INTRODUCTION.

IMITATION is of so extensive and so varied an import, when its relations and effects in all that falls within the scope of the faculty of imitating are considered, a faculty which is one of the distinctive characteristics of man, that ever to have a complete and exhaustive treatise on the subject may well be despaired of.

Imitation would almost of itself afford means for a full exposition of man, both in his natural and social condition. Indeed, what is there, whether in his habits, his tastes, or his works, that does not admit of reference to the imitative instinct? To enter into an investigation of the theory of imitation in its fullest extent, would be to submit every action of human life, every object that enters into the relations of social existence, to an analysis without end.

By restricting the idea of imitation, as is an

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nounced in the title of this essay, within the circle of the fine arts, so called, it will have been already seen that I am far from having projected one of those theories which, pretending to be universal, far exceed the abilities of their authors and the comprehension of their readers.

Some metaphysicians,* with a view to embrace the whole theory of imitation in the fine arts, have endeavoured to refer every idea concerning it to one general principle, but one so elevated, placed in a region so little accessible to the generality of persons, that those even who think they have attained to it, seize, as it were, but a point of concentration, where the whole absorbs its several parts.

Others, crawling as theorists along the multifarious paths of analysis, have flattered themselves that they have been enabled to trace out, step by step, the whole of a general doctrine, in every way applicable to each of the fine arts; but in aiming at the universal, they have been wanting in unity; they have had too many parts to join together to admit of forming from them one body, and from the incoherency of their production have been unsuccessful in achieving a whole.

If, in restricting a general theory of imitation to the fine arts, it were proposed to embrace the

whole of each one, or the ideas relative to each of its parts, the design nevertheless would be still vast, and the task to be prosecuted scarcely find a limit. In fact, each of the fine arts presents itself to our view, within its own particular and distinct province, well nigh as one of those confederate states, which with others forms one whole and the same empire, but which, though submitting to the general laws of a central government, has no less its customs, its privileges, its laws of exception, and its especial character impressed upon it by nature. Consider then, how many studies, and how great an extent of knowledge must needs be united to constitute a proper qualification to treat thoroughly the particular theory of all the fine arts, since so much labour is requi site to work out that of one only.

The entire theory of one art alone is not so very simple a matter.

At the very outset of an undertaking similar to the present, it is immediately perceived that, instead of one theory only, many, and among these very different ones, must necessarily be included. Every art produces by its works different impressions, and very distinct effects, from which arise forms of composition corresponding, either to the peculiar aspects of the model, or to the organs or faculties of the body or mind with which they are held to be in relation. For instance, according to the diversity of forms of composition in its

works, an art addresses itself to the reason, the imagination, the feelings, the taste, or the physical organ. There will be then the theory of the reason or judgment, the theory of the imagination, that of the feelings and the expression of the passions, that of taste or of fitness, and that of the practical execution or skill.

What I have said above explains far better than I could otherwise render it intelligible, how foreign it is to my wishes to comprise, under the general expression of imitation, ideas and researches so extensive.

My design is not to consider the different arts, as modes of imitation, in the variety of the resources peculiar to all and each, of the studies they require, of the rules that observation and experience have assigned to them, of the methods. which are proper to them, of the reasons which advance or retard perfection, of the causes of their impressions, &c., &c.

Far from having proposed to myself to tread such a multiplicity of paths, which may be compared to radii terminating at the circumference of a complete theory, I am contented, in the first part, or that which has for its object the nature of imitation, to place myself, as it were, in a kind of centre, which I look upon as the starting point of all the paths. It seems to me that certain altogether primary, and central, ideas upon what constitutes the elementary principle of that imitation

which is proper to the fine arts, have never been collected together, and reconciled under one single point of view, in such manner as to determine all the uncertainties of opinion, and give to it an invariable rule.

After having considered the nature of imitation, it cannot but be inquired what ought to be its true end. Here again Here again incomplete ideas, the results of views too confined, have been the means of establishing doctrines which fall far short of their object. I have thought it incumbent on me to direct them to a more exalted end, which, without being exclusive, without prohibiting the power to desist at an inferior stage, might indicate to genius the goal which it should be its ambition to Such is the subject of the second part

arrive at.

of this work.

The end once established, there will remain for the theory to point out the way which conducts to it.

The third part is devoted to the development of the means of imitation. But what is so called, according to the system of this work, has nothing but the name in common with the practical, technical, or didactic means appertaining to each art. The means to be discussed are those which arise from the very nature of imitation, and are closely related to the nature of its end, those which depend on the action of the judgment and understanding, and which are directed by taste in accor