An agreement to lease land for the term
of two years, at a rent equal to the full
rental value of the premises, the occupa
tion to commence at a future day, is an
agreement relating to an interest in land,
and under s. 16, c. 28, R. S. 1843, and not-
withstanding the exception in that section
relating to leases not exceeding the term
of three years, to be valid, it must be in
writing. Stackberger v. Mosteller, 461
3. A suit will not lie upon an oral agree-
ment for such a lease on account of the
refusal of the lessee to deliver possession
of the premises at the time appointed.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
See LIMITATIOns, Statute of.
See ADMINISTRATOR'S SALE, 3, 4. BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, 3 to 5. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 12 to 15, 17. IMPRISONMENT FOR
DEBT. JUDGMENT, 7. MISDEMEANOR. PRO-
SECUTING ATTORNEY. RETAILING, 3, 5.
SHERIFF, 7, 8, 9. STAY OF EXECUTION.
SUMMONS, 1, 2. SUNDAY. TAXES, 1, 2, 6.
USURY, 3.
1. The act of 1848 authorizing a reference
of the claim of Patrick McGinley against
the state to three disinterested persons, to
be appointed by the governor, enacted
that two of such persons should be men
of legal attainments, &c. Held, that the
act was merely directory to the governor,
and that his action in the premises could
not be reviewed.-The State v. McGinley;
That act made it the duty of the Supreme
Court, on an appeal from the award of
the arbitrators, to examine the case upon
its merits.
The legislature, by authorizing an ap-
peal to the Supreme Court from the award
of the arbitrators, intended that said
Court should be governed by the rules of
law applicable to ordinary suits. Ibid.
4. A member of the board of public works
could not, under the internal improve-
ment act of 1836, approve or disapprove
of a contractor's work.
Ibid.
5. The statute which exempts persons or
property from taxation, is to be construed
86
strictly.-Orr v. Baker,
6. The statute which exempts from taxation
the lands whereupon every building
erected for religious worship is situate,
not exceeding ten acres, was not intended
to include any part of the land which is
diverted to secular uses for gain. Ibid.
7. When a statute confers a new power on
a justice of the peace, he must proceed in
the mode prescribed by the statute-
Bargis v. The State,
126
8. An act of 1849 conferred upon justices
of the peace in certain counties, exclusive
jurisdiction over certain offences, and
enacted that they should, "on complaint
under oath, or on view, take jurisdiction
of all such offences." Held, that the jus-
tice could not render a judgment against
an offender upon confession of any such
offence, except on such complaint or on
Ibid.
9. The statute creating the Centreville and
Abington Turnpike Company, provided
that, for the purpose of determining the
damages to be allowed for land taken for
the use of the company, each party might
select one disinterested freeholder of the
county, and give notice to the other party
to select another, to act as arbitrators.
Held, that the claim filed need not show
that the arbitrator selected by the claim-
ant was a disinterested freeholder.-The
Centreville, &c., Turnpike Co. v. Jarrett
et al.,
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16. The act of January 16, 1849, giving
exclusive original jurisdiction of assaults
and batteries to justices of the peace in
Delaware county, took effect from its
500
passage.-Smith v. The State,
17. The R. S. 1852 were not in force in
March, 1853.-Ledley v. The State, 580
18. The internal improvement act of 1836,
except so far as it conflicts with the acts
transferring the various public works,
has not been repealed; and the Supreme
Court has constantly regarded it as en-
tering into and forming a part of the vari-
ous acts conveying away, for construction,
the public works, so far as consistent with
those acts.-Null et al. v. The White
Water, &c., Canal Co.,
431
19. The act of January 16, 1849, giving
exclusive original jurisdiction of assaults
and batteries to justices of the peace in
Delaware county, took effect from its pas-
sage.-Smith v. The State,
500
20. The meaning of the act entitled "an
act to amend article 5, chapter 28, of the
Revised Statutes of 1843," approved Jan-
uary 21, 1850, is, that in the distribution
of the surplus of the personal estate of a
deceased husband, after the payment of
debts, there shall be given to the widow,
where there are no heirs lineally descend-
ed, the amount of dowry which she
brought to the husband, if the surplus is
sufficient for that purpose; and where
the surplus exceeds that amount, she shall
receive such amount and half of the resi-
due: but where she brought no dowry,
she shall have half of such surplus.-
Carothers et ux. v. Little et al.,
21. Section 3 of chapter 71 of the R. S.
1843, does not make it penal to issue or
put in circulation as a circulating medium,
or substitute for bank notes, bills contain-
ing a promise to pay a sum of money in
bank notes.-The State v. Watson, 595
22. The law in relation to exceptions in a
statute is, that if the exception be con-
tained in a subsequent clause or statute,
it is matter of defence, and need not be
negatived in the information; but if it be
closely connected with the enacting
clause, or if it be in the same clause of
the act which creates an offence, it is
necessary to show by negative averment
that the defendant is not within the ex-
ception.-Brutton v. The State, 601
23. Jennings county is one in which by the
act of January 16, 1849, exclusive original
jurisdiction, in cases of assault and bat-
tery, is vested in justices of the peace.—
Sumpter v. The State,
24. The R. S. 1852 did not take effect till
the 6th of May, 1853.-The State v. Kiger,
621
STAY OF EXECUTION.
See ALIMONY, 2, 3. JUDGMENT, 12, 13.
ditches, &c., as might be necessary for the
construction, repair, &c., of such highway.
-Conwell v. Emrie,
209
2. When the supervisor acts without the
scope of his authority, and private injury
is thereby sustained, the law will not pro-
tect him.
Ibid.
A promissory note was made payable, in
terms, without the benefit of the stay of 3.
execution. Suit was brought upon the
note and the court rendered judgment for
the plaintiff, and that the defendant should
have no stay of execution. Held, that so
much of the judgment as prohibited the
stay of execution was erroneous.-McLane
et al. v. Elmer,
A person acting as supervisor was sued
in case for constructing a culvert across
a public road in his district in such a man-
ner as to convey water from a hill side
into and upon the plaintiff's tan-yard, to
his injury, &c. The plaintiff having
proved the construction of the culvert by
the defendant, in the manner charged,&c.,
held, that the defendant, in order to re-
relieve himself from liability, was bound
to show that the culvert was necessary for
the construction, repair, or preservation
of the highway, and was constructed at
the proper place.
Ibid.
1. It appeared by the briefs of the counsel
in a cause, that judgment had been ren-
dered for more than was due, in order to
give the Supreme Court jurisdiction and
extract an opinion on certain points sup-
posed to be at issue in the case; and the
character of the proceedings, as shown by
the record, indicated that such was the
fact. The Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment, without investigating the
grounds on which it was rendered.-
260
Hotchkiss et al. v. Jones,
2. Motion to reinstate a cause upon the
docket of the Supreme Court. The cause
having been continued for two terms suc-
cessively under the general order, was, at
the next term, regularly called for trial,
and, the plaintiffs failing to appear, was
dismissed, at the instance of the defend-
ants, under rule 19, governing the prac-
tice of the Court, which prescribes that
“if, when a cause is called, the plaintiff
fail to appear, the defendant may have
the cause dismissed," &c. At a subse-
quent day of the same term, on motion of
the plaintiffs' counsel, a rule was gran-
ted and served on the defendant's counsel,
to show cause why the case should not be
reinstated, &c. The only ground for rein-
stating the cause, was contained in an
affidavit of the plaintiffs' counsel, alleg-
ing that he was necessarily absent on the
calling of the cause; that it was dismissed
for want of prosecution; and that he be-
lieved there were merits in the cause, and
that justice required its reinstatement.
Held, that no sufficient reason was shown
for granting the motion.-Hood et al. v.
Dinwiddie et al.
294
3. Where, however, at the calling and dis-
missal of a cause, the plaintiff is tempo-
rarily out of the court-room, but returns
immediately and asks its reinstatement,
the Court would direct the entry of dis-
mission to be stricken out.
Ibid.
4. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction
under s. 119, 2 vol. R. S. 1852, to correct
an alleged error in the finding of the Court,
in a criminal cause, where the defendant
has been acquitted.-The State v. Yount,
653
SURETY OF THE PEACE.
An affidavit for surety of the peace alleged
that the complainant verily believed and
actually feared, &c., that A. B. would kill
him, or do him great bodily injury, or pro-
cure others to do so, &c. Held, that the
charge was bad for being in the alterna-1.
tive. Steele v. The State,
SURPLUS REVENUE,
See DEPOSIT, 2. RELATOR.
TAXES.
See TREASURER.
1. The statute which exempts persons or
property from taxation, is to be construed
strictly-Orr v. Baker,
86
2. The statute which exempts from taxation
the lands whereupon every building erec-
ted for religious worship is situate, not ex-
ceeding ten acres, was not intended to in-
clude any part of the land which is diver-
ted to secular uses for gain.
Ibid.
3. A tract of land was listed twice for taxes
of the year 1827-once as first-class, and
once as second class land. The clerk, in
transcribing from the assessment-roll, car-
ried out the tract as first-class land. The
law of 1825, and the act of which it is
amendatory, made it the duty of the clerk
to carry out the assessment into the du- |
plicate; but there was no provision in a
case where the land was thus listed twice,
which listing should be carried out. The
land was afterwards sold for the non-pay-
ment of the taxes of 1827. Held, that
the sale could not be supported.-Barnes
v. Doe d Pelton,
The charter of the Terre-Haute Draw-
bridge Company does not authorize the
company to create any obstruction to the
navigation of the Wabash river in con-
structing their bridge.-The Terre-Haute
Drawbridge Company v. Halliday et al., 36
2. By an obstruction is meant such an impe-
diment to the navigation, that boats in
passing along the stream could not, by the
use of skill and care, avoid being injured.
Ibid.
See CONTRACT, 13.
TITLE BOND.
See VENDOR And Purchaser, 4.
TRANSCRIPT.
See JURISDICTION. PROMISSORY NOTE, 9.
County treasurers were not, under the R. S.
1843, entitled to a per cent. for paying out
that part of the revenue collected on the
tax duplicate.-Woollen v. The Board of
Commissioners of Jefferson Co.,
331
See VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 6.
In trover, upon the general issue, the plain-
tiff must recover upon the strength of his
own title and right of possession, and not
2. A. being indebted to B. for the balance of a note then due, and desiring an extension of credit, went with B. to C., to whom B. then sold the note at a discount of 10 per cent., upon an agreement that a credit of a year was to be extended to A. upon the note. A., at the same time, to indemnify B., executed to B. a note, in form of a due bill, for the amount of the discount upon the first note. Held, that the latter note was void, as being given entirely upon a usurious consideration.
Ibid. 3. Section 29, c. 31, R. S. 1843, is retrospective, and revives contracts which were, by the previous act, void for usury.Reed et al. v. Coale, Administrator,
4. But the payee of a usurious note, under the law of 1843 can only recover the principal, without interest, and if any
interest has been paid, it is deducted from the principal, and judgment rendered for the residue; and the defendant recovers his costs. Ibid.
5. To constitute usury, two things are necessary: 1. A loan, and 2. The taking of more interest than the law allows; and where these facts are shown to exist, the law pronounces the intent to have been corrupt. Ibid.
6. In a civil case, evidence is not admissible to show that the party contracting for usurious interest had no corrupt purpose in taking it. Ibid.
See EVIDENCE, 1. JUDGMENT, 4.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
See ADMINISTRATOR'S SALE, 1, 2. ADVERSE POSSESSION. CERTIFICATE FOR CANAL LAND, 2. CHANCERY, 5. CONVEYANCE. COVENANT, 1 to 6. EXECUTION, 6. FRAUDU LENT CONVEYANCE. JUDGMENT, 1. NOTICE. PLEADING, 8, 10, 14, 27, 30. PROMISSORY NOTE, 32. SEDUCTION. SHERIFF, 4, 5.
1. A. sold and conveyed to B. and C. a tract of land and took their note for part of the purchase-money. Afterwards, and before the note became due, he sent an agent to collect it. Upon the proposal of B., the agent agreed to take the individual note of B., with an extension of the time of payment, for a part of his half of the note, upon his paying in hand the residue of such half. The money was thus paid and the note taken, and the agent thereupon entered a credit on the original note for one-half thereof. The land afterwards passed into the hands of D., an innocent purchaser, for a valuable consideration, without notice of the circumstances under which the credit was made, or the individual note of B. executed. A. received the note of B., acquiesced for several years in the arrangement made by his agent, and did not disapprove thereof; but afterwards filed his bill to enforce his lien, as a vendor, against the land in the hands of D., for the non-payment of the individual note of B. Held, that as to D., at least, A. must be held to have ratified the act of his agent, and that the credit entered on the original note by the agent must be treated as a payment, and that the individual note of B. must be
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