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have corrected this mechanical propensity; but it will ever retain a sensible influence over the generality of mankind ; and these are almost the only people we have to do with in the business of the passions and imagination.

This observation shows us how cautious all writers should be not to engage the attention of their readers too much to vicious characters; since, when once they have, by this means, engaged our interest in their favour, we are very backward to withdraw our good wishes; and the interest we take in the character and schemes of a bad man, cannot but leave upon the mind an impression unfavourable to virtue. A natural love for virtue is a very insufficient security against this influence, especially in young minds. No writer, who hath at heart the interest of virtue, and the happiness of his fellow-creatures, ought to trust to it. Even the prudent and virtuous Mr. Richardson hath interested his reader so much in the character of Lovelace, in Clariffa, that, I believe, there are few of his readers who would be displeased with the fuccess of his base designs upon any other woman than Clarissa herself, in whose favour we have been beforehand more strongly interested.

In the third place, let it be noted, that when each of the pleasures of the imagination are referred to some one source, I only mean, that ideas and sensations of that kind are the principal ones that


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enter into its composition. For, in fact, none of our intellectual pleasures are so simple as to be derived froni one single source only. They are all of so complex a nature, and are so connected with one another, that, it is probable, there is not onė sentiment of pleasure or pain that can be called intelle&tual (not being a direct impression upon fome of the external senses) but what is more or less compounded of almost all the other intellectual pleasures and pains too. The principle of affociation is predominant in every thing relating to our intellectual faculties : and, in a situation so exposed as ours is to joint impressions, from a variety of independent objects, our fensations cannot fail to be fo commixed and combined together, that it must be extremely difficult, if not impossible, completeIy to resolve any one of them into all their feparate, component parts. All that can be done, is, to place each pleasing object, that occurs in works of taste and genius, under that species of pleasure which originally, oř most eminently, entered into the composition of it; and at the same time, not wholly to omit taking notice of other sources from which it borrows any thing confiderable.

Montesquieu, in his Ejay on Taste, very ingeniously enumerates a variety of causes which contribute to excite the fingle feeling or sensation which the mind perceives upon the view of a regular garden. And Dr. Gerard, in his treatise upon the



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same subject, has illustrated the same observation
by analizing the complex sensation of pleasure we
perceive from a view of a fine human face.

It will answer my purpose better, and more emi-
nently contribute to throw light upon several other
important particulars relating to Taste, to consider
the pleasures we receive from the prospect of a fine
country landscape, and consequently from the de-
scription of rural scenes in paftorals, and books of

This will, likewise, illustrate the doctrine of ASSOCIATION, and the very probable opinion of Dr. Hartley, who supposed that it is the only mental principle employed in the formation, growth, and declension of all our intellectual pleafures and pains.

There is no person, who hath passed much of his time in the country, but must have connected with the idea of it a variety of distinct pleasures, which are now separately indistinguishable ; tlough the traces of them, still remaining in the mind, contribute to swell the complex sensation of pleasure which he feels upon the view of it. Among the principal ingredients in this complex sensation, we may mention the pleasures with which our external senses have a thousand times been affected in the country; the sweet smells and the fine colours of flowers, the agreeable taste of fruits, the melody of birds, and the pleasure we have received from rural sports and pastimes. These, if we be advanced in life, we may have no great re

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lish for ; yet the ideas of the pleasure we may formerly have received from these objects, still adhere to the idea of the scenes in which they were enjoyed, and recur, in a confused sensation of pleasure, whenever those scenes are presented to the mind.

To these we may add the ideas of the healthfulness, and of the comparative innocence of a country life, the apparent usefulness of husbandry; a view of the plenty of the necessaries and conveniencies of life which the earth affords; the ideas of novelty, beauty, and grandeur, with which we have, upon innumerable occasions, been struck in viewing the scenes of nature; together with the ideas of the jocundity and happiness which our fellow-creatures must frequently have shared with us in a country life.

All these fources have contributed, in a greater or less degree, to the complex sense of pleasure which a fine country prospect affords ; and to these a philosophical and devout observer adds lively ideas of the power, wisdom, and goodness of God, the marks of which are so conspicuous in the vegetable and animal world. By him the Deity is feen in all his works; and though, upon the first view of a rural scene, the ideas of the Divine Being and his providence be not distinctly perceived, they cannot fail greatly to heighten every complex sensation into which they really enter.



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From the principle of association we may, likewise, account for the tumultuous pleasurable senfation we feel upon the view of the place where we passed our infancy, the school where we were educated, or any other place, or person, with whom a great number of our ideas and sensations have formerly been associated, though they now form one complex sensation, and are separately indistinguishable. Even painful sensations, as they give no pain upon reflection, unless they have been extremely violent indeed, only contribute to heighten the complex pleasing emotion.

Sometimes it is observable, that, immediately upon feeling a tumultuous sensation of this kind, the idea of some particular affecting circumstance will occur distinctly, it not having perfectly coalefced with the general complex sensation ; whereas, by degrees, it intirely vanishes into, and makes a part of it, and in its separate state is quite forgotten. Facts of this nature are circumstances extremely favourable to this hypothesis of the mechanical generation of our intellectual pleasures and pains by the principle of association ; and there are few persons who attend to their feelings but must have observed them.

It is easy to conceive that complex sensations of this kind are capable of being transferred to objects which are similar to those with which they were originally associated, by means of any common property. Thus the complex sensation, con


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