Delusions of Intelligence: Enigma, Ultra, and the End of Secure Ciphers
Cambridge University Press, 14.08.2006 - 314 Seiten
In 1974, the British government admitted that its WWII secret intelligence organization had read Germany's ciphers on a massive scale. The intelligence from these decrypts influenced the Atlantic, the Eastern Front and Normandy. Why did the Germans never realize the Allies had so thoroughly penetrated their communications? As German intelligence experts conducted numerous internal investigations that all certified their ciphers' security, the Allies continued to break more ciphers and plugged their own communication leaks. How were the Allies able to so thoroughly exploit Germany's secret messages? How did they keep their tremendous success a secret? What flaws in Germany's organization allowed this counterintelligence failure and how can today's organizations learn to avoid similar disasters? This book, the first comparative study of WWII SIGINT (Signals Intelligence), analyzes the characteristics that allowed the Allies SIGINT success and that fostered the German blindness to Enigma's compromise.
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British Sigint Organization
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Abwehr Admiralty agencies Allied analysts appear Army attack Ausw¨artiges B-Dienst beneﬁt Bletchley Park Bletchley’s Bombes break Britain captured centralization cipher machine cipher security cipher system civilian codebooks codes and ciphers collaboration command convoy cooperation coordinates cracking cribs cryptanalysts cryptographic cryptologic D¨onitz daily key daily settings deciphering decryption developed difﬁcult effort enciphered Enigma ciphers Enigma keys Enigma machine Enigma’s security experts exploited ﬁeld ﬁnd ﬁnding ﬁrst French GC&CS gence German German intelligence Germany’s Heer high-grade Hitler interception investigations leaks Luftwaffe machine’s Marine Marine’s mechanical messages National Security Agency Navy Nazi Ofﬁce ofﬁcial OKW/Chi operations organizations Park’s personnel physical compromise possible POWs procedures proved radar radio reading Enigma reconnaissance reports rotors secret service branches Sigaba sigint signal security signals intelligence signiﬁcant SLUs Special Liaison Units speciﬁc staff Steckerboard success tactical intelligence teleprinter tion trafﬁc Typex U-boats Ultra units upgrades Wehrmacht wiring
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Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2007