Syllabus.

be a burden upon all the property. It can be assessed and collected for corporate purposes only.

It was held, in Harward v. St. Clair Drain. Co. 51 Ill. 130, that sec. 5, Art. 9, was a limitation upon the power of the legislature. It must therefore follow that the legislature can not clothe the corporate authorities of the municipality with power to assess and collect taxes from only a part of the municipality, for a corporate purpose. The corporate purpose must extend to the entire city, and in the apportionment of the tax to effectuate the purpose, the principle of equality and uniformity must be observed. City of Chicago v. Larned, 34 Ill. 203.

The decree of the court is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to make the injunction perpetual, and to grant the relief prayed for.

1. COMMON PLEAS COURT OF SPARTA-writ issued from, how directed. A writ issued from the court of common pleas of the city of Sparta, in Randolph county, is properly directed "to the city marshal and all sheriffs, coroners and constables of said county."

2. SAME-territorial jurisdiction of. The territorial jurisdiction of such court is, by the provisions of the constitution of 1848, relating to inferior local courts, circumscribed by the city limits.

3. SAME-writ, whether void-service. Although the mandate of a writ, issued from such court, is to summon the defendant "if he shall be found in your county," etc., yet the service, if shown by the return to have been made in the city of Sparta, is good, otherwise it is defective.

But the writ itself, by reason of such mandate, although the service be defective, is not void and should not be quashed.

10-59TH ILL.

Syllabus. Statement of the case.

4. SAME-venue. In the margin of a writ, issued out of the common pleas court of the city of Sparta, in Randolph county, the proper State and county were named, and the command in the body of the writ was to summon the defendant, “to be and appear before the common pleas court of Sparta, of said county, on," etc.," to be holden," etc., "at the court house in Sparta, in said Randolph county," etc.: Held, the venue was well enough laid.

APPEAL from the Common Pleas Court of Sparta; the Hon. WILLIAM P. MURPHY, Judge, presiding.

This was an action of assumpsit, brought on a promissory note given by Witbord to Gardner. The question arises upon the writ, which was as follows:

STATE OF ILLINOIS, 88.
Randolph county.

The people of the State of Illinois to the city marshal, to all sheriffs, coroners, and constables of said county, greeting:

We command you to summon Henry A. Witbord, if he shall be found in your county, personally to be and appear before the Common Pleas Court of Sparta, of said county, on the first day of the next term thereof, to be holden at the court house in Sparta, in said Randolph county, on the first Monday of February, 1871, to answer unto Henry Gardner, in a plea of assumpsit, to the damage of said plaintiff, as he says, in the sum of three hundred ($300) dollars, and have you then and there this writ, with an endorsement thereon in what manner you have executed the same.

Witness Theodore Simpson, Clerk of our said court, and the seal thereof, at his office in Sparta, in said Randolph [SEAL.] county, this 23d day of December, A. D., 1870. THEODORE SIMPSON, Clerk.

[Return of Officer.]

State of Illinois, Randolph county:

I have duly served the within named Henry A. Witbord, this 13th day of January, A. D., 1871, as I am herein comEDWIN R. FOSTER, City Marshal.

manded.

Statement of the case. Opinion of the Court.

The defendant filed a motion to quash the writ, assigning the following special causes:

First. For that the writ is not directed to the city marshal of the city of Sparta.

Second. For that said writ, being original process, is directed beyond the jurisdiction of the court, to-wit: "To the city marshal and all sheriffs, coroners and constables of said county," to-wit: Randolph county.

Third. For that said writ commands to summon said Witbord if found in the county.

Fourth. Writ is directed and by its terms sent beyond the jurisdictional limits of the court.

Sixth. For that there is no venue laid in said writ, that is to say, the venue of said court is not laid in said writ.

The court sustained the motion to quash the writ, and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.

Mr. J. BLACKBURN JONES, for the appellant.

Mr. JOHN MICHAN and Mr. R. J. GODDARD, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE SHELDON delivered the opinion of the Court:

The error assigned upon this record, is, sustaining a motion to quash the writ.

The writ was properly directed “to the city marshal and all sheriffs, coroners and constables," as the act to establish the court of common pleas in the city of Sparta, in Randolph county, expressly provides that all process shall be so directed. Session Laws of 1869, page 140, sec. 8.

The venue of the court is well enough laid in the writ. The proper State and county are named in the margin according to the ordinary form, and the command in the body of the writ is, to summon the defendant, "to be and appear before the common pleas court of Sparta, of said county, on the first

Syllabus.

day of the next term thereof, to be holden at the court house in Sparta, in said Randolph county," etc.

The territorial jurisdiction of this court is limited by the constitution to the city of Sparta. The People v. Evans, 18 Ill. 361; Holmes v. Fihlenburg, 54 Ill. 203.

Although the mandate of the writ is, "to summon Henry A. Witbord, if he shall be found in your county," etc., the service, if it had been shown by the return to have been made in the city of Sparta, would have been good. It is now defective, as it does not appear by the return to have been so made. But the writ itself was not void, and should not have been quashed.

The judgment of the court below is reversed and the cause remanded.

Judgment reversed.

CHARLES PINKSTAFF et al.

v.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, use, etc.

1. ADMINISTRATOR'S BOND—where a second or additional bond is given liability thereon. An administrator, after having given the usual bond required, gave a second or additional bond, not, however, on the application of the sureties in the first bond, under the 79th section of the statute, but to furnish security for his official conduct satisfactory to the probate court. The second bond did not by its terms relate back to the granting of the administration. Its conditions were identical with those of an ordinary administrator's bond, except that, after describing the principal in the bond, as administrator of the "goods and chattels, rights and credits" of the deceased, he is required to make an inventory merely of the "rights and credits" which should come to his hands, leaving out the words "goods and chattels." The effect of this was that when, in a subsequent part of the conditions of the bond, the administrator was required to deliver and pay over to the persons entitled thereto, "all the rest of said goods and chattels," the words "said goods and chattels " should be

Syllabus. Opinion of the Court.

referred to all the goods and chattels which had come to the hands of the administrator, and not merely to those coming to his hands after the giving of the bond.

2. If the more specific conditions in the bond would not be sufficient, the general one that he was to "do and perform all other acts which may be at any time required of him by law," would require him to pay over to the guardian whatever might be due the heirs.

3. So, where the administrator had misapplied the funds of the estate before the second bond was given, by appropriating them to his own use, the sureties on such bond would be liable to the guardian of the heirs for such portion of the money as he was entitled to in that capacity; and this, even if the sureties were only liable for breaches occurring after its execution, because the gravamen of the action would be, not the prior misapplication, but the failure to pay over.

4. Nor is it necessary, in such case, that the first bond should be exhausted, before resort could be had to the second. The first bond continued in force, and was as obligatory upon its makers as if the second had never been given; but a creditor, or other person interested in the estate, has his election upon which to sue, if the mal-administration for which suit is brought, would be a breach of both the bonds.

5. JUDGMENT-in suit on administrator's bond. In an action upon an administrator's bond, the formal judgment in debt need not be for the full penalty of the bond.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Crawford county; the Hon. H. B. DECIUS, Judge, presiding.

Mr. E. CALLAHAN, for the plaintiffs in error.

Mr. J. G. BoWMAN and Mr. J. S. PRITCHETT, for the defendants in error.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE LAWRENCE delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an action brought by the guardian of the infant children of Mary E. Hyde, deceased, against the sureties, upon a second or additional bond given by her administrator. The breach in the declaration is, the refusal of the administrator to pay over to the guardian the money belonging to the heirs. A recovery is resisted on the ground, that the assets came into the hands of the administrator, and, as averred in the plea