foundation for the charge, but it muft proceed from ignorance, or fomething worfe.

I go on to another objection, which has been taken to this, fyftem," that the expence of the general government and of the ftate governments, will be too great, and that the citizens will not be able to fupport them." If the state governments are to continue as cumbersome and expensive as they have hitherto been, I confefs it would be diftreffing to add to their expences, and yet it might be neceffary; but I think I can draw a different conclufion on this fubject, from more conjectures than one. The additional revenue to be raifed by a general government, will be more than sufficient for the additional expence; and a great part of that revenue may be fo contrived, as not to be taken from the citizens of this country; for I am not of opinion, that the confumer always pays the impoft that is laid on imported articles; it is paid fometimes by the importer, and fometimes by the foreign inerchant who fends them to us. Had a duty of this nature been laid at the time of the peace, the greatest part of it would have been the contribution of foreigners. Befides, whatever is paid by the citizens, is a voluntary payment.

I think, fir, it would be very eafy and laudable, to lessen the expences of the state governments. I have been told, (and perhaps it is not very far from the truth) that there are two thousand members of affembly in the feveral states; the bufinefs of revenue is done in confequence of requifitions from congrefs, and whether it is furnished or not, it commonly becomes a fubject of difcuffion. Now when this business is executed by the legislature of the United States, I leave it to those who are acquainted with the expence of long and frequent feffions of affembly, to determine the great faving that will take place. Let me appeal to the citizens of Pennfylvania, how much time is taken up in this ftate every year, if not every feffion, in providing for the payment of an ama zing interest due on her funded debt. There will be many fources of revenue, and many opportunities for economy, when the business of finance fhall be administered under one government; the funds will be more productive, and the taxes, in all probability, fs burthenfome than they are now.

I proceed to another objection, that is taken against the power given to congrefs, of raifing and keeping up standing armies. I confefs I have been furprized that this objection was ever made, but I am more fo that it is fill repeated and

infifted upon. I have taken fome pains to inform myself how the other governments of the world ftand with regard to this power; and the refult of my enquiry is, that there is not one which has not the power of raifing and keeping up standing armies. A government without the power of defence ! it is a folecifm!

I well recollect the principle infifted upon by the patriotic body in Great-Britain; it is, that in time of peace, a ftanding army ought not to be kept up, without the confent of parliament. Their only apprehenfion appears to be, that it might be dangerous, was the army kept up without the concurrence of the reprefentatives of the people. Sir, we are not in the millenium. Wars may happen-and when they do happen, who is to have the power of collecting and appointing the force then become immediately and indifpenfably neceffary?

It is not declared in this conftitution, that the congrefs.fball raife and fupport armies. No, fir, if they are not driven to it by neceflity, why thould we fuppofe they would do it by choice, any more than the reprefentatives of the fame citizens, in the state legiflatures? for we muft not lofe fight of the great principle upon which this work is founded. The authority here given to the general government, flows from the fame fource, as that placed in the legislatures of the feveral ftates.

It may be frequently neceffary to keep up standing armies in time of peace. The prefent congrefs have experienced the neceflity; and feven hundred troops are just as much a ftanding army as feventy thoufand. The principle which fuftains them is precifely the fame. They may go further, and raife an army, without communicating to the public the purpofe for which it is raifed. On a particular occafion, they did this: When the commotions exifted in Maffachusetts, they gave orders for enlifting an additional body of two thousand men. I believe it is not generally known, on what a perilous tenure we held our freedom and independence at that period. The flames of internal infurrection were ready to burk out in every quarter; they were formed by the correfpondents of fome ftate officers (to whom an allufion was made on a former day) and from one end to the other of the continent, we walked on afhes, concealing fire beneath our feet; and ought congrefs to be deprived of power to prepare for the defence and fafety of our country? Ought they to be

reftrained from arming, until they divulge the motive which induced them to arm? I believe the power of railing and keeping up an army, in time of peace, is effential to every government. No government can fecure its citizens againft dangers, internal and external, without poffeffing it, and fometimes carrying it into execution. I confefs it is a pow er, in the exercise of which all wife and moderate governments will be as prudent and forbearing as poffible. When we confider the situation of the United States, we must be fatisfied, that it will be neceffary to keep up fome troops for the protection of the western frontiers, and to fecure our intereft in the internal navigation of that country. It will be not only neceffary, but it will be economical on the great fcale. Our enemies finding us invulnerable, will not attack us, and we fhall thus prevent the occafion for larger standing armies. I am now led to confider another charge that is brought against this fyftem.

It is faid, that congrefs fhould not poffefs the power of calling out the militia, to execute the laws of the union, fupprefs infurrections and repel invafions, nor the prefident have the command of them, when called out for fuch purpofes.

I believe any gentleman who poffeffes military experience will inform you, that men without an uniformity of arms, accoutrements and difcipline, are no more than a mob in a camp; that in the field, inftead of affifting, they interfere with one another. If a foldier drops his mufquet, and his companion, unfurnished with one, takes it up, it is of no fervice, because his cartridges do not fit it. By means of this fyftem, a uniformity of arms and difcipline will prevail throughout the United States.

I really expected that for this part of the fyftem at least, the framers of it would have received plaudits, instead of cenfures, as they here difcover a strong anxiety to have this body put upon an effective footing, and thereby, in a great meafure, to fupercede the neceffity of raifing, or keeping up, ftanding armies.

The militia formed, under this fyftem, and trained by the feveral ftates, will be fuch a bulwark of internal ftrength, as to prevent the attacks of foreign enemies. I have been told, that about the year 1744, an attack was intended by France upon Maffachusetts Bay, but was given up on reading the militia law of that province.

If a fingle flate could deter an enemy from fuch attempts, what influence will the propofed arrangement have upon the different powers of Europe!....

In every point of view, this regulation is calculated to produce the beft effects. How powerful and refpectable muft the body of militia appear, under general and uniform, regulations! how disjointed, weak and inefficient are they at prefent! I appeal to military experience for the truth of my obfervations.

The next cbjection, fir, is a serious one indeed; it was made by the honorable gentleman from Fayette (Mr Smilie) "The convention knew this was not a free government, otherwife they would not have asked the powers of the purfe and fword." I would beg to ask the gentleman, what free government he knows that has not the powers of both? there was indeed a government under which we unfortunately were for a few years paft, that had them not, but it does not now exift. A government without thofe powers, is one of the improvements with which oppofition wish to aftonifh mankind.

Have not the freeft government thofe powers? and are they not in the fulleft exercife of them? this is a thing fo clear, that really it is impoffible to find facts or reafon more clear, in order to illuftrate it. Can we create a government without the power to act; how can it act without the affiftance of men? and how are men to be procured without being paid for their fervices? is not the one power the confequence of the other?

We are told, and it is the laft and heaviest charge, "that this government is an ariftocracy, and was intended fo to be by the late convention ;" and we are told (the truth of which is not difputed) that an aristocratical government is incompatible with freedom. I hope, before this charge is believed, fome stronger reasons will be given in fupport of it, than any that have yet been produced.

The late convention were affembled to devife fome plan for the fecurity, fafety and happinefs of the people of the United States; if they have devised a plan, that robs them of their power, and conftitutes an ariftocracy, they are the parricides of their country, and ought to be punished as fuch. What part of this fyftem is it that warrants the charge?

What is an aristocratic government? I had the honor of giving a definition of it at the beginning of our debates; it

is, fir, the government of a few over the many, elected by themfelves, or poffeffing a fhare in the government by inheritance, or in confequence of territorial rights, or fome quality independent of the choice of the people; this is an aristocracy, and this conftitution is faid to be an aristocratical form of government, and it is also said that it was intended fo to be by the members of the late convention who framed it. What peculiar rights have been referved to any clafs of men, on any occafion? does even the first magiftrate of the United States draw to himself a single privilege, or fecurity that does not extend to every perfon throughout the United States? Is there a fingle diftinction attached to him in this fyftem, more than there is to the lowest officer in the republic? Is there an office from which any one fet of men whatsoever are excluded? Is there one of any kind in this fyftem but is as open to the poor as to the rich? to the inhabitant of the country, as well as to the inhabitant of the city? and are the places of honor and emoluments confined to a few? and are thefe few the members of the late convention? Have they made any particular provifions in favor of themselves, their relations, or their pofterity? If they have committed their country to the demon of ariftocracy, have they not committed themselves alfo, with every thing they held near and dear to them?

Far, far other is the genius of this fyftem. I have had already the honor of mentioning its general nature; but I will repeat it, fir. In its principle, it is purely democratical; but its parts are calculated in fuch manner, as to obtain those advantages alfo, which are peculiar to the other forms of government in other countries. By appointing a fingle magiftrate, we fecure ftrength, vigour, energy and refponfibility in the executive department. By appointing a fenate, the members of which are elected for fix years, yet by a rotation already taken notice of, they are changing every fecond year, we fecure the benefit of experience, while, on the other hand, we avoid the inconveniences that arife from a long and detached eftablishment. This body is periodically renovated from the people, like a tree, which, at the proper feafon, receives its nourishment from its parent earth.

In the other branch of the legislature, the house of reprefentatives, fhall we not have the advantages, of benevolence .and attachment to the people, whofe immediate reprefentaives they are?

R