A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism

for any opinion is really convinced of it himself, tends to propagate that conviction.

A perfon fhews that he is fully perfuaded of the truth of what he contends for, and his confidence in the goodness of his caufe, when he is willing to appeal to the judgment and confcience of other perfons, and particularly when he dare appeal to his adversary himself. For no perfon would ferioufly make fuch an appeal, who did not believe his cause to be fo clear that all the world, if they confidered it, would concur with him in it. This formal appeal, therefore, to a perfon's judges, his hearers, and his adverfary, is a figure of the first rank in oratory, and greatly conducive to the purpofe of perfuafion.

It hath ftill a stronger effect of the fame kind when an orator breaks out into an exclamation, exprefling his wonder, astonishment, and indignation, that his opinion fhould be controverted, or his caufe oppofed; and a stronger ftill, when not only visible but invisible powers, when not only rational beings, but things inanimate are invoked, to atteft the truth of what is advanced. All paffions are communicative, and are univerfally propagated by the genuine expreffions of them.

Many happy inftances of thefe forms of addrefs are found in the orations of Cicero, particularly in his invectives against Verres, Catiline, and Antony. The very first words of his first oration against Catiline, which was delivered in the fenate, when Catiline

Inftances of the most abfurd rant, and fuch extravagance as is incompatible with every character, and with every paffion, abound in Dryden's plays, particularly in the part of Almanzor in the Conqueft of Granada.

It is impoffible not to smile when Moliere makes Harpagus (when he is about to examine upon the rack all his family, fervants, fons, and daughters) fay he would apply the torture to himself, "et a moi auffi.".

Very extravagant likewife is the following speech, which Shakespeare puts into the mouth of Ligarius:

Now bid me run,

And I will ftrive with things impoffible,

And

get the better of them.

JULIUS CESAR, A&t II. Scene 3.

LECTURE

LECTURE XV.

Of Forms of Addrefs adapted to gain BELIEF; and, firft, of thofe that imply PRESENT THOUGHT, and an UNPREMEDITATED EXPRESSION.

HAVING obferved what I think most important relating to the paffions, I proceed to confider what relates to the judgment, in affenting to what is proposed to it.

Independent of the power of arguments, there are feveral forms of addrefs adapted to engage belief, which abound in the works of orators. These it is in the power of every fpeaker to adopt at pleafure, as they are, each of them, nothing more than a different manner in which arguments may be introduced and expreffed. Since, however, they do contribute greatly to the success of an orator, I shall enumerate the principal and most striking of them, and endeavour to fhew the cause of the influence which they have upon our minds.

Every art of perfuafion founded upon nature, and really tending to engage belief, must confift of fuch forms of addrefs as are natural to a perfon who is himself strongly convinced of the truth and importance of what he contends for; who is corifcious that he is perfectly mafter of his fubject,

and

and acquainted with every thing that can be advanced for or against the question in debate; who is poffeffed even of a redundancy of proof for what he advances; and who is, moreover, perfectly candid and unprejudiced, willing to allow all the weight he can to the pleas of his adversaries.

From the principle of Sympathy, which is natuIral to the human mind, we univerfally feel ourfelves difpofed to conform to the feelings, the sentiments, and every thing belonging to the fituation of those we converfe with, and particularly of all those persons who engage much of our attention. If, therefore, no prejudice intervene, we always feel ourselves more or lefs difpofed to adopt the opinions of those perfons with whom we have frequent intercourse. Confequently, we are, in all cafes, more difposed to give our affent to any propofition, if we perceive that the person who contends for it is really in earnest, and believes it himfelf. Indeed, prior to our hearing any arguments, we are naturally inclined to suppose, that a strong conviction and perfuafion in other perfons could not be produced without a fufficient cause; from being sensible that a like strong persuasion is founded upon fufficient reafons in ourselves. The ideas of strong perfuafion and of truth being, on this account, intimately affociated together, the will introduce the other, fo that whatever manner of addrefs tends to demonftrate that the advocate

for

for any opinion is really convinced of it himself, tends to propagate that conviction.

A perfon fhews that he is fully perfuaded of the truth of what he contends for, and his confidence. in the goodness of his caufe, when he is willing to appeal to the judgment and confcience of other perfons, and particularly when he dare appeal to his adversary himself. For no perfon would ferioufly make fuch an appeal, who did not believe his cause to be fo clear that all the world, if they confidered it, would concur with him in it. This formal appeal, therefore, to a perfon's judges, his hearers, and his adverfary, is a figure of the firft rank in oratory, and greatly conducive to the purpofe of perfuafion.

It hath still a stronger effect of the fame kind when an orator breaks out into an exclamation, expreffing his wonder, astonishment, and indignation, that his opinion should be controverted, or his cause oppofed; and a stronger ftill, when not only vifible but invifible powers, when not only rational beings, but things inanimate are invoked, to atteft the truth of what is advanced. All paffions are communicative, and are univerfally propagated by the genuine expreffions of them.

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