fate which, with so much self-abasement, he dreaded for himself? Would he have played and tampered with those insane horrors, instead of appealing to that intellect which, even in detailing them, evinced its strength, and to that sense of justice, never blind nor without charity, but when beholding his own frailties-instead of demonstrating, by a force of reason which his unhappy friend could not have resisted, the total impossibility of his ever suffering the frightful punishment he so much feared, but which, in the whole course of his sinless life, he could not have incurred? But the Rev. Mr. Newton was without light; the language which the Author of man has impressed upon, the dome of thought had not then been interpreted aright, and the inner mysteries of the sanctuary were yet unsolved.

The melancholy poet, but too prone to observe the darker shades of life, required society the opposite to that which Olney or his religious associations furnished. And the attentive reader of his history cannot fail to discover, in the salutary effects which ever followed his occasional intercourse with strong and healthy minds, the absurdity of that philosophy which, by a species of homeopathic treatment, would cure with what created the disease-would substitute the base for the antidote-and attempt to dissipate the mists by extinguishing the sun.

During the five or more years when he was engaged upon the translation of Homer, his health was unusually sound, and his mind proportionately vigorous; but after that work was completed, and all proper excitement withdrawn from his faculties, he unwisely returned again to theological mysticism. His intellect began to wander, and once more became thoroughly overcast; but now, unfortunately, with clouds and thick darkness no more to be completely dispelled, and whence he at last emerged, the dim phantom of himself, with his physical energies utterly sapped, his mind emasculate and shattered— the unhappy victim of religious mania.

ARTICLE VI.

The Philosophy of Human Life: being an investigation of the great Elements of Life-the Power that Acts-the Will that directs the Action-and the Accountability or Sanctions that influence the formation of Volitions; together with Reflections adapted to the physical, political, popular, moral, and religious natures of man. By AMOS DEAN, Professor of Medical Jurisprudence in the Albany Medical College. Published by Marsh, Capen, Lyon, & Co. Boston: 12 mo. pp. 300.

It is highly gratifying to observe that the number of works published on phrenology is rapidly increasing. This fact shows that not only the advocates of the science are zealously engaged in multiplying their efforts in its behalf, but also that a strong conviction exists in the community generally of the truth and importance of the principles it involves. It is stated, on good authority, that a greater number of works on phrenology have been published and sold in Great Britain for several years past, than on any other one subject, with the exception of religion. And we can see no satisfactory reason why this may not yet be the case in the United States. As an evidence of this, there have been published within the past year, five or six new books by our own countrymen, besides new editions called for of several foreign works on the science.

Among the former, may be mentioned the one heading this article. Its extended title will convey to the reader some idea of the nature and character of the work. Its author was one of the first in the United States to espouse publicly the new science. Nearly ten years since, Mr. Dean delivered a course of lectures on phrenology before an association of young men in the city of Albany. These lectures were afterwards published in a small volume, under the title of "Elements of Phrenology," which met with quite a favourable recepMr. Dean has also contributed several interesting articles to the Edinburgh, as well as to the American Phrenological Journal. And we congratulate the friends of the science in the reception of this, his last and most valuable contribution on the "Philosophy of Human Life." Our only regret is, that we cannot possibly do the work justice within the small space in which the limits of a periodical like this necessarily confine us.

tion.

The topics discussed in the present work, are among the most difficult and abstruse that have ever come before the human mind. Perhaps it may be safe to say, that no other subjects whatever have

excited as much controversy, or enlisted more talent, than those of Will, Free Agency, and Human Responsibility. And the principles involved in them are still very far from being settled, or even a small share of the difficulties that beset inquirers on these subjects, from being removed. The functions of the brain must be correctly and thoroughly understood by all leading writers on mental science, before these points can be generally settled; and even then, large numbers in the community will be entirely incapable of understanding the philosophy of Free Agency and Human Responsibility. But the past history, and the present state of mental science, however, indicate that the time is not far distant when all views of mind, which can have any permanent influence, or command any tolerable share of attention and respect, must be based on a knowledge of the structure and functions of the brain. The number of eminent men who are compelled to admit this fact, is rapidly increasing, and it is the part of wisdom and self-interest for all engaged in the study of the philosophy of the mind, to examine the facts and principles adduced on this subject, as they may be found collected and recorded in various phrenological works.

The work before us on the "Philosophy of Human Life," is based strictly on phrenological principles, though the technical language of the science is not generally used. The author commences by defining the number and nature of the primitive faculties of the mind, and then describes, in a very clear and satisfactory manner, what is understood by the term "power"-a term which has elicited no small share of controversy, and been greatly mystified by the metaphysicians. It is utterly impossible, in our present state of existence, to have any clear and definite conceptions of the nature of mental power, if we consider the mind only abstractly, and perfectly independent of the body.

Mr. Dean here devotes forty pages to a consideration of the Will. His views on this point are decidedly ingenious and philosophical, being well arranged and clearly presented. He alludes to the erroneous views which some have entertained on the subject in the following manner :

"The will appears to have been considered, by many, not as originating from the mind, or as forming a part of it, but as introduced into it. They seem to have viewed it as a separate, independent agent, finding an appropriate employment in the coining of decisions or determinations which the mind and material organisation are best occupied in carrying into effect. This may be inferred from their speaking of the self-determining power of the will, a power which certainly can be exercised in no other way than by an act of the will. This act, like every other, must have a cause; and if the will be self-determining, can be caused

only by an act of itself. This would involve the obvious contradiction of requiring an act of volition to precede every act of volition; which is the same, in substance, as to require a beginning prior to any beginning.

"It may also be inferred from the power they vest in the will of recalling past ideas. That is a power the will can never directly exercise. If ideas cannot be recalled by the different faculties that originally entertained them, no act of the will can be competent for that purpose. If they can be, and are so recalled, they are then present to the mind, and no act of the will is required.

"If the will be an agent thus introduced, and thus gifted with the power, not merely of controlling mind and matter, but also itself, it would be important to inquire into the manner of its introduction; into its composition; into the principles on which its decisions are founded; and into the authority by which it claims to exercise such illimitable sway over the powers of mind and body, with which its only tie of connection would seem to be that of command on the one part, and obedience on the other.

The will is not a tyrant, merely in"All this, however, is an error. It is no more separate from, or indetroduced into the mind to control. pendent of, intellectual action, than are perception, memory, or association. It is a legitimate part of the operation of mind; and hence its origin, elements, and principles are to be sought in that great concentration of all feeling and of all thought.

"With this view of the origin and nature of will, it may be defined to be, The decision of the whole mind upon the whole matter."

To explain this point briefly in our own words, we would remark that will, as connected with free agency, may be considered the decision or assent of a majority of the faculties, in view of all the motives presented to them through the intellect. Three conditions are absolutely necessary to constitute any being a free agent: viz. first, WILL; secondly, A PLURALITY OF MOTIVES; and thirdly, POWER The faculties of the in the WILL over the INSTRUMENTS OF ACTION. mind may be considered as constituting a little republie, each possessing a nature peculiar to itself, and affected accordingly, in view of motives, or rather, in accordance with certain fixed relations which Now, since the prothe mental faculties sustain to external objects. pensities and sentiments, i. e. the animal and moral nature of man, are mere blind instincts in themselves, motives must be addressed to them through the medium of the intellect, which alone is endowed It is the intellect which with the powers of perception and reason.

furnishes not only the motives, but judges of their adaptation to the
other faculties, and reasons on the consequences of selecting and act-
ing in view of the motives presented. Here a knowledge of the
structure of the brain throws great light on the subject of the will, as
The posterior and middle lobes of the
connected with free agency.
brain include the organs of the propensities and sentiments, while the
anterior lobe includes those of the intellect.

Sir Charles Bell discovered that two distinct sets of nervous

filaments proceed from the spinal column, and, that though they are enveloped in the same sheath, and cannot, in their texture, be distinguished from each other, yet perform entirely different functions. Those filaments which proceed from the anterior part of the spinal column, are the voluntary nerves, or nerves of motion, and those proceeding from the posterior part, are involuntary nerves, or nerves of sensation. Consequently, the latter class of nerves, as far as the choice or agency of the individual is concerned, must necessarily be governed or controlled by the former. Hence, it might be inferred, a priori, that the same harmony exists in the distribution of the nervous filaments, when applied to the brain. And it has since been fully established by phrenological discoveries, that the nerves of motion, or the voluntary nerves, ramify the convolutions of the anterior lobe of the brain; whereas, the nerves of sensation, or the involuntary nerves, ramify the convolutions of the middle and posterior lobes, which also receive a few nervous filaments of motion, and only a few, compared with the anterior lobe. Accordingly, therefore, will depends chiefly upon the anterior lobe, and the propensities, feelings, and sentiments, manifested by the functions of other portions of the brain, must be governed principally by means of the intellect.

Inasmuch as phrenology proves that there is a plurality of faculties to the mind, there will necessarily be a plurality of motives; and, by the discovery of the connection of the voluntary nerves with the anterior lobe of the brain, we see that this fact gives man indirectly power over the instruments of action, or the organs of sensation and feeling. But the actual power of the will must chiefly depend on the relative size existing between the anterior and the middle and posterior lobes of the brain. There are, then, different degrees of free agency, and, consequently, corresponding variations in the amount of human responsibility. In this remark, we simply refer to the natural capabilities of man, and not to the privileges enjoyed, or the knowledge acquired, both of which conditions have a powerful influence on human character and conduct. As the philosophy of the will and moral agency can never be correctly and fully understood without a knowledge of the structure and functions of the brain, we regret that Mr. Dean should have omitted, or passed over so slightly, this important part of the subject. And we hope, if a new edition of his work is called for, he will not fail to introduce this point, and show the dependence of the will on the intellect, and the relations which subsist between the different lobes of the brain; for by this means only, can a rational and satisfactory explanation be given of the principles involved in free agency.

Mr. Dean devotes the chief body of the work, under the heads of