Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political CompetitionHerbert Kitschelt, Steven I. Wilkinson Cambridge University Press, 29.03.2007 - 377 Seiten Most models of party competition assume that citizens vote for a platform rather than narrowly targeted material benefits. However, there are many countries where politicians win elections by giving money, jobs, and services in direct exchange for votes. This is not just true in the developing world, but also in economically developed countries - such as Japan and Austria - that clearly meet the definition of stable, modern democracies. This book offers explanations for why politicians engage in clientelistic behaviours and why voters respond. Using newly collected data on national and sub-national patterns of patronage and electoral competition, the contributors demonstrate why explanations based on economic modernization or electoral institutions cannot account for international variation in patron-client and programmatic competition. Instead, they show how the interaction of economic development, party competition, governance of the economy, and ethnic heterogeneity may work together to determine the choices of patrons, clients and policies. |
Inhalt
Abschnitt 1 | 32 |
Abschnitt 2 | 45 |
Abschnitt 3 | 50 |
Abschnitt 4 | 68 |
Abschnitt 5 | 84 |
Abschnitt 6 | 110 |
Abschnitt 7 | 125 |
Abschnitt 8 | 141 |
Abschnitt 10 | 182 |
Abschnitt 11 | 189 |
Abschnitt 12 | 191 |
Abschnitt 13 | 206 |
Abschnitt 14 | 227 |
Abschnitt 15 | 251 |
Abschnitt 16 | 276 |
Abschnitt 17 | 298 |
Abschnitt 9 | 159 |
Abschnitt 18 | 322 |
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and ... Herbert Kitschelt,Steven I. Wilkinson Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2007 |
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
allocation Andhra Pradesh argue Austria ballot behavior Belgium benefits beta coefficient candidates caste chapter citizen-politician linkage citizens clien clientelism clientelistic exchange clientelistic linkages clientelistic networks clientelistic politics clientelistic practices clientelistic system clients coalition constituencies countries decline deliver democratic deprivation index direct exchange distribution district dominance economic development effective elections electoral system elites ethnic categories ethnic favoritism ethnocultural expect factors favor funds governors groups incentive increase incumbent individual industrial institutions intra-party Italy Japan Kitschelt labor-based parties leaders legislative less linkage mechanisms linkage strategies machine politics Madhya Pradesh mobilization monitoring monopoly municipalities naya netas organization Panchayat partisan party competition patron patronage democracies percent Peronist political machines political parties politicians Pradesh preference votes programmatic party programs Rajasthan reform regimes regional rent-seeking risk rural sector SNTV/MMD social targeted telism tion Udaipur district urban variable village voters winning
Verweise auf dieses Buch
Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene Eingeschränkte Leseprobe - 2007 |