1. A complaint under the act of 1852 estab- lishing courts of Common Pleas, for an assault and battery, did not set out the christian name of the defendant, but only the initials. Held, that the defendant could avail himself of the omission by motion to quash, as well as by plea in abatement.-Gardner v. The State, 632 2. In January, 1853, the R. S. of 1852 not being in force, informations for misde- meanors were not authorized by law, but only a sworn charge or complaint. Ibid.
CONDITION SUBSEQUENT. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 10. CONDITIONAL SALE.
See MORTGAGE, 2 to 4. CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT. See JUDGMENT, 4. CONSIDERATION.
See PLEADING, 31, 35. PROMISSORY NOTE, 7, 11, 12, 15, 16, 33, 34. SEDUCTION.
See AUDITOR. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 4. NEW TRIAL, 2. REMEDY, 1. STATUTES 14, 15.
The presumption that an act of the legis-
lature is in violation of the constitution is not to be indulged, unless it is clearly subversive of that instrument. Ibid.
6. Such a presumption cannot arise from the mere fact that an act is imperfect or impolitic.
It is the right and duty of the courts to inquire into the constitutionality of the acts of the legislature, whenever such questions are judicially presented. Ibid. 8. A construction of the constitution by the legislature, where it is restrictive of legis- lative authority; or where the constitu- tional question has not been considered by that body; or where such legislative construction is not continuous and con- curring, is not entitled to much weight; and as between two legislative construc- tions differing from each other, that more nearly contemporaneous with the consti- tution, would seem to be the better author- ity. Ibid.
9. Sections 22 and 23 of art. 4 of the constitu- tion of 1851, were designed to remedy the evil of local and special legislation which had grown up under the old system. Ibid. 10. The law-making power being vested by the constitution of 1851 in the general assembly, the exercise, by any other body, of the power to make, sanction, suspend, or give effect to, the laws is necessarily excluded. Ibid.
11. The term "operation of the laws,” as used in s. 26 of art. 1 of the constitution of 1851, seems to mean, their taking effect and continuing in force. Ibid.
12. So much of the act of Murch, 1853, "to regulate the retailing of spirituous liquor," &c., as relates to the popular vote, is in conflict with ss. 25 and 26 of art. 1, and, 3. also, of ss. 22 and 23 of art. 4, of the con- stitution. Ibid.
13. Submitting laws to the vote of the peo- ple in their primary capacity, is subver sive of the representative system and in- consistent with the constitution. Ibid. 14. It is, also, inconsistent with the con- stitutional provision requiring the yeas and nays on the final passage of a bill.
16. Section 5 of article 7 of the constitution of 1851, which requires the Supreme Court, upon the decision of every case, to give a statement in writing of each ques- tion arising in the record of such case, and the decision of the Court thereon, applies only to cases arising under that constitution.-Hand et al. v. Taylor, 409 17. So much of s. 15 upon p. 3 of vol. 2, R. S. 1852, as requires an attorney at law, in the case of a poor person, to prosecute or defend, upon his appointment by the Court, without fee, is in conflict with s. 21, art. 1, of the constitution of 1851, and void.-Blythe v. The State, 525
1. A motion for a continuance, based upon an affidavit of the party, is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court trying the cause; and the propriety of granting or refusing it must depend, to a great ex- tent, on the peculiar circumstances of each case. From the very nature of the case, the Court trying a cause-witness- ing all the proceedings, and being, from personal observation, familiar with all the attendant circumstances-has the best opportunity of forming a correct opinion upon the case presented.-Detro v. The State,
2. The general principles relative to the granting of continuances are well and clearly defined, but, of necessity, there is a considerable latitude of discretion left to be exercised by the Court, and, if no general principle has been violated, the
presumption will be in favor of the action of the Court. Ibid.
The defendant, indicted for larceny in the Wells Circuit Court, applied for a continuance upon his affidavit stating that he could prove by one A., a resident of Miami county, Ohio, that at the time the property mentioned in the indictment was alleged to have been stolen, the de- fendant was in the town of Greenville, and in the neighborhood, in Darke coun- ty, Ohio, and further, that said A. could prove his entire innocence of the charge, &c. Held, that the affidavit was defect- ive for confining the alibi to the day al- leged in the indictment. Held, also, that the general allegation that the defendant could prove his innocence by the absent witness, was immaterial. Held, also, that the refusal of the continuance was not Ibid.
After verdict against the defendant, he made a motion for a new trial, on the ground of the refusal of the Court to grant the continuance upon such affidavit. The Court overruled the motion. The evi. dence in the cause was not set out in the record. Held, that it must be presumed that the evidence did not disclose that the larceny was committed on the day alleged in the indictment, and that no cause for a new trial was made by the evidence. Ibid. 5. In a suit to recover the amounts of an en- gineer's estimates for work done for a railroad company, the declaration left the amounts blank, and the Court allowed the plaintiff to supply the blanks by insert- ing the amounts. The defendant having applied for a continuance, without show- ing that he was prejudiced by the amend. ment, held, that the continuance was pro- perly refused.-The Rushville, &c., Rail- road Co. v. McManus, 275
See BOND, 1. BURDEN OF PROOF, 1. DOWER, 2. MARRIAGE, 1 to 3. RESCISSION. SALE, 3, 4. STATE PRINTER, 6, 7. WHITE WA- TER VALLEY CANAL COMPANY, 1.
1. A contract between McGinley and the state for building a bridge on the line of one of the public works, after prescribing what things should be done and omitted by the engineer or his assistant, provided that the contractor was in all things to follow the directions of the engineer or his assistant. Held, that he was only au- thorized to follow the engineer or his assistant in those things wherein they had a right to direct him.-The State v. McGinley,
2. The parties to a written contract, not under seal. may, before breach, enter into a valid oral contract providing for its discharge by the delivery of property, or in any other manner.-Ward v. Walton, 75 3. Where an attorney at law engages to defend a cause for a specific sum, and dies before the cause is determined, his administrator may recover from the client, upon the quantum meruit, the amount which the intestate's services were really worth to him.-Coe v. Smith, Administra. tor,
7. If A. promises B. to do a particular thing for B., in consideration of something to be done by B. upon the happening of a particular event, and such event may happen before the thing can be performed by A., the undertakings of the parties are independent.-Gillum v. Den417 8. If A., however, sues B. on his part of the contract, after the time fixed for the performance by B. of his part has elapsed, the case is in the same condition as if the undertakings had been dependent. Ibid. 9. A full and faithful compliance with a contract is required by the rule that an agreement must be performed according to its terms as understood and assented to by the parties.
10. A. undertook, for a sufficient consideration, to keep four children of B., for two years, and to board and clothe them. Held, that the parties must be presumed to have intended that the boarding and clothing, &c., were to be suitable to A.'s condition in life, and in accordance with the usages of the society in which he and his family moved. Ibid.
II. The release of a parol contract need not be under seal.-Develin v. Riggsbee, 464 12. A. agreed to deliver to B., between the 20th of December, 1851, and the 1st of January, 1852, four thousand shoulders, &c., to be paid for at the time of delivery. The place of delivery was not designated.
Held, in a suit by A. against B. for the non-performance of the agreement, that the property should have been delivered to B. where A. had it at the time of the sale, or at A.'s usual place of business, and that a request to deliver it was unnecessary. But, held, that the declaration should have contained an averment that the plaintiff, at the time and place of delivery, was ready to receive and pay for the goods.-Bailey v. Ricketts et al., 488 13. The time fixed for the performance of a contract was "the latter part of Janua ry." Held, that the phrase must be construed to mean the whole of that part, and that a suit would not lie for the non-performance of the contract until the expiration of the month. Held, also, that the declaration of the defendants, before the end of the month, that they would not then, nor ever, deliver the goods, did not excuse the plaintiff from deferring suit until the end of the month.
14. The plaintiffs sued the defendant upon a special agreement, and also upon a quantum meruit, for services rendered by them as attorneys at law. The evidence showed that the plaintiffs had agreed with the defendant to commence and prosecute a suit for her to set aside a deed executed by her to one A., and that if the deed should be set aside she was to pay them for their services 150 dollars, but if it should not be set aside, she was not bound to pay them anything. The plaintiffs had accordingly commenced and prosecuted the suit, and the Court upon the final hearing set aside the deed as to part of the property conveyed by it, but confirmed it as to the residue. Held, that the plaintiffs could not recover anything on a count upon the special agreement; but that, upon the quantum meruit, they were entitled to recover an amount equal to the benefit received by the defendant from their services, not exceeding the sum agreed upon for an entire performance of the contract.-Major et al. v. McLester,
1. In 1850 the legislature enacted a law, the first section of which declared that all such persons as should become stockhold- ers to the capital stock thereinafter men- tioned, their successors, &c., should be and were thereby constituted a body cor- porate by the name of the American Live Stock Insurance Company. The second section enacted that one A. and seven others named, or a majority of them, should be commissioners to receive sub- scriptions of stock, and that, when two hundred shares should be subscribed, they should call a meeting of the stock- holders "by an advertisement published in such place or places as the commission- ers might determine, stating the time and place at which such meeting of the stock- holders shall by ballot elect the first di- rectors of said company." It was further eracted that the stock should be in shares of 50 dollars each, and that, at the time of subscribing, there should be paid an instalment of 1 dollar on each share sub- scribed, and that the remainder should be paid at such time and on such terms as should be determined by the president and directors of the company.
this law, articles of association were pre- pared, the subscribers to which severally undertook to pay 5 per cent., in cash, at the time of subscribing, and to secure the balance by executing a promissory note, to be approved by the directors, payable on demand. B. became a subscriber of
annul or vitiate the existence of the cor- poration.
Held, also, that the provision in said section 2 for the raising of the stock and bringing about the first election of directors, was directory, and merely for convenience, and not essential to the validity of the Held, also, that a plea setting up that 1 dol- corporate organization. lar on a share was not paid at the time of subscribing, was no defence to the action. Held, also, that the facts that one C., who received the subscription, represented that he was authorized to receive the sub- scriptions, when he was not, and that the directors had not ordered it to be taken, were no defence to the action.
Held, also, that the first section of the com- pany's charter created the corporation out of the stockholders; and, so soon at least as the stock was subscribed, the corporation was complete, without the election of directors, and without a for- mal organization.-Judah v. The Ameri- can Live Stock Insurance Co.,
ten shares, and executed his note for the See ATTORNEY AT LAW, 1, 2, 5. ARBITRATION,
amount of his subscription, less 5 per cent., payable on demand "in such sums and at such times as might be duly as- sessed thereon by order of the directors to meet the exigencies of said company." In a suit against B. upon his subscrip- tion and note,
Held, that the question whether the exigen- cies of the company required the pay- ment of the instalments, could not be raised in a suit at law to recover them. Held, also, that the fact that the commis- sioners may not have met to receive sub- scriptions, nor called a meeting of the stockholders to elect directors, did not
1. Upon an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace, the defendant, if he reduces the justice's judgment more than 5 dollars, is entitled, under the R. S. 1843, to a judgment for costs.-Hunt v. Lewis,
2. The statute creating the Centreville and Abington Turnpike Company, authorized an appeal from the decision of the arbi- trators selected by the parties to the Cir- cuit Court, according to the same rules that prevail in cases taken from a justice's judginent. The company having ap-
pealed from the decision of the arbitrators to the Circuit Court, and reduced the amount awarded over 5 dollars, held, that the company were entitled to recover costs.-The Centreville, &c., Turnpike Co. v. Jarrett et al., 213
3. In actions ex delicto, under the R. S. 1843, where the title to real estate comes in question, the plaintiff, when successful, is entitled to recover full costs, though he does not recover 5 dollars in damages.-Burnett v. Coffin, 218
4. Action to recover damages for the overflow of the plaintiff's land by a mill-dam erected by the defendant. Plea, not guilty. Verdict for the plaintiff for 1 cent, and judgment accordingly, and for costs. The R. S. 1843 were then in force. The evidence was not upon the record. Held, that it must be presumed that the title to real estate came in question, and that the judgment for costs, was, therefore, right. Ibid.
5. In an action of tort, where the damages laid are over 50 dollars, but the recovery is for a less sum, the plaintiff is, under the R. S. 1843, entitled to costs.-Hull v. Kirkpatrick, 637
5. Neither does the fact that an execution has been awarded upon the judgment against the land. Ibid.
6. A, having been indicted in twelve cases for retailing spirituous liquor, the indictments were all, by consent, submitted, at the same time, for trial, to a jury. The testimony of a witness was heard, the jury found the defendant guilty upon nine of the indictments, and assessed a separate fine in each case, and judgments were rendered accordingly. Held, that a separate jury fee, docket fee, and witness fee were taxable on each of the judgments 7. against the defendant.-Krutz v. The State, 647
See BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS. COUNTY AUDITOR.
COUNTY TREASURER. See TREASURER. COURT.
A Court has the power to protect itself against gross violations of decency and decorum, and an appellate Court can only interfere where the power is shown to have been abused.-Brown v. Brown, 627
The yielding to the paramount title of a stranger, by giving up possession or buying in such title and continuing possess ion under it, is evidence of an eviction.
Debt on a penal bond. The conditions were that the obligee had leased to the obligors a steamboat for a specified term, with her tackle, &c., for a sum namedthe obligors to have the control of the boat during the term, and to return her, with her fixtures, at E., in as good condition, &c., reasonable wear excepted. The lessees were to pay the expenses of the boat during the term. If the boat should be stopped for debts previously contracted, the lessees were to be discharged as to rent, &c., but if destroyed while in the lessees' possession, then, besides paying the rent, they should also pay a sum specified for the boat. On the performance of these conditions, the bond was to be void. The obligee warranted the boat to be sound, seaworthy, and to contain the necessary apparel, &c. Held, that the covenants in the condition of the bond were not dependent.-Clifford et al. v. Smith,
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