CHAPTER IV.

THE CONSEQUENCES DRAWN FROM THE FOREGOING DEFINITION IDEAS ARE EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO POETRY AS TO

AND

PAINTING.

It has been established as an elementary principle of imitation in the fine arts, that to imitate is to produce the resemblance of a thing in some other which becomes the image of it.

Having distinguished two kinds of resemblance, the one identical, being in fact only the repetition of a thing by the thing itself; the other imitative, being the repetition of a thing by some other which becomes the image of it; it must follow from this distinction, that the idea attached to the word image, is that which characterizes such resemblance as is proper to imitation in connection with the fine arts.

But to render this theory general, the definition of imitation, and the terms which constitute it, must be alike consistent with all the fine arts, as well those that are addressed to the senses, as those addressed to the mind.

Now it is possible that the word resemblance, and yet more, image, may here occasion some difficulty. Image, it may be urged, can be understood only of the works of painting, and the graphic arts. If it is to the eyes that a resemblance attained by means of an image is addressed, how can a condition, which ought only to be binding on some of the arts, enter into an elementary principle which is sought to be rendered common to them all?

I might answer that the employment of the word image is by no means unusual in poetry, and every one is aware of the metaphorical acceptation of it, borrowed from painting. It is true that this name is generally appropriated to certain conceptions of detail, to partial expressions or descriptions; but this instance will suffice to authorize the employment of it in a more extended relation, if it can be shown that the arts of poetry, like those of design, possess also the power of producing two sorts of resemblance, identical and imitative, that they can also be concerned about the imitation of reality by reality, instead of adhering to a mode equivalent to that to which we apply the word image. Be it only understood that the words image and reality are here, as is the word imitation itself, taken in an analagous signification, and a sense altogether as true, though of a less material truth, equally in speaking of poetry as when applied to painting.

It must be confessed that all the forms of composition in poetry do not possess the property of imitation in the same degree; this depends in general on the kind of subjects which fall within the scope of each. But since poetry treats of subjects (and those indeed the most numerous) in which persons are to be made speak and act, and in which verbal descriptions of things, actions, emotions, and manners are requisite, who will contend that the expression of these may not be the effect of imitation, morally understood? Now the effect of such imitation is to produce a moral image, that is, one addressed to the mind. And if this be indisputable, it is equally so that to poetry, as to painting, may belong the reproduction of objects either in such a way as to constitute reality, or in such as would rightly be consistent with an image.

One instance of this among many others, that the sequel of this work will afford (see Part II. Chap. iii.) is the servile reproduction, by the writer, in the language he attaches to his interlocutors, of thoughts, set forms of speech, common phrases, or expressions of vulgar language; this surely is the repetition of reality, instead of imitative resemblance. It is evident in this instance, that the thing to be reproduced by imitation, namely, the dialogue, is not reproduced in some other thing, that is, in another dialogue which becomes the image of it. It is evident that

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there are not two distinct things, but the same twice over.

This is also expressed by the word copy; for copy, copia, means only a double. In fact, the whole of this analysis is little else than an exposition of the word copy, and the idea belonging to it. It would indeed have been made use of, but that in a subject where ambiguity is so easily attached to every word, custom had already given to the word copy, some significations which would confound the idea belonging to it with that of imitation.

In order to establish a parallel, on the point which now engages our attention, between poetry and painting, after having shown how, in the first, the thing imitated may fail to be an image, by being only a copy or identical repetition, it will suffice to cite in anticipation (see Part III. Chapter vii.) the resources, which the art of poetry has at command, in order to reproduce the resemblance of things in some other things which become the images of them. These resources are, for instance, the choice of words, arrangement of sentences, ideas, the employment of metre and rhyme, the expression of the language of the passions, metaphor, allegory, and all the varieties of style which this art has at its disposal, as so many means of exchanging reality for its representation, and, to speak precisely, the thing itself for its image.

As we have seen, the only difference lies be

tween the nature of the thing to be imitated, and that of the thing which becomes the image of it; and this difference being that which sets a bound between the order of moral, and the order of physical things, is also that of the arts themselves.

The elementary principle of imitation may then be applied to all the arts, and may be so applied in the terms of our definition, so that, when treat- · ing of the arts comprised under the name of poetry, what is termed the image, a necessary condition of all imitation, will be (as has been already shown) an image only to the eyes of the mind, while in the arts comprised under the name of painting, what is called the image, is such to the eyes of the body.

I think I have for the present (see Part II. Chapter ii.) where the same subject is resumed) sufficiently explained the sense in which I make use of the words image, or imitative resemblance, and reality, or identical similarity. But identity of resemblance is to be understood, not only (the words being taken in their material sense) of that which, in physical objects, is obtained by means of tracing, the mould, or the pattern, nor, in the before mentioned instance, the dialogue, of meré exact and literal repetition, but yet further (in accordance with the spirit of things) of all imita- | tion which aims at appearing what it is not. Now such is the case when the imitator endeavours to carry similarity so far, as to excite an idea of the

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