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AFFGHANISTAN AND INDIA.

THE events of the last six months have at length reduced the question of our Affghan policy into something like a definite form. From the day when our columns first crossed the Indus in hostile array, we never ceased to proclaim that any permanent occupation of the country, as a conquest made on our behalf, could never be for an instant contemplated; and that the sole object of the expedition was the restoration of the friendly dynasty of the Suddozyes, to whom we were bound by the ties of ancient alliance, to the throne from which they were excluded by an usurping chief, the continuance of whose rule was incompatible equally with our interests and with the welfare of his own country. On this avowed principle, Affghanistan was laid waste with fire and sword, the castles of its independent nobles besieged and stormed, and the chiefs themselves slaughtered while fighting in defence of their thresholds; and all this was carried on ("with a view," as stated by a writer in the Asiatic Journal, "to the reconstruction of the social edifice!") in the name of a monarch who, as was notorious to every one, was in effect as much a state prisoner of the English at Cabul as his unfortunate competitor, Dost Mohammed, was in Hindostan, and who exercised less real power, beyond the precincts of his own palace, than the youngest subaltern of the invading army. Herat in the meanwhile, the securing which against attack was the original pretext of the war, was almost the only corner of Affghanistan into which our intrusive arms did not penetrate; and its vizier, Yar. Moham. med, was suffered with perfect impunity to insult and expel our envoy, to levy war against his own nominal sovereign Shah- Kamran, and to open correspondence with all the enemies of England, avowed or secret. Never, in fact, was the notable Whig process

of a non-intervention war more completely carried out than in this instance. All this time, every rupee of revenue extracted from the country in the name of Shah-Shoojah cost at least ten in the collecting; and as the restored monarch was bound by treaty to keep up a subsidiary force, the expense of supporting which would have considerably exceeded the income he had ever been able, even in his former days of prosperity, to levy in his dominions, the slender resources of Affghanistan must, in the natural course of things, have been utterly exhausted in a few yearswhile the current outlay could only be met by incessant draughts on the Calcutta treasury, which was forced to make constant advances, and to contract heavy loans for the sake of maintaining its grasp of a territory already mortgaged far beyond the fee simple of its value. It appears difficult to conjecture how this blissful state of things would have terminated

whether by the bankruptcy of the Indian exchequer, or by the conversion of Affghanistan into a desertif we had been less unmolested in our philanthropic efforts to "make a solitude and call it peace," and ShahShoojah had been still suffered by his affectionate subjects to slumber, undisturbed by cares of state, within the screens of his well-stocked zenana. But the recent catastrophe has given us a chance of extrication from the dilemma. Of the country we are now no longer in possession; and if the intelligence brought by the last mail is to be relied on, both our protegé ShahShoojah, and his nephew and rival Kamran, have closed their career in death; thus virtually terminating the Suddozye dynasty, as the sons of the late Shah are utterly powerless and insignificant among the crowd of chiefs, and one at least of them (Seifdar-Jung) is actually in arms against us. It now re

For the honour of our national character, we hope that the accounts which have appeared from the Delhi Gazette, of the degrading restrictions to which this illustrious captive is said to be now subjected, may be either unfounded or exaggerated. He has already experienced sufficient of unmerited evil at our hands; and it is next to impossible that he can be in any way cognizant of the proceedings of his son,

See our August No., last year, page 173.

mains to be seen whether we shall consider it incumbent upon us, for the vindication (as the phrase is) of our military honour, to perpetrate a second act of violence and national injustice by reconquering Affghanistan, and holding it without disguise as a province of our empire: or whether, making the best of a bad bargain, we shall content ourselves with occupying a few posts on its frontier, and leaving its unhappy natives to recover, without foreign interference, from the dreadful state of anarchy into which our irruption has thrown them.

In the hurried and confused accounts which have been received of the opening of the bloody drama, but little mention is made of the indications which immediately preceded the outbreak; but even if we put the most favourable construction on the conduct of the officials both at Cabul and in the Bengal Presidency, their blind infatuation and want of foresight seem almost to have surpassed the bounds of belief. We have been informed, on authority which we cannot question, that as long ago as August last, information had been received by the Cabinet of Calcutta, of the existence of a widely- ramified conspiracy throughout Affghanistan; but so far were Lord Auckland and his advisers from deeming it necessary to reinforce the inadequate and overworked army of occupation, that orders were actual ly given for the return of Sale's brigade to Hindostan; and they were accordingly on their march from Cabul to Peshawer, when they were attacked by the insurgents, and with difficulty fought their way to Jellalabad, where they have ever since been blockaded. Even the warning received in October, by Sir Alexander Burnes, from Captain Gray of the 44th, (to whom the plot had been revealed by an Affghan chief,*) failed to

awaken so much as a sense of personal insecurity in the mind of the destined victim; and he continued to live as before in the midst of the native town, instead of placing himself in comparative safety within the English lines. The military commanders emulated the supineness of the diplomatists; the stores and commissariat, far from being placed in the fortified camp, or even in the Bala- Hissar † or citadel, were left in a situation which is naïvely described in one of the accounts as "exposed to the first attack of an enemy!"-and all the letters written by the mail which left Cabul only the day before the revolt, describe every thing as being "quiet and peaceable" in the capital.

On the 2d of November, however, (the anniversary of the final defeat of Dost-Mohammed at Purwan-Durrah,) the storm burst forth. At the moment of the breaking-up of the durbar or levee, the war-cry of Islamism was raised throughout the city, and the streets were instantly thronged with thousands of armed and furious Affghans. Burnes, cut off by his own unhappy rashness from either defence or escape, perished at the first onset; the greater part of the ammunition and provisions, exposed as we mentioned above, fell into the hands of the assailants; and numbers of officers and men were promiscuously slaughtered, before they could succeed in rallying within the defences of the cantonments and the BalaHissar. The latter position was eventually abandoned, (though the Shah continued to reside there, and Sir William Macnaghten, with Conolly and others, strongly recommended the concentration of the troops within its walls, rather than in the cantonments,)-and the whole of our force, amounting to between 5000 and 6000 bayonets, Europeans and sepoys,

* "He (Mohammed Uzeen Khan) told me, that he was much alarmed for our safety that the whole of Affghanistan was determined to make common cause, and to drive out or murder every Feringhi in the country-and that Cabul itself was ready to break out." This was forthwith communicated by letter to Sir A. Burnes, whom it reached October 15, or seventeen clear days before the explosion-" The bearer brought a letter to the chief, acknowledging the receipt, but I never heard a line from Sir Alexander Burnes !" Letter of Captain Gray, Bengal Hurkaru, January 3, quoted in Times, March 10.

This phrase has not a little perplexed some of the periodical press, it implies "the upper merely the " upper town or castle," (as bala-khaneh, balcony, means room,") in which the royal palace is situated, and which commands the lower and more extensive portion, divided in two by the Cabul river.

with at least an equal number of camp followers, was drawn together within the intrenched camp. The assailants had at first consisted principally of the tribes near Cabul, and the Kohistanis,* or inhabitants of the mountain tract immediately north of the city; but their ranks were daily swollen by the accession of numerous Ghazis, or religious enthusiasts, who, stimulated by the preaching of their moollahs, flocked from all parts of the country, and even (as it is reported) from Uzbek Tartary, to join the holy war, and aid in the extermination of the infidels. The original leader of the movement is believed to have been Zemaun Khan,† a nephew of Dost Mohammed; but he was soon superseded by the arrival of the second son of the Dost, Mohammed Akhbar Khan, who had escaped from detention at Bokhara. This young chief had formerly been governor of Jellalabad for his father, and had attained a high military reputation among his countrymen, by the signal victory which, in 1837, he had gained over a Sikh army at Jumrood.

Meanwhile, a rising simultaneous with that at Cabul had taken place in every part of the country: the British detached posts had been either cut off or driven in; and the four fortresses of Candahar, Ghazni, Jellalabad, and Cabul, were all that remained in the hands of the Feringhi invaders. An attempt to push forward a column from Candahar for the relief of Cabul, failed from the advanced period of the

season, and the determined opposition of the intervening tribes; and it speedily became evident that the troops in the capital, almost destitute as they were of provisions and ammunition, could not continue much longer to hold out.

On the 23d of December, + accordingly, a conference for arranging terms of capitulation took place between Akhbar Khan and Sir W. Macnaghten; but the interview was broken in upon by a band of armed fanatics, who murdered the British envoy, with one of his attendant officers, on the spot, treating his remains with every circumstance of brutal indignity. But notwithstanding this fearful proof of the treacherous ferocity of the enemy, the necessities of the troops compelled Sir H. Pottinger (who succeeded as political chief) to attempt a renewal of the negotiation; and on January 6th, a convention having been concluded for an unmolested passage to the frontier, the whole British force moved out of their cantonments, and took the road through the passes of the Suffeid. Koh (white mountain) towards Jellalabad—a distance of 105 miles, over tracks rising at the highest point to an elevation of 8200 feet above the level of the sea. "At this point" (Tazeen)—— (we quote the notes to Wyld's excellent map of Affghanistan and the Punjab,) "the thermometer, on the 8th of October, was 19° at sunrise, and the hill streams were frozen over with a

thin coating of ice. The road across this mountainous district, is such as

* These Kohistanis are a branch of the Eusofzye tribe, and have long been noted as the most turbulent and bigoted of the Affghan population. At the battle of Noushehra against the Sikhs in 1823, the Eusofzyes, according to information collected on the spot by Dr Lord," were so blinded by religious frenzy, that they fought more like devils than men. Though repeatedly driven back, they were as often rallied by the shrieks end curses of their women, who mingled unveiled in the fight, and by the Allah-ho-akbars of their maddened moollahs. After the action, dead Eusofzyes were found on dead Sikhs, their teeth still clutching the throats of their adversaries." our first entrance into the country, the hill Eusofzyes (Kohistanis) were among the warmest supporters of the Shah; but had been alienated by the renewal of obsolete and oppressive taxes.

On

†The name of this leader probably gave rise to the statement, (which, from subsequent accounts, would seem to be unfounded,) that a son of Shah-Zemaun (the blind elder brother of Shah-Shoojah) had been set up by the insurgents as king.

Sir W. Macnaghten, in a letter published since his death by the Hon. Mr Erskine, states that this measure had been pressed upon him more than a fortnight previously by the military chiefs, and complains bitterly of "the cowardice of the troops, and incapacity of the commanders," as having led to the triumph of " a contemptible enemy." It cannot yet be ascertained how far these grave charges are capable of substantiation-but the latest advices from India (by the June mail) state, that the supreme government has referred both the conduct of General Elphinstone at Cabul, and the recent surrender of Ghazni, to the decision of courts-martial.

has seldom been crossed-the celebrated Bolan Pass is a trifle to it."

At the time of the capitulation, the total number was about 5000 soldiers, including one Queen's regiment, (the 44th,) and more than 6000 suttlers and other attendants on an eastern camp. But no sooner had the disspirited columns quitted the shelter of their lines, than they were assailed on all sides by swarms of furious Ghazis, who darted on their prey with all the eagerness of religious and national hatred. For the first two days the troops succeeded in keeping the Affghans at bay; but the unfortunate sepoys, benumbed by the intense cold, and unable to struggle through the snow, became almost incapable of handling their arms: and as the army advanced deeper into these tremendous defiles, which had probably never before been traversed by an armed force at such a season, its demoralization became complete. Akhbar Khan, who accompanied the march, professed his utter inability to restrain the attacks of his fanatic followers; but proposed to ensure the personal safety of the commander-in-chief, General Elphinstone, with other superior officers, and the ladies accompanying the army, if they would place themselves in his hands as hostages. It is difficult to conceive that any circumstances could justify the acceptance of this. proposition-it was, however, acceded to; and the fate of the main body, thus abandoned by their leaders, was not long deferred. The route became a scene of continual and almost unresisted carnage; the sepoys perished helplessly; the 44th held out for some time longer; but the soldiers, infuriated by their sufferings, at length broke out into mutiny. All semblance of order or discipline was now lostthe officers, quitting their men, attempted to push forward on horseback to Jellalabad; but only one (Dr Brydon) succeeded in reaching it; the remainder fell into the hands of the Affghans, and were either slain on the spot or made prisoners. The extermination of the rest of the army ap

pears to have been complete, only a few stragglers having been spared by the capricious mercy of individual chiefs; so that of 11,000 who quitted Cabul on January 6, certainly not more than a few hundreds remained alive on the 14th!

[It will be observed that we have refrained from imputing to Akhbar Khan personally any share either in the murder of Sir William Macnaghten, or the violation of the convention; looking upon him rather as the unwil ling spectator of outrages which he had not the power of preventing. From the former charge we consider him to have been amply vindicated by the personal evidence of Captains Lawrence and Mackenzie, the two officers who escaped from the fatal interview; and during the disasters of the retreat, he appears to have endeavoured as far as possible to check the assailants, (who, it should be remembered, were not of his own tribe the Dooraunis, but Ghiljis and Eusofzyes,* over whom he had little influence,) and to have displayed a degree of humanity very unusual in an Asiatic conqueror in the moment of victory.]

Never was the extermination of any civilized force more complete and disastrous; and never, since the disgraceful capitulations in the first American war, had so signal and calamitous a reverse befallen the British arms; further aggravated, also, by the miserable weakness and indecision of the generals, and the indiscipline of the English part of the troops; for the sepoys alone appear to have behaved steadily to the last. But whatever allowances may be made for want of caution in the first instance, and subsequent mismanagement, it is sufficiently clear that the rapidity of our original successes against a foe taken almost by surprise, had led our commanders greatly to underrate the prowess and military character of the Affghans; and that the descendants of the conquerors of Persia and Hindostan, when banded together by any feeling strong enough to obliterate for the time the remembrance of their eternal feuds,

* A letter from Jellalabad, quoted in the Asiatic Journal for April, says: "The attacking party appear to have been the eastern Ghiljis, who did not form a portion of Mohammed Akhbar's army, He told our officers that neither he nor Meer Musjedee, who had both signed the treaty, had any influence over the eastern chiefs. As long as Mohammed Akhbar Khan remained with our party, all seemed to go on well."

still maintain their hereditary claim to be held as the bravest and most warlike of the Asiatic nations. Not the least remarkable feature* in this memorable insurrection, is the good faith which the conspirators observed to each other prior to the explosion. In spite of the endless dissensions which keep every tribe and every village of the Affghans almost constantly in arms against their neighbours, not one was found, among the thousands to whom the plot must have been known, who would betray his brethren of the faith for the incentive of Feringhi gold. Deep and deadly must have been the feeling of exasperation against us which could not only prompt such an union of discordant elements, but maintain it unbroken through all the toils and losses of the subsequent warfare: for Mohammed Akhbar, as we have already observed, seems to have exercised command only over his own clansmen, the Dooraunis, while the great body of the insurgents obeyed no leader but the impulses of their own fanatic zeal. Even in this furious burst of national indignation, the republican spirit which eminently distinguishes the Affghans from all other Asiatics, was so unequivocally apparent, as forcibly to recall the language (worthy of a petty Polish noble under the old régime) in which the aged chief of the Meeankhail tribe replied to Mr Elphinstone's eulogy on the blessings of a firm and established government under a powerful monarch, "We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood, but we will never be content with a master!"

The suddenness and magnitude of the disaster seem at first utterly to have paralysed the minds of the Indian authorities. Not only was no attempt made to raise the leaguer of Cabul, (for which omission, indeed, the shortness of the time, and the severity of the season, was perhaps sufficient excuse,) but the gallant band at Jellalabad were left throughout the winter, and almost up to the date of the last advices, to maintain themselves not only unsupported by efficient aid, but even without any communication or promise of succour to encourage them in the desperate struggle for existence. An attempt was indeed made about the middle of January, by a sepoy division under Colonel Wild, to advance through the formidable Khyber Pass for their relief; but this force, though it succeeded in occupying the Ali-Musjid fort in the centre of the defiles, was not only inadequate in strength to the enterprise, but wholly unprovided with artillery -an oversight or neglect scarcely credible and it was consequently repulsed with loss in an action at Jumrood, (the scene of Akhbar Khan's victory over the Sikhs,) and with difficulty made good its retreat, withdrawing the garrison from Ali-Musjid. The Sikhs, however, continued friendly, both from the inveterate hatred which they bear the Affghans, and from the necessity of our alliance to their monarch Shere Singh for his support on his tottering throne; and by their efficient aid in supplying stores and munitions, the corps under General Pollock was put in a condition to renew the attack on the pass: and the lately-received mail informs

* A similar long-continued secrecy marked the revolt of the Ghiljis against Persia in 1708-see Hanway and Malcolm-when the governor, Goorgeen-Khan, (a Georgian by birth, and grand-uncle of the famous Russian general Prince Bagrathion,) was murdered in the citadel of Candahar. His Georgian cavalry, however, though only 600 in number, cut their way through the enemy to their own country.

The answer of the Khyberees and Afreedees to the proposals recently made them for an unmolested passage through their defiles was, "This is not a war of gold, but of religion."

Our relations with the Sikhs appear not unlikely, from recent accounts, to lead to a curious complication of our eastern hostilities, In the anarchy following the accession of Shere Singh, a chief named Zorawur Singh, with a few thousand followers, made an incursion (without authority from Lahore) on the Chinese frontier in Tibet, where at first he gained extraordinary successes, but was eventually defeated and killed by a Tartar-Chinese army sent against him. In the prosecution of their victory, the Chinese have attached the hill Rajahs about Ladakh, who are subject to Lahore; and as we are bound by treaty to aid the Sikhs if called upon, the result may be an AngloSikh invasion of China on the west!

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