profess not to deny the reality of extension in matter or body; but they affirm it to be only a modification or phenomenon of force. In the theory of "simple elements," extension as physically continuous, is not a real predicate of matter at all; it is not a property that is really inherent in matter or body; but yet body occupies extension, the simple elements of which a body is constituted being as a collection of mathematical points separated by small intervening spaces. These simple elements, composing body, are kept in their relation to each other by duly balanced attraction and repulsion; they are in mathematical extension, therefore, but they have no extension.

In order to conceive "body" as thus composed, then it becomes necessary to explain away physical quantity or real extension, as being any real property of matter, and consequently to deny that we can perceive such property through our senses. In the theory, physical continuous extension as a real predicate or property of matter, does not exist, and it cannot exist. It is not claimed that experimental science furnishes demonstrative proof of this assertion; for experimental science is limited to matter as an object of the senses, and the senses apprehend matter only as having extension. The defenders of the system claim to demonstrate theoretically and a priori that it is impossible, in the very nature of things, for matter to be really extended. The mass of mankind would answer, "we see evidently through our senses that matter or body is really extended," and "facts are stubborn things." Indeed, the 'fact" is here the refutation of theory.

But what argument demonstrates apodictically the impossibility of real and physical extension in matter? If such thing can be thus demonstrated at all, it can be done by one argument, for when a conclusion is true, as following from the very nature of things, or a priori, the medium of demonstration, or the reason, is really one;' then, what is that one necessary and conclusive reason? There is no such proof to be given, and consequently, “the system of simple

"In speculativis medium demonstrationis, quod perfecte demonstrat conclusionem, est unum tantum; sed media probabilia sunt multa. Et similiter in operativis quando id quod est ad finem, adæquat, ut ita dixerim, finem, non requiritur quod sit nisi unum tantum." St. Thomas's Summa, p. 1, qu. 47, a. 2 ad 3. In the speculative order (or order of necessary truth), the medium of demonstration, which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly, is only one. Similarly in practical things also when the means to an end, so to say it, equals that end, there is required only one means to that end.

In other words, there is one, and only one demonstration for any conclusion following by necessary sequence from principles that are absolutely true; and this holds, whether that conclusion be one which follows immediately from the principles, or one which is deduced by valid and necessary sequence, as more remote; for, "the medium of demonstration" may consist of several arguments, one following through another as its medium.

elements" cannot rightfully claim to offer what is, at the best, more than a plausible or probable hypothesis for explaining the composition of bodies.

There are those, however, who contend that a conclusive reason why matter cannot, in the nature of things, be really extended, is because in such hypothesis, matter should be infinitely divisible, whereas this infinite divisibility of matter is something impossible, or it would lead to absurd consequences. It does not necessarily follow, however, that "matter being really extended, matter is therefore infinitely divisible," since the existence of any body of matter could, by the choice of God, be made actually dependent on a particular degree of real quantity or extension. But even admitting that we may predicate of matter as really extended, infinite divisibility by way of infinite series, what absurdity thence follows? All real extension as extension is thus divisible, as the textbooks of mathematics explain; but what essential difference is there between the difficulty of comprehending clearly infinite divisibility as a true predicate of the mathematical line, surface, or solid really described by movement of your hand, and that of comprehending infinite divisibility as a true predicate of this or that quantity of matter really extended? No absurd consequence follows from predicating infinite divisibility in either case; for such division can never become actually infinite, either in the one or in the other. All mere logical difficulty concerning this point is obviated for hin who understands the axiom which is here to be applied: "from the indefinite infinite to the actual infinite there is no illation;" infinite divisibility can never reach infinite actual division, since these two things mutually exclude each other. It follows, then, that the infinite can never be an actual predicate or property of any quantity, whether physical and real quantity or only mathematical; and thus the objection becomes a mere equivocation on the words "infinite divisibility," which neither assert nor imply that body, as really extended, must, on that account, be actually susceptible of the predicate, infinite, under any possible respect. Besides, if we assume that matter or body is not really extended, would we, or even could we then perceive it through our senses, just as we now actually perceive it? Or, supposing matter or body to be really extended, would we, or even could we then perceive it through our senses in a different manner from that in which we actually perceive it? The idealist evades argumentation which concerns external objects; he denies objective realities and the facts furnished by them; he devises, instead, ideas, which he can more easily explain than he can objects not produced by him; for those ideas are figments of his own, which he trims, amends, or adds to, as required for maintaining their factitious consistency.

How shall we account for the different species of matter or bodies, in the hypothesis that all matter is composed of simple elements? Much must be explained away before the theory can be fitted to meet that difficulty. Moreover, in that theory, either these simple elements act at a distance, or they do not; if the former be required by the theory, it is absurd, as against the evident axiom, “nihil agit in distans," nothing can act at a distance. If the latter be admitted by the theory, then the simple elements are united by a real medium, which is really and physically extended; but this, however, contradicts the fundamental principle of the theory, namely, that real extension in matter is impossible.

If we suppose a body to be before us, composed, in accordance with the theory, only of simple elements, it is difficult even to conceive how such a collection of entities, in themselves really simple, can, by being placed in the vicinity of each other, become an object of the senses. In such a supposition all the terms now employed to express the realities in matter or body as perceived evidently through the senses and affirmed by obvious first judgments of reason, must actually express an erroneous meaning. But truly the faculties of mankind are not deceived in their direct and natural act of perceiving their own objects, when those objects are intuitively evident to them.

Some theories proposed in recent times for explaining the nature of matter and the composition of bodies obscure and weaken, if indeed they do not tend totally to destroy, all the main arguments for demonstrating the immateriality and spirituality of the human soul. Such systems have helped not a little to confirm many minds in their adhesion to Locke's opinion, who asserts that material substance is unknowable, and that reason is unable to demonstrate the impossibility for matter or body to think intellectually. This happens all the more easily since some of those hypotheses, as before said, either deny or else explain away many predicates or properties of matter which were always commonly given to it by mankind, and which at the same time were heretofore regarded as certainly distinguishing material substance or body from spiritual substance. If any matter is in itself simple and subsistent, and such the simple elements are held to be, then how shall we demonstrate the falsity of Mr. Locke's words, that "for aught we know, matter is susceptible of intellectual power and thought?" What becomes of the argument for the soul's spirituality, founded on its properties and action as a simple substance? The evident qualities of all matter, and the distinctive characteristics of reason, or of intellectual action, are known by way of first facts and judgments. To deny or doubt them, with the idealist or skeptic, is to give up truths that serve as first principles for explaining the nature of the

human soul and discriminating between spirit and matter. If these plain facts and truths are really deceptive and uncertain, or merely present phenomena which are erroneously conceived by the minds. of men, on what then shall we base a genuine distinction between matter and spirit?

The difficulties raised up by these new hypotheses, in regard to the distinction between matter and spirit, lead to the further and consequent difficulty of accounting by them for the union of the material and the intellectual principles in man. Tyndall, whose doctrine seems to combine the "force" theory with "positivism," passes by this difficulty in the Nineteenth Century, for November, 1878, as unanswerable; yet he claims that science will finally explain how matter can think intellectually. Others of his school simply remit the whole subject to questions belonging to the category of the unknowable that dark pit to which Herbert Spencer also consigns all inquiry concerning the existence of a personal God.

It will not be amiss, perhaps, if this point in Spencer's doctrine be here stated, in a passing way: Spencer contends that God, as He is usually conceived by men, is only an anthropomorphous God: that is, God, as generally conceived by the human mind, is only a man fully perfected in his species.1 One aim of Spencer's

1 It has been proposed among the learned, more than once, rigorously to banish all figurative terms from the language of philosophy or metaphysics. Dugald Stewart once favored such an undertaking; but subsequently, on more mature thought, he concluded, with D'Alembert, that “the total proscription of figurative terms from all abstract discussions," was merely a visionary project, and not reducible to practice. (Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, 1877, vol iv. part iii. chap. ter ii section iii.) A style that is ornamented with tropes and figures, is gross and unprecise in philosophy; yet all terms used by us in reasoning from visible or sensible things, to the supersensible or abstract order of objects, have more or less of an analogical meaning, since it is only by means of analogies and relations that our minds make the transition from one order to the other.

Those "scientists" of the present day who defend materialism, desire, with Maudsley (see preface to Body and Mind) to interdict all "words which have meanings of a metaphysical kind attached to them." Both of these schemes to change language, but founded on contrary reasons, however, are mere conceits, proposing what is wholly impractical; for, first, those designs are based on what is false; and, secondly, the natural good sense of mankind cannot be led into extravagances of that sort, since such changes would upset both their thought and language.

The general tendency of sound thinkers who treat abstract and metaphysical questions is towards a certain unity of terminology in philosophy, on the basis of the ancient classic languages, especially the Latin, from which most of the borrowed terms used by metaphysicians are derived. This tendency is opposed by the school of erratic essayists who are for "no dogma," and who prefer to contemplate stern truth as mitigated with some vagueness and obscurity of the words in which it is enunciated. As an example: for how many fallacies do they not prepare the way, by confounding the signification of "mind" with that of "soul," of "believe" with that of "know?" Ballerini gives a similar instance of effort made to render words obscure or equivocal, the words chosen for the purpose being "actus humanus" and "actus hominis." Words with their

philosophy, of all genuine philosophy, his followers assert, is, as called by Mr. Fiske, in his Cosmic Philosophy, the deanthropomorphization of God; to which it may be added, in a corresponding jumble of Latin and Greek, that it is, moreover, the detheozation of God, by burying Him in outer darkness, among the condemned objects making up the comprehensive and convenient category of the unknowable. Spencer's reasoning on this subject is subtle, and it is specious enough actually to have deceived some, among whom may be included Fiske; but, in reality, it amounts to what is merely an equivocation. It is true that we reach our idea of God, with His attributes, by analogical reasoning; but it is not true to say that therefore a personal God, as conceived by us, is of man's nature, or that He has, as conceived by our minds, any attribute common to Him and man; for He transcends all genus and species, as actually conceived by us. Analogical unity does not suppose real identity of attribute, for then it would be, not analogy at all, but similarity, between the objects compared. God and creature agree by analogy which is transcendental; the note in which they agree has not a univocal meaning or name in God and creature. Analogy may be intrinsic to one of its terms, without being at all intrinsic to the other; as, for example, a healthy man, a healthy climate. Thus, analogy may relate objects to one another which are of a totally different order. Creatures are truly related to God, and by means of that relation we can reason from creatures to God; but in doing so we wholly abstract from, or drop from our conclusion to God, all predicate of what is real in creatures, since we use no term as univocal in its application to creature and to God. Had Spencer considered the nature of analogy more thoroughly, as, for example, that between ideas and their physical objects, the agreement of words and things, etc., he would, perhaps, have interpreted differently the language of his supposed watch, as speaking intelligently of things belonging to a higher species than itself, in terms of watch-wheels, springs, lever, crystal, hands, etc. It must be admitted, then, that the theories of material substance

meanings thus craftily perplexed, are like counterfeit coins. An opposite class of minds have argued that metaphysical and theological questions should be discussed only in the Latin language, in imitation of Brahminical exclusiveness for Sanscrit.

There is a degree of truth implied, at least, in all these extreme notions; but yet, they are extreme opinions, and the simple truth is midway between them. The Church adopts the Latin language in her ritual, her doctrinal decisions, and in all her official utterances; for the words of a fixed language do not change their meaning or become equivocal. For wise reasons, aspirants to the priesthood are taught philosophy and theology mainly in the Latin language. But the Church does not prescribe a language in which her children must think, speak, and write their philosophical or theological speculations. That is left to be determined by custom, education, actual expediency, and the like.