resentatives of the persons whom she imagined to be present.

At the termination of her paroxysms she sunk into a profound sleep. The frown disappeared from her brow, the respirations again became long and deep. Then in the course of fifteen or twenty minutes, she would open her eyes, and recollection was at once restored. She then invariably reverted to the time and place, at which the attack commenced, and in no instance manifested any knowledge of the time which transpired during the interval. In one paroxysm she remembered events that took place in another, though there was no remembrance of them in the interval. The physician who reported her case, says, almost every day furnished examples of this phenomenon. In the case quoted by Mr. G. Combe, in his System of Phrenology, p. 487, the facts are strikingly similar to those of the above, so far as it regards the phenomenon of memory. In this case, he says, the circumstances which occurred during the paroxysms were completely forgotten by her, when the paroxysms were over, but were perfectly remembered during subsequent paroxysms. In these cases, all the mental operations, which occurred during the paroxysms, were so different in degree, combination, and manifestation, from those of the ordinary state, that they were, to all purposes, the mental manifestations of another mind. The higher activity of the morbid state could avail itself of ideas common to both states; but the lower activity of the ordinary and rational state, had nothing sufficiently exalted or sufficiently like the other, to furnish any clue to the recollection of one from the exercises of the other. I have given my views of the above, as appearing to explain a great principle in rela

tion to memory, as well as to elucidate what is sometimes called double consciousness, divided consciousness, or double personality. In the case of Jane C. Rider, there was a great difference in her feelings, her movements, her mental activity, and in the combination of organs in exercise. Some of the faculties were in the highest state of exaltation, and others in a state of torpor. The combination active, constituted her peculiar individuality or state of being. The manifestations under this state were so different in all respects, that nothing which happened in her ordinary states, tended in the least to suggest them. And this arises from the difference in the two mental states, and not from the actual difference in the circumstances around her. Hence she could have no remembrance of those states. A person in one place, and under one set of influences, appears to himself so different from what he does under opposite influences, that he hardly recognises his own identity, and at such times he will find it difficult to remember the things connected with former and opposite conditions.

CHAPTER XX.

JUDGMENT.

Ir Judgment be considered as a power of comparing the qualities and relations of individual objects, it is

simply a function of all the intellectual faculties, like perception, conception, and memory. Thus we judge of form, magnitude, color, cause, effect, resemblances, analogies, and differences of objects, by means of the functional power of the appropriate faculties. From this view of the subject, we see that judgment is not a fundamental faculty, but a mere function of all the intellectual faculties; and its power in a given case will depend on the degree of energy, which the faculty in exercise possesses. But judgment, in its more appropriate sense, has a very comprehensive signification, and an extensive bearing upon mental manifestation and character in general. While few possess this trait of character to a high degree, the great mass of the community are very deficient in it. There are very few who can so far depend upon their powers of analysis, as to investigate a complicated subject at all points, and arrive at conclusions which may be safely relied upon, as the basis of important undertakings, or the adjustment of important interests. A few master spirits of this character are to be found in every age, to shed their light upon their country and posterity. The influence of such men is felt in all situations, whether as private citizens, philosophers, counsellors, judges, or rulers. If we were asked what above every other quality characterized Washington, Franklin, and Marshall, we would say judgment. This enabled them to discover the truth, and to apply it with practical ability and strong common sense.

The inquiry which it now concerns us to make is, What are the ingredients which go to make up, what we thus denominate, superior judgment?

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1. It is believed that the leading intellectual organ concerned is that of comparison. This organ has the most enlarged functional power of all the intellectual organs. While the perceptive organs are confined to their own objects and relations, this compares things of the most opposite kinds, and looks through the whole range of nature. It can compare color to sound, or an object of sense to a feeling of the mind. It draws analogies, discovers resemblances, and detects differences. It abstracts parts or comprehends a whole. It has all the severity of truth, and all the playfulness of poetry. It enriches the poet with figures, and the mathematician with the perception of proportions. Without a good

share of this faculty, no man can aspire to be a discoverer in science, or claim to possess a true philosophical mind. If alone, it does not always secure the character for sound judgment; I have never seen sound judgment where this is wanting.

2. As comparison acts upon materials furnished by the other intellectual faculties, these must be well balanced and active, or the materials thus furnished will not be well prepared. If, for instance, there be general deficiency in the perceptive organs, and as a consequence deficient power of observation, the data on which comparison must act will be deficient. So if causality be small, then the relation of cause and effect, and other innate relations recognised by this organ, will be overlooked. Therefore judgment will be incorrect in results, however justly drawn from the materials on which it has acted.

3. We have seen in another place, that when some of the feelings are strong and others feeble, the light they

throw upon the intellect will be unequal, and with it there follows an unequal and defective perception of objects. Hence the judgments, formed under the influence of some strong, and other feeble, feelings, will partake of The intellect should always hold a decided predominance. This is much less so than could be desired. Most of the world are more or less slaves to some strong passion. Carried to an extreme, it becomes monomania.

error.

To be wanting in those feelings, which belong to a subject, is as much a source of false judgment as an over endowment of them. A juror, who has little approbativeness, will never estimate adequately the injury inflicted upon character. One who has small philoprogenitiveness, will never correctly appreciate a father's feeling, when lacerated by the seduction of a favorite daughter. There should be, indeed, a fine logic among the feelings, which, when preserved, gives almost an instinctive perception, and love of truth, in the common concerns of life. This balance is acquired and maintained by attention to the proper culture and regulation of all the faculties, and especially of conscientiousness and the moral sentiments generally. So that there is an intimate connexion between sound judgment, and sound principles, between a just and a judicious man. He that violates his conscientiousness darkens his intellect to the perception of truth.

5. But without cool and patient habits of investigation, the best balanced intellect and feelings will not save us from erroneous judgments. We should secure all the evidence the nature of the case admits of, and should reject all which is irrelevant to the case in question. Some persons seem to pride themselves upon a violation