For my own part, I have been often loft in aftonishment at the vafinefs of the profpect before us. To open the navigation of a fingle river was lately thought in Europe, an enterprize adequate to imperial glory. But could the commercial fcenes of the Scheldt be compared with those, that, under a good government, will be exhibited on the Hudson, the Delaware, the Potowmac, and the numerous other rivers, that water and are intended to enrich the dominions of the United States ?

The difficulty of the business was equal to its magnitude. No finall fhare of wisdom and address is requifite to combine and reconcile the jarring interests, that prevail, or seem to prevail, in a fingle community. The United States contain already thirteen governments mutually independent. Thofe governments prefent to the Atlantic a front of fifteen hundred miles in extent. Their foil, their climates, their productions, their dimenfions, their numbers are different.-In many instances a difference and even an opposition fubfifts among their interests: And a difference and even an opposition is imagined to fubfift in many more. An apparent intereft produces the fame attachment as a real one; and is often purfued with no less perfeverance and vigour. When all these circumstances are feen and attentively confidered, will any member of this honorable body be furprized, that fuch a diverfity of things produced a proportioned diverfity of fentiment? Will he be furprized that such a diverfity of senti ment rendered a spirit of mutual forbearance and conciliation indifpenfably neceffary to the fuccefs of the great work? and will he be furprized that mutual conceffions and facrifices were the confequences of mutual forbearance and conciliation? When the springs of oppofition were fo numerous and ftrong, and poured forth their waters in courfes fo varying, need we be furprized that the ftream formed by their conjunction, was impelled in a direction fomewhat different from that, which each of them would have taken separately?

I have reafon to think that a difficulty arose in the minds of fome members of convention from another confiderationtheir ideas of the temper and difpofition of the people, for whom the conftitution is propofed. The citizens of the United States, however different in fome other refpects, are well known to agree in one strongly marked feature of their character-a warm and keen fenfe of freedom and indepenThis fenfe has been heightened by the glorious re

fult of their late struggle against all the efforts of one of the
moft powerful nations of Europe. It was apprehended, I
believe, by fome, that a people fo highly fpirited, would ill
brook the restraints of an efficient government. I confess
that this confideration did not influence my conduct. I knew
my constituents to be high-fpirited, but I knew them also
to poffefs found fenfe. I knew that, in the event, they
would be best pleased with that system of government, which
would be beft promote their freedom and happiness. I have
often revolved this fubject in my mind. I have fuppofed one
of my constituents to afk me, why I fuch a vote on a
gave
particular question? I have always thought it would be a fatisfac-
tory answer to fay, because I judged, upon the best consider-
ation I could give, that fuch a vote was right. I have
thought that it would be but a very poor compliment to my
constituents to fay-that, in my opinion, fuch a vote would
have been proper, but that I fuppofed a contrary one would
be more agreeable to thofe who fent me to the convention.
I could not, even in idea, expofe myself to fuch a retort, as,
upon the laft anfwer, might have been juftly made to me.
Pray, fir, what reasons have you for fuppofing that a right
vote would difplease your conftituents? is this the proper
return for the high confidence they have placed in you?
If they have given cause for such a furmife, it was by choof-
ing a reprefentative, who could entertain fuch an opinion
of them. I was under no apprehenfion that the good peo-
ple of this state would behold, with difpleasure, the bright-
nefs of the rays of delegated power, when it only proved
the fuperior fplendor of the luminary, of which thofe rays
were only the reflexion.

A very important difficulty arofe from comparing the extent of the country to be governed, with the kind of government which it would be proper to establish in it. It has been an opinion, countenanced by high authority, "that "the natural property of small ftates is to be governed as a republic; of middling ones, to be fubject to a monarch ; "and of large empires, to be fwayed by a defpotic prince; "and that the confequence is, that, in order to preferve the "principles of the established government, the state must be fupported in the extent it has acquired; and that the spi"rit of the state will alter in proportion as it extends or con"tracts its limits." (Montefquieu, b. 8. c. 20.) This opinion feems to be supported, rather than contradicted, by the histo

ry of the governments in the old world. Here then the difficulty appeared in full view. On one hand, the United States contain an immenfe extent of territory, and, according to the foregoing opinion, a defpotic government is best adapted to that extent. On the other hand, it was well known, that, however the citizens of the United States might, with pleasure, fubmit to the legitimate restraints of a republican. conftitution, they would reject, with indignation, the fetters of defpotifm. What then was to be done? The idea of a confederate republic prefented itself. This kind of conftitution has been thought to have "all the internal advanta-/ ges of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical government."Mont. b.9.c.1.2. Paley 199.202.. Its defcription is, "a convention, by which feveral ftates "agree to become members of a larger one, which they. "intend to establish. It is a kind of affemblage of facieties, "that constitute a new one, capable of encreasing by means of "farther affociation." Montefquieu, b. 9. c. 1. The expanding quality of fuch a government is peculiarly fitted for the United States, the greatest part of whofe territory is yet uncultivated.

But while this form of government enabled us to furmount the difficulty laft mentioned, it conducted us to another, of which I am now to take notice. It left us almost without precedent or guide; and confequently, without the benefit of that inftruction, which, in many cafes, may be derived from the conftitution, and history and experience of other nations. Several affociations have frequently been called by the name. of confederate states, which have not, in propriety of language, deferved it. The Swifs Cantons are connected only. by alliances. The United Netherlands are indeed an affemblage of focieties; but this affemblage conftitutes no new one; and, therefore, it does not correfpond with the full definition of a confederate republic. The Germanic body is composed of fuch difproportioned and difcordant materials, and its structure is fo intricate and complex, that little ufeful knowledge can be drawn from it. Ancient hiftory discloses, and barely discloses to our view, fome confederate republics-the Achaean league--the Lycian confederacy, and the Amphyctyonic council. But the facts recorded concerning their conftitutions are fo few and general, and their hiftories are fo unmarked and defective, that no fatisfactory information can be collected from them concerning many particular circumftances, from an ac

curate difcernment and comparison, of which alone legitimate and practical inferences can be made from one conftitution to another. Befides, the fituation and dimenfions of those confederacies, and the ftate of fociety, manners and habits in them, were fo different from those of the United States, that the most correct defcriptions could have fupplied but a very fmall fund of applicable remark. Thus, in forming. this fyftem, we were deprived of many advantages, which the history and experience of other ages and other countries would, in other cafes, have afforded us.

I

Permit me to add, in this place, that the fcience even of government itself, feems yet to be almost in its ftate of infancy. Governments, in general, have been the refult of force, of fraud, and of accident. After a period of fix thousand years has elapfed fince the creation, the United States exhibit to the world, the first inftance, as far as we can learn, of a nation, unattacked by external force, unconvulfed by domeftic infurrections, affembling voluntarily, deliberating fully, and deciding calmly, concerning that fyftem of government, under which they would with that they and their pofterity fhould live. The ancients, fo enlightened on other fubjects, were very uninformed with regard to this. They feem fcarcely to have had any idea of any other kinds of governments, than the three fimple forms, defigned by the epithets, monarchical, ariftocratical and democratical. know that much and pleafing ingenuity has been exerted, in modern times, in drawing entertaining parallels between fome of the ancient conftitutions and fome of the mixed governments that have fince existed in Europe. But I much fufpect that, on ftrict examination, the inftances of refemblance will be found to be few and weak; to be fuggefted by the improvements, which, in fubfequent ages, have been made in government, and not to be drawn immediately from the ancient conftitutions themselves, as they were intended and understood by thofe who framed them. To illuftrate this, a fimilar obfervation may be made on another subject. Admiring critics have fancied that they have discovered in their favourite Homer the feeds of all the improvements in philofophy and in the fciences, made fince his time. What induces me to be of this opinion is, that Tacitus-the profound politician Tacitus-who lived towards the latter end of thofe ages, which are now denominated ancient, who undoubtedly had ftudied the conftitutions of all the states

and kingdoms known before and in his time; and who certainly was qualified in an uncommon degree, for understanding the full force and operation of each of them, confiders, after all he had known and read, a mixed government, composed of the three fimple forms, as a thing rather to be wifhed than expected: And he thinks, that if fuch a government could even be instituted, its duration could not be long. One thing is very certain, that the doctrine of representation in government was altogether unknown to the ancients. Now the knowledge and practice of this doctrine is, in my opinion, effential to every fyftem, that can poffefs the qualities of freedom, wifdom and energy.

The

It is worthy of remark, and the remark may, perhaps, excite fome surprise, that representation of the people is not, even at this day, the fole principle of any government in Europe. Great-Britain boafts, and the may well boast, of the improvement fhe has made in politics, by the admiffion of representation: For the improvement is important as far as it goes: but it by no means goes far enough. Is the executive power of Great-Britain founded on reprefentation? This is not pretended. Before the revolution many of the kings claimed to reign by divine right, and others by hereditary right; and even at the revolution, nothing farther was affected or attempted, than the recognition of certain parts of an original contract*, fuppofed, at fome former remote period, to have been made between the king and the people. A contract seems to exclude, rather than to imply, delegated power. judges of Great-Britain are appointed by the crown. The judicial authority, therefore, does not depend upon reprefentation, even in its most remote degree. Does representation prevail in the legislative department of the British government? even here it does not predominate; though it may serve as a check. The legislature confifts of three branches, the king, the lords, and the commons. Of these only the latter are fupported by the conftitution to represent the authority of the people. This fhort analysis clearly fhews to what a narrow corner of the British conftitution the principle of representation is confined. I believe it does not extend farther, if fo far in any other government in Europe. For the American ftates, were referved the glory and the happinefs of diffusing this vital principle throughout the conftituent parts of government. Representation is the chain of communication between the people, and thofe, to whom they