A man who has been religiously educated, and has believed in religion until his habits are formed, is in much less danger from throwing off their restraints, so far as this life is concerned, than one who has never been a believer. When the character is formed by force of habit, and the parts are cemented, the bands may be burst with less danger.

CHAPTER XVII.

ATTENTION.

MENTAL philosophers have spoken of Attention as a distinct power of the mind. From the view Phrenologists have taken of mental manifestations, attention means simply an active state of any intellectual faculty, or of several at the same time. To attend to any subject is to put into action the intellectual faculties upon that subject. It is common language to inquire, What are you attending to now? It means the same as if the expression had been, Upon what have your intellectual faculties been engaged? From the views taken of the influence of the affective faculties upon the intellect, in chapter XII. we are prepared to deduce the laws of attention.

1st. If a subject furnish an agreeable exercise to a large intellectual organ, or a class of large intellectual organs, it will be easy to give it a due share of attention. A person with a large organ of tune attends to music

with ease and pleasure. A person with a large, active organ of number attends readily and exclusively to arithmetical operations.

2d. When any subject is highly interesting to our feelings, they will excite the intellect to the subject. It is easy to think of an absent friend. When reverence is large and active, it is easy to join in prayer, &c.

3d. The degree in which our attention will be excited will depend upon the state of the organs, the number of large intellectual organs to which the subject gives an agreeable exercise, the number of strong feelings it gratifies, and the intensity of that gratification.

est.

Thus, if our faculties be perfectly refreshed, as in the morning when we are in good health, all the faculties seem in a state of spontaneity, eager for gratification, and at such a time almost any subject will possess an interest. It should therefore be a rule to take up the least interesting subject then. When we have toiled through the day and become exhausted, scarcely any subject has an interYou will find it difficult to influence a man to give you any attention to an article you would sell him late in the day. The morning is the time for business. So when one is in ill health, it often produces mental distraction. When a subject excites into action all the large intellectual organs, addressing itself strongly both to the perceptive and reflective faculties, the attention will be very strongly fixed, because all the organs act in harmony.

So when a subject excites several strong feelings, the attention will be easily secured. Present to the devout man the subject of religion, exciting as it is to all the higher sentiments, and you easily arouse his attention, to a great degree of intensity.

Students, who can be masters of their time and attention, will find their advantage in commencing in the morning with those studies which are the least interesting, and finishing with those which are the most so; and after study is over, to attend to literature, society, and amusements, for the purpose of exercising the feelings, and at the same time giving a new impetus to the intellect.

CHAPTER XVIII.

PERCEPTION, CONCEPTION, AND IMAGINATION.

PERCEPTION is not a distinct faculty, but indicates that the intellectual faculties are assisted and stimulated to action by certain external helps. Objects of sense are perceived by the intellectual organs, through the agency and stimulus of the senses. So if objects are described, by drawings, writings, or conversation, they will be perceived by the mind. When the steps of an argument are stated to me, I am assisted to perceive the relation of one step to another. But conception is an unassisted act of the mind upon its own materials. The degree of activity into which the mind may be excited will depend upon the interest of the subject. The mind may be more intensely agitated by its perceptions, than it would be in its own calm, spontaneous activity.

Perceptions may range from the faintest glimmerings up to the most intense glow. Hence a certain degree of perceptive power may be possessed by organs, which are too feeble for the spontaneity of conception. Many persons can merely perceive the difference in two colors side by side, but could not tell the difference if they saw them in different places, as in doing this they would be obliged to conceive the absent color, to compare it with the present.

Reflection seems to import that spontaneous activity of the higher intellectual organs, which is identical with conception, when applied to these organs. We may say with propriety that an argument is well conceived. We often say, upon reflection we conceive a thing to be so or so. Mr. Combe defines perception, as "the lowest degree of activity of the intellectual faculties excited by an external object, and conception, as a higher degree of activity depending on internal causes, and without the interference of external objects." To make perception depend on degree of activity, seems to me to be unphilosophical, because the degrees of activity are infinite; and I apprehend that the organs may be more intensely active in perception, than they sometimes are in concepOthers will decide which is right.

tion.

Imagination differs from conception in this, that by the term conception we do not imply the formation of new combinations, but simply contemplate former conceptions or perceptions. But in an effort of imagination. we make new formations and combinations, with reference to a definite purpose. It therefore implies the leading exercise of the comparing power, in reference to propriety and effect. Imagination requires the activity of

the perceptive organs generally, and also of causality and comparison; and the beauty of its creations will depend much upon the well regulated activity of ideality, which gives us delight in the beautiful. Fancy may be considered as synonymous with imagination. I see no good ground for the distinction made by Mr. Combe.

CHAPTER XIX.

MEMORY.

We have already spoken of perception, conception, and imagination, as modes of activity of the intellectual faculties. It remains to consider another mode of mental exercise, denominated memory. To constitute this, requires the reappearance of former perceptions, conceptions, or imaginings, in connexion with a perception of their relation to a past intellectual exercise. This act of the mind requires no new faculty, but is simply a function of all the faculties. The only point, by which it is distinguishable from other intellectual exercises, is that it is not the first time they have occupied the mind, and the mind perceives this fact in connexion with the things remembered. Sometimes the recollection is so distinct, that it is connected with a particular period.

As organs, which are small and feeble in their functions, will not perceive or conceive with clearness, so they