XXXIX. 1769. Feb. While England was enforcing its restrictive com- CHAP. mercial system with the most jealous vigilance,1 Du Chatelet continued his intercession with Choiseul, to employ Free Trade as the great liberator of Colonies. "The question," he pleaded, "cannot be submitted to the decision of the Chambers of Commerce. We know their principles. They regard every thing in colonial commerce which does not turn exclusively to the benefit of the Kingdom, as contrary to the end for which Colonies were established, and as a theft from the State. To practise on these maxims is impossible. The wants of trade are stronger than the laws of trade. The North of America can alone furnish supplies to its South. This is the only point of view under which the cession of Canada can be regarded as a loss for France; but that cession will one day be amply compensated for, if it shall cause the rebellion and independence of the English Colonies, which become every day more probable and more near." At the same time the Parisian world was alive with enthusiasm for the Americans, and with admiration for their illustrious advocates. But Spain had been the parent of the protective system, and remained the steadfast supporter of that restrictive policy, by which, in the midst of every resource of wealth, she had been impoverished. From the first proposal of throwing colonial commerce open, she feared the contraband exportation of gold and silver. "Besides;" thus Grimaldi, the 'T. Bradshaw to R. Sutton, Esq. 25 Feb. 1769; Treasury Letter Book, xxiv. 106. 2 Du Chatelet to Choiseul, 17 February, 1769. "Extract of a Letter from London, of 5 April, 1769. 1769. Feb. CHAP. Spanish Minister, gave his definitive answer; "the XXX X. position and strength of the countries occupied by the Americans, excite a just alarm for the rich Spanish possessions on their borders. They have already introduced their grain and rice into our Colonies by a commerce of interlopers. If this introduction should be legalized and extended to other objects of commerce, it would effectually increase the power and prosperity of a neighbor, already too formidable. Moreover; it is probable, that if this neighbor should separate from its metropolis, it would assume the republican form of Government; and a republic is a government dangerous from the wisdom, the consistency, and the solidity of the measures which it would adopt for executing such projects of conquests as it would naturally form."1 The opinion of Spain was deliberately pronounc ed and sternly adhered to. She divided the continent of North America with England, and loved to see "her enemy" embarrassed by war with its Colonies; but while she feared England much, she at that early day feared America more; she preferred as a neighbor a dependent Colony to an independent Republic; and Spain was later than Great Britain itself to confess our national existence. 'D'Ossun to Choiseul, Madrid, 20 Feb. 1769. A copy of this letter is in the French Archives, Angleterre, T. 485, p. 473. The orig inal is in the series marked Espagne, T. 556. Compare Choiseul to Du Chatelet, 14 March, 1769. CHAPTER XL. VIRGINIA COMES TO THE AID OF MASSACHUSETTS.-HILLSBO- MARCH-MAY, 1769. XL. 1769. THE decision of the King of Spain had been CHAP. hastened by tidings of the rebellion in New Orleans, which engaged the most earnest attention of his March Council.1 The Cabinet, with but one dissentient, agreed that Louisiana must be retained, as a granary for Havana and Port Rico, a precaution against the contraband trade of France, and a barrier to keep off English encroachments by the indisputable line of a great river. "Still more," said the Duke of Alba, "the world and especially America must see that the King can and will crush even an intention of disrespect." "If France should recover Louisiana," said Masones de Lima, "she would annex it to the English Colonies, or would establish its independence."" "A republic in Louisiana," such was D'Aranda's carefully prepared opinion, "would be independent of the European powers, who would all cultivate her friendship and support her ex 2 1 Grimaldi to Fuentes in Ga- Gayarré's Louisiana, iii. 248, CHAP. istence. She would increase her population, enlarge XL. her limits, and grow into a rich, flourishing and free March State, contrasting with our exhausted Provinces. From 1769. the example before them, the inhabitants of our vast Mexican domain would be led to consider their total want of commerce, the extortions of their Governors, the little esteem in which they themselves are held, the few offices which they are permitted to fill; they would hate still more the Spanish rule, and would think to brave it with security. If by improving the government of the Mexican Provinces and the condition of their inhabitants, we should avoid the fatal revolution, Louisiana would still trade with the harbors on our coast, and also by land with Texas and New Mexico, and through them with Old Mexico. Between Louisiana and Mexico, there are no established limits; the rebels, if they remain as they are, will have a pretext for claiming an arbitrary extension of territory." He therefore advised to reduce the colony, but to keep New Orleans in such insignificance as to tempt no attack. 1 The King accepted the decision of his Cabinet; adding his fear lest the example of Louisiana should influence the colonies" of other powers," in which he already discerned the rising "spirit of sedition and independence." A different train of reasoning engaged the Cabinet of France. "Here," said one of its advisers, "is the happy opportunity of dividing the British Empire, by placing before its Colonies the interesting spectacle of two potentates who pardon, who protect, and who deign 'Gayarro's Louisiana, iii. 255, 256. * Gayarré's Hist. de la Louisiane, ii. 266. XL. 1769. March in concert to utter the powerful word of liberty. CHAP. War between France and England would bind these countries more firmly to their metropolis. The example of happiness will allure them to the independence towards which they tend. By leading them to confide in France and Spain, they will dare more and dare sooner. Nothing can better persuade to this confidence than to establish liberty in Louisiana,1 and to open the port of New Orleans to men of all nations and all religions." "The passion for extended dominion must not hide from Spain, that a discontented and ill guarded Colony cannot arrest the march of the English, and will prove an unprofitable expense. Were we to take back Louisiana, our best efforts could effect less than the charm of liberty. Without the magic of liberty, the territory will never become more than a simple line of demarkation. Severity would throw it into despair and into the arms of the English. To give voluntarily what the British Parliament haughtily refuses, to assimilate New Orleans in its form to the freest of the British Colonies, to adopt for it from each of them whatever is the dearest to them, to do more, to enfranchise it and maintain invariably privileges capable of intoxicating the English and the Americans, this is to arm their America against themselves, by risking no more than what would otherwise be neglected." Every Frenchman had in his heart an excuse for the insurgents, and was ready to applaud their delirium of nationality and 'Idée sur l'opposition trouvée par les Espagnols à la Louisiane. Archives Françaises, Angleterre. 2 "La Nouvelle Orleans seroit ouverte à toutes les Nations, et à toutes les religions." |