of these most obvious and reasonable rules, and form judgments without apparent examination or reflection. This too often characterizes physicians, lawyers, and judges, men who of all others are most responsible to their fellow-citizens for the judgments they may form. Wit comes in flashes, poetic fancy loves the freshness and far seen, unreal resemblances of marvellousness. But judgment is cool, collected, sober, steady, hard working, and german to common sense.

The above view of our subject shows, that sound judgment depends upon the predominating activity of comparison, a well balanced intellectual and affective organization in general, and a due degree ef information and reflection upon the subject on which a judgment is to be formed.

CHAPTER XXI.

TASTE.

THE view already taken of Judgment prepares us for a correct conception of Taste, or in other words, it enables us to give a phrenological analysis of what is implied, when we say of a person that he has a good or bad taste. Taste, then, implies the exercise of judgment as to the effect, which any object of nature or art has upon our perceptive and affective faculties, as it regards the sublime and beautiful. In order that a person should possess good taste on any subject, the following particulars should concur.

1. Large comparison. This is necessary in order that we may compare the impressions made by one object with those made by another upon our feelings; and that we may see how all the particular parts and ingredients contribute towards giving an effect to the whole. Comparison being thus active, taste will be improved, as this faculty is increased in power and activity by experience.

2. The other intellectual faculties should also be active, that all the parts, qualities, and relations of objects, may be distinctly perceived and attended to. If form be deficient, we shall overlook any defect in the form of the object. If color be inactive, we shall not discover either the beauties or defects of coloring. If locality be wanting, we shall disregard the relations of position. If causality be deficient, we shall not readily discover the relation between certain forms, colors, and positions, their indications of significance, fitness, utility, or study the mental emotions which usually accompany them.

3. It is not only necessary to have an intellect which can perceive, but there must be a sense of the beautiful and the grand, which spring principally from ideality and reverence. Ideality seems to be excited by the perception of the harmonious combination of every part in relation to the whole. As for instance, in looking at a human countenance, we are delighted by that harmonious combination, which arises from the union of appropriate color, form, and expression, with the character, age, and condition of the person.

4. But good taste also requires that harmonious exercise of the affective faculties in general, which is consistent with the predominance of the higher sentiments; and which will also keep each feeling so far active, as to

relish only a due degree of stimulus addressed to it. With large amativeness, combativeness, destructiveness, or self-esteem, an individual will be in danger of offending against good taste, by the manifestations of these feelings too strongly and frequently. So, with a deficiency in any feelings, a person will be in danger of committing offences against taste, by a disregard of them in others, and in an over manifestation of the opposite feelings. Thus, where benevolence is deficient, the person will be blind to the beauty, which that emotion sheds over one's countenance or writings; and also he will mar the beauty of whatever he does or says, by manifestations of a preponderating selfishness. I might here add that susceptibility to the pleasures of taste, and delicacy of taste in the fine arts, will depend much upon a fine nervous and sanguine temperament.

and

Were we to go into an examination of the adaptation of the objects of nature and art to give exercise and pleasure to taste, it would require a volume. This, too, would be exceedingly difficult, as that which gratifies taste is often the result of the harmonious and complicated combination of parts in reference to a whole; and that whole is constructed for some purpose of utility, adds to it the beauty of design, fitness, wisdom, and goodness. In studying the sublimity and beauty of nature, we but study the power, wisdom, and goodness of God. In studying the handy work of his creatures, we again see but imitations of him who created, at the same time that we look at the works of the creature.

Before we leave this interesting subject, we will observe that tastes will differ in different individuals, to the same extent that their judgments will be found to differ; and

differences in organization and external influences lay the foundation for these differences. There is, indeed, no universal unvarying standard of taste. Nor does its gratification depend upon any particular uniform conformation or quality of matter. It is rather dependent upon the degree, in which any formation or quality of matter gives agreeable exercise to the mental faculties.

Those whose organizations are the most unequal will be most likely to offend against taste. But the greatest offences will be committed where comparison is very deficient. If ideality be small, and the organization in other respects be equal, there may be no great offences against taste, but every thing, which comes from the hands of such persons, will be characterized by plainness and destitution of ornament.

CHAPTER XXII.

SYMPATHY.

MEN, in their social state, are connected by the ties of neighbourhood, business, politics, friendship, kindred, and religious faith. In our intercourse with the world, we meet with some who are agreeable, but more who are disagreeable, and even repulsive. To the few we cling, and to the many we manifest a kindness and friendship, which springs more from interest, pacific feelings, or charity, than from fellow-feeling and congeniality.

There are attractions and repulsions in physics; among vegetables, some are said to perish in the neighbourhood of certain others; among the lower animals the same law prevails.

The question occurs, Why is this so? Let us recur to fundamental principles. It will be recollected that some of the faculties are social, and that others are anti-social. The intellectual faculties are eminently social. We like to engage in the same studies and pursuits of others around us. Hence science flourishes best in society.

The higher sentiments are social, and persons, in whom these predominate, are pleased with the society of each other, so far as these faculties are concerned. Approbativeness is selfish, yet not anti-social. A person, in whom self-esteem is large, associates agreeably with another, in whom the same feeling is small, and reverence is large; but meets the manifestations of large self-esteem in another with coldness and distance. Amativeness and adhesiveness are social, and sympathize readily. The other propensities in general are anti-social and selfish.

Taste implies the exercise of judgment upon the sublime and beautiful in nature and art, but Sympathy belongs only to our feelings towards others, not merely in reference to beauty or sublimity, but to the degree in which the faculties of the one find agreeable exercise in the society of the other. And this is so exclusively a matter of feeling, that the judgment can hardly be said to take a part in it. This discloses to us the principle on which sympathy is founded. In order that two persons shall feel sympathy or congeniality in each other's society, they shall be so constituted, that each excites in the other pleasurably the social feelings, without opposing