There seems, however, to be so great a similarity in our fituations, as is fufficient to afford a foundation for a confiderable fimilarity in tafte; particularly in perfons whofe education and manner of life have been nearly the fame. But a ftandard of tafte, founded upon the fimilar influences which perfons fo fituated have been subject to, cannot be applied to those persons whose education and manner of life have been very different. It is no wonder that a perfon accustomed to the refined fentiments of modern times cannot relish fome of the compofitions of the ancients; that what is deemed a fine taste in the Eaft, fhould not be deemed equally good in Europe; or even that what is admired in France, fhould not always meet with the fame approbation in England.

This diverfity of tafte would certainly be much more confiderable at prefent, were it not for the easy intercourse there is between different nations, and different univerfities, particularly by means of the art of printing; by which they communicate their feveral feelings, and thereby bring their taftes nearer to a perfect fimilarity. It confirms this observation, that it is generally thought that fomething of the strength of the English writers is perceived in fome of the later French compofitions; and that our modern polite authors in England have acquired the delicacy and correctness of the French. The confequence of a freer intercourse between the eastern and western parts of the world

would,

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would, certainly, be their profiting by our tafte, and our manner of compofition, if not our acquiring alfo fomething more of theirs. And, from this principle, we may expect that, in consequence of the growing intercourfe between all the nations of the earth, and all the literati of them, an uniform and perfect standard of taste will at length be eftablished over the whole world.

In the mean time, justness of taste will be determined by appealing to the general sense of those who have been the most converfant with the subjects of it. A deviation from this general taste will be reckoned a fault, and a coincidence with it an excellence; and the difficulty there is in ascertaining what is this medium of opinion in connoiffeurs makes the business of criticism, or the standard of judging in works of genius, fo vague and undetermined as it is. Perfons who have not been converfant with the subjects of tafte are excluded from having any vote in this case, because their minds have not been in a proper fituation for receiving the ideas and fenfations which are requifite to form a just taste.

LECTURE XVIII.

A general Account of the Pleasure we receive from Objects that occafion a moderate Exertion of our Faculties.

fition, derive their excellence and fine effect, either from drawing out and exercifing our faculties, by the views they prefent to our minds; or elfe by transferring from foreign objects, by the principle of affociation, ideas which tend to improve the fenfe of a paffage. In what cafes the effect of compofition is heightened by each of thefe means, and in what manner it is done, will be the subject of the following Lectures to explain.

One property effential to every thing that gives us pleasure is, that it occafions a moderate exercise of our faculties. Pleafure confifts of fenfations moderately vigorous. It is, therefore, capable of existing in any degree between the two extremes of perfect languor and tranquillity of mind on the one hand, and actual pain and uneafinefs on the other. It is obfervable, likewife, that the more moderate any pleasure is, the longer continuance it is capable of; and that the more intense any pleasurable fenfation is, or the more nearly it approaches

approaches to a ftate of pain, the lefs capable it is of a long duration. Immoderate pleasure, as it were, oppreffes, fatigues, and exhaufts the mind.

Nothing can be more evident than the truth of thefe principles, when applied to our external or corporeal fenfes. Warmth, for inftance, is a fenfation increafing in pleasure in all its gradations, from the torpid and benumbed state of the body, till it become actually hot and painful. Likewife a moderate and barely fenfible degree of warmth is agreeable through the whole courfe of our lives; but we foon grow impatient of greater degrees of warmth, though for a time they may produce a more grateful sensation. In like manner, the limits of the pleasures of taste are, the infipid on the one hand, and the acrid and pungent on the other. Also the moderate pleasure which we receive from our common aliments, is always grateful; whereas viands of a high flavour, abounding with falts, which act forcibly upon the nerves appropriated to the sense of tafte, though they yield a more exquifite relifh for the time, foon cloy and difguft the palate. The fame things may be observed concerning the remaining fenses of smelling, feeing, and hearing.

To thefe affections of the external and corporeal fenfes, those of the internal and intellectual are ftrictly analogous. Indeed, it is impoffible they fhould not be fo, if the former be the only fources of the latter; that is, if, as was hinted before, all M 2

our

our intellectual pleasures and pains consist of nothing but the simple pleasures and pains of sense, commixed and combined together in infinitelyvarious degrees and proportions, fo as to be separately indistinguishable, and transferred upon reign objects, by the principle of afsociation.

fo

It is obfervable, likewife, that a moderate exertion of our active powers is attended with a continued perception of moderate pleasure, both as it quickens the perceptive powers, and expofes us to the influence of objects that are adapted to affect our senses; but that a violent exertion is, for fimilar reasons, attended with pain and uneasiness. That this is equally true with respect both to the powers of our bodies and the faculties of our minds, is too obvious to require illuftration. Indeed, it is wifely provided by Divine Providence, that both our minds and bodies are equally impatient of a state of reft and inactivity. Hence we are conftantly impelled to exert ourselves with vigour in the station in which we are placed; and we can never be happy, and enjoy our being, unlefs we fulfil the great ends of it.

All perfons, indeed, have not an equal relish for the fame exercises, but in all minds there is an appetite for fome or other fpecies of it; and when once, by addicting ourselves to any kind of exercife, we have acquired a habit of it, from that time it becomes, in a manner, neceffary to our happiness.

That