agree with our definitions and enume merations?

In the fecond place, we are told, that there is no check upon the government but the people; it is fortunate, fir, if their fuperintending authority is allowed as a check: But I apprehend that in the very conftruction of this government, there are numerous checks. Befides thofe exprefly enumerated, the two branches of the legiflature are mutual checks upon each other. But this fubject will be more properly difcuffed, when we come to confider the form of govern ment itself; and then I mean to fhew the reafon, why the right of habeas corpus was fecured by a particular declaration in its favor..

In the third place we are told, that there is no fecurity for the rights of confcience. I afk the honorable gentleman, what part of this fyftem puts it in the power of congrefs to attack thofe rights? when there is no power to attack, it is idle to prepare the means of defence..

After having mentioned, in a curfory manner, the foregoing objections, we now arrive at the leading ones againft the propofed fyftem.

The very manner of introducing this conftitution, by the recognition of the authority of the people, is faid to change the principle of the prefent confederation, and to introduce a confolidating and abforbing government!

In this confederated republic, the fovereignty of the ftates, it is faid, is not preferved. We are told, that there cannot be two fovereign powers, and that a fubordinate fo vereignty is no fovereignty.

It will be worth while, Mr. Prefident, to confider this objection at large. When I had the honor of fpeaking formerly on this fubject, I ftated, in as concife a manner as poffible, the leading ideas that occurred to me, to afcertain where the fupreme and fovereign power refides. It has not

been, nor, I prefume, will it be denied, that fomewhere there is, and of neceffity muft be, a fupreme, abfolute and uncontrolable authority. This, I believe, may juftly be termed the fovereign power; for from that gentleman's (Mr. Findley) account of the matter, it cannot be fovereign, unless it is fupreme; for, fays he, a fubordinate fovereignty is no fovereignty at all. I had the honor of obferving, that if the question was alked, where the fupreme power refided, different answers would be given by different writers. I mentioned, that Blackstone will tell you, that in Britain, it is lodged in the British parliament; and I believe there is no writer on this fubject on the other fide of the Atlantic, but fuppofes it to be vefted in that body. I ftated further, that if the queftion was afked, fome politician, who had not confidered the fubject with fufficient accuracy, where the fupreme power refided in our governments, he would answer, that it was vefted in the ftate conftitutions. This opinion approaches near the truth, but does not reach it; for the truth is, that the fupreme, abfolute and uncontrolable authority, remains with the people. I mentioned alfo, that the practical recognition of this truth was referved for the honor of this country. I recollect no conftitution founded on this principle: But we have witneffed the improvement, and enjoy the happiness, of feeing it carried into practice. The great and penetrating mind of Locke, feems to be the only one that pointed towards even the theory of this great truth.

When I made the obfervation, that fome politicians would fay the fupreme power was lodged in our ftate conftitutions, I did not fufpect that the honorable gentleman from Westmoreland (Mr. Findley) was included in that defcription ; but I find myself difappointed for I imagined his oppofition would arife from another confideration. His pofition is, that the fupreme power refides in the ftates, as governments; and mine is, that it refides in the PEOPLE, as the fountain of government; that the people have not-that the people mean not-and that the people ought not, to part with it to any government whatsoever. In their hands it remains fecure. They can delegate it in fuch proportions, to fuch bodies, on fuch terms, and under fuch limitations, as they think proper. I agree with the members in oppofition, that there cannot be two fovereign powers on the fame fubject.

I confider the people of the United States, as forming one

great community; and I confider the people of the different ftates, as forming communities again on a leffer fcale. From this great divifion of the people into diftinct communities, it will be found neceffary, that different proportions, of legiflative powers fhould be given to the governments, according to the nature, number, and magnitude of their objects,

Unless the people are confidered in thefe two views, we fhall never be able to understand the principle on which this fyftem was conftructed. I view the states as made for the People, as well as by them, and not the People as inade for the states; the People, therefore, have a right, whilst enjoying the undeniable powers of fociety, to form either a general government, or ftate governments, in what manner they please; or to accommodate them to one another; and by this means preserve them all; this, I fay, is the inherent and unalienable right of the people; and as an illuftration of it, I beg to read a few words from the declaration of independence, made by the reprefentatives of the United States, and recognized by the whole union.

"We hold thefe truths to be felf-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among thefe are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to fecure these rights, governments are inftituted among men, deriving their just powers from the confent af the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes deftructive of thefe ends, it is the RIGHT of the People, to alter or to abolith it, and inftitute new governments, laying its foundation on fuch principles, and organizing its powers in fuch forms, as to them fhall feem moft likely to effect their fafety and happiness."

This is the broad bafis on which our independence was placed on the fame certain and folid foundation this system is erected.

State fovereignty, as it is called, is far from being able to support its weight. Nothing lefs than the authority of the people, could either fupport it, or give it efficacy. I cannot pafs over this fubject, without noticing the different conduct purfued by the late fœderal convention, and that obferved by the convention which framed the conftitution of Pennsylvania; on that occafion you find an attempt made to deprive the people of this right, fo lately and fo expressly afferted in the declaration of independence. We are told in