with men, the lofs of lives, if attended with no other confequence, was productive of no real weaknefs; while on the fide of the Ruffians every lofs was irreparable, or at beft, could fcarcely be fupplied fooner than the end of the campaign. In fuch circumftances, it would be wrong to judge from events; nor were the Ruffian generals blameable, for using their utmost efforts to bring matters to an immediate crisis on the other fide of the Danube, as it was the only means by which they could change the nature of the war, and preferve their best troops from mouldering away in an ineffectual fervice. On the other hand it must be acknowledged, that the Grand Vizir, by not foregoing any of the advantages, and by making the best ufe of the means that were in his power; by preferving the grand army whole, and by wifely abitaining from a general engagement, though frequently urged to it, at the fame time, that by repeatedly pouring detachments upon them, he kept the Ruffians in hot and continued action, has undoubtedly performed in this campaign, the part of a great captain.

As the Turks give no detail of their military tranfactions, and the Ruffians only fuch a one as is fuited to the meridian of their own people, and calculated for certain purpofes, no regular account of this campaign is to be expected, until fome future Manftein, among their foreign officers, fhall get free from the shackles of power, and give an account of things as they really were. In the prefent circumftances we can do little more than to judge of particular tranfactions by their general confequences.

It appears upon the whole, that the kind of war which we have already noticed, began to grow very warm upon the Danube, immediately after the breaking up of the conferences at Bucharest. Every day, and almost every night, produced fome fall action, or gave an opportunity for fome furprize, in most of which the Ruffians are faid to have been very fuccessful, and to have deftroyed great numbers of the enemy. As forage grew more plenty, the grand army approached clofer to the Danube, and matters became more ferious. We are not however to imagine that the Turks were entirely on the defenfive; on the contrary, they made repeated attempts upon the Rullian fide of the river, and in one, to furprise the fortress of Giurgewo, are faid to have loft a confiderable number of men. In one of thefe conflicts (which were frequently very fevere, and attended with various fuccefs) one of the Princes Repnin, with a confiderable number of Ruffians, were taken prifoners on the Danube, and being fent to Conftantinople, were, with the other prifoners who had been formerly taken, amounting in the whole to about three thoufand, led in cavalcade through the ftreets of that city; exhibiting by this means a kind of political triumph, calculated to flatter national vanity, and to keep up the fpirits of the people.

The Ruffian army was commanded by Count Romanzow, and was computed at the opening of the campaign to confift of about 87,0co men, of which near one third was cavalry. About the middle of June preparations were made for its paffing the Danube.

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and carrying the war into Bulgaria with effect; for which purpofe it was intended to force the city of Siliftria, and make it a place of arms, by which means a communication would have been kept between the polls on the Danube, and the grand army, as it penetrated farther into the country. As the Turks have been uncommonly alert in their pofts during this campaign, the paffage was not effected without danger, and a confiderable lofs on both fides. The Generals Weifman and Potemkin, firft creffed the river near Brahilow, in the night between the 18th and 19th of June, at the head of a body of about 15000 men, foon after which they had a bloody engagement with a body of the enemy, in which the Ruffian horfe was defeated by the Turkish cavalry, and driven back upon their own foot; but being well fupported by the infantry, and returning to the charge, the main body of the enemy did not think proper to renew the engagement, and quitted the field. The two generals then marched up the river, and covered the paffige of the grand army, which was not compleated till the 24th of the fame month, when it marched in large divifions towards Siliftria.

Among the various accounts that have been given of the fucceeding tranfactions, which, though from the fame quarter, are generally contradictory, even as to dates and names, we can venture only to give what seems to be the general refult of the whole. It need scarcely be obferved, that the immenfe tract of mountains, anciently called Hemus, and now known by the barbarous term of Balkan, encircle Romania in fuch a manner, as to

form almoft an infuperable barrier between it and Bulgaria, as well as the neighbouring country of Macedonia. The vait branches of this mountain run every where deep into Bulgaria, and make the country in a very great degree rough and impracticable, even to the confines of the Danube, which feparates it on the lower fide, from the countries of Wallachia and Beffarabia to the Black-Sea. The Grand Vizir was encamped towards the foot of the mountains, from whence he commanded the lower country, into which he could pour his troops like a torrent as he faw occafion; at the fame time that the enemy could not force him to an engagement, except under fuch difadvantages of ground, as it was not probable any general would run the hazard of, and the mountains at his back afforded a fure protection, in cafe of the worst misfortune that could follow.

Upon the march to Siliftria, the Ruffians found themselves continually harraffed, furrounded and attacked by great bodies of the Turkish horfe, the Grand Vizir having detached 27000 of his best cavalry for that purpose. It was to little purpose that thefe troops were frequently repulled: they were still relieved by fresh detachments, and their attacks as continually renewed; while the Ruffians found it impoffible to procure forage, and could fcarcely obtain time for a moment's reit, or to take the bit out of the horses mouths. In the mean time, the army suffered greatly for want of water; and were exposed without cover to the night rains, and to the cold and winds which fell upon them from the mountains, and which, notwithftanding

ftanding the feafon of the year, they found to be very fevere. The badness of the roads, and the number of defiles, alfo made the carriage of the artillery and baggage extremely difficult; while the alertnefs of the enemy, who watched every advantage, and laid ambufcades in every defile, kept the foldiers conftantly under arms, and wore them down with continual fatigue.

The generals Weifman and Potemkin, having at length arrived with the vanguard at Siliftria, found it strongly defended by three Bafhas at the head of a numerous body of troops, amounting in the whole to about 24000 men. The greater part of theie troops formed a ftrong encampment on the top of a hill, which was adjoining to, and commanded the town. The Ruffian generals having June 28th. made the neceffary difpofitions upon their arrival, marched early the next morning to attack the Turkish camp.

In their way to the intrenchments, they were furiously affaulted by the Turkish pahis, or horfe, who lay in wait for them, and when thefe were difperfed by the artillery, they found the janiffaries well prepared to receive them at their intrenchments, which they defended with the greateft bravery. A warm and bloody engagement then enfued, in which the Ruffians were thrown into great diforder, and the Turks, harried by their impetuofity, and the hopes of a compleat victory, quitted their trenches, and curfued them with great flaughter to the bottom of the hill. injudicious measure being quickly perceived by General Weifman, he immediately made the proper ad

This

vantage of it, and fome Ruffian regiments having marched up the hill in another quarter, became mafters of the trenches without oppofition. The Turks now perceived, too late, the error which they had committed, and as it was impoffible to regain the ground which they had loft, were obliged to retire into Silistria.

The main body of the Ruffian army having arrived before the town on the following day, General Romanzow made preparations for a general affault; but the continual and vigorous fallies made by the Turks prevented the neceffary difpofitions from taking place, and rendered the design impracticable. In the mean time the General reseived intelligence, that the Grand Vizir had detached 50,000 men to the affistance of the befieged, and was himself in person taking meafures to cut off the retreat of the Ruffians. In thefe untoward circumftances a retreat became abíolutely neceffary; but was not easily effected in the fight of fo alert an enemy. Marshal Romanzow, the better to cover his defign, feemed to renew the preparations for his attacks, and keeping up a continual fire on the town, decamped filently in the night, and began his retreat in as good order as the prefent circumstances would admit.

Uninformed though we are of particulars, fome judgment may be made of the nature of fuch a retreat, by recollecting the numberlefs obftacles that impeded their progrefs, upon their advancing triumphantly as invaders into the country. In this retreat, General Weilman, who commanded the van, found a defile, through which the army muft of neceffity pafs, ftrongly poffeffed

poffeffed by a body of 13000 Turks: a defperate engagement enfued, in which the Ruffians were very roughly handled, and that brave general, in endeavouring to rally his broken troops, and lead them on to another charge, was fhot dead on the spot. Some fresh regiments however coming up, and attacking the Turks in flank, they feem, unneceffarily, but happily for the Ruffians, to have given up the advantages they had gained, and to have abandoned their strong port. The army having paffed this defile, gained the banks of the Danube, which they repaffed, on the zd, 3d, 4th, and 5th of July, and on the 7th fung Te Deum for their fuccefs.

Some other actions happened in the course of this expedition, of which we are not able to give the particulars; among thefe, General Soltikoff, who commanded a detached body, is faid to have defeated and killed the Basha Fifula Sara. Upon the whole, it feems evident as well from the immediate and fubfequent confequences, as from a confideration of the nature of the service, and country, that this expedition was very ruinous to the Ruffian army, and that the cavalry in particular, must have fuffered extremely. Some of the first letters from the Ruffian camp, computed their lofs at about 10,000 men, and the writers confoled themselves with the hopes, that the Turks had loft as many. This number, however, is reduced to 1200, in the account which was published by authority at Petersburg; a number which feems totally incompatible with the acknowledged feverity and danger of the fervice, and the final event of the expedition.

These fevere conflicts, and repeated trials of kill and courage, greatly cooled the ardour of the combatants on both fides, and the Danube became, til near the end of the campaign, a fufficient rampart to their hoftilities. Sickness, the confequence of exceffive fatigue, of the fcarcity and badnefs of provifions, the heat of the weather, and the unhealthy marthes of the Danube, made great progrefs in the Ruffian camp, and obliged General Romanzow to retire from the confines of the river, and to poft the army in the neighbourhood of Jaffi, and the higher countries. There feems but little room to doubt, that the Turks had fuffered very feverely in the late actions, as well as their enemies; nor could it otherwise be well accounted for, that they attempted to make no advantage of the fubfequent weak ftate of the Ruffian army; unless it should be imagined, that a thorough knowledge of the advantages of his fituation, together with the prudence and caution that are characteristic of the prefent Grand Vizir, fhould prevent him from putting any thing to the hazard, where fo great an object was at ftake, as the immediatef ecurity of the empire.

Though the greater part of the troops in Poland, as well as fome others in the nearest provinces, were immediately put in motion to reinforce Marfhal Romanzow's army, a perfect filence and tranquillity, notwithstanding, reigned on the Danube, till about the middle of September, when we again find that the contending parties were in motion, and fome finall actions took place on that river, in which the Ruffians were fuccessful. Towards

Towards the latter end of October, Marshal Romanzow again croffed that river with the whole army, and a hot war was carried on in Bulgaria for above fix weeks. We are more in the dark as to the particulars of this latter campaign, than we are, even as to thofe of the former; in many inftances, the accounts of both that have been published, bear fo near a refemblance, both as to particular actions, and their confequences, that by changing their dates they would ferve equally well for either.

It appears, however, that the Ruffian army was divided into two great parts, and that while one, which feems to have been commanded by Count Romanzow, carried on and covered the fiege of Siliftria, the other, under the command of the Generals Ungern, Suwerow, and Prince Dolgorucki, extended their operations towards the coafts of the Black Sea. Soon after their croffing the DaO&. 28th. nube, thefe generals attacked, near the lake Karaffow, Dageftanli Ali Pacha, whom they defeated, and are faid to have taken his camp, artillery, and baggage, and to have difperfed the body of forces which he commanded. A few days after, they gained another advantage over a body of Turkifh forces near a place called Bazardgic, whom they are faid to have entirely routed. Thefe fucceffes encouraged them to push on their forces to the city of Varna, which lies on the Black Sea, and has the best port in Bulgaria.

The conqueft of this place would have been of infinite confequence to the Ruffians, as they would not only thereby have established them felves in Bulgaria for the winter; VOL. XVI.

but from its vicinity to Romania, it would greatly facilitate any future defigns they might form for the invafion of a country, which comprehends the feat, and it might be faid the life of the empire. It would then be no very difficult matter, to build or procure such a number of fmall craft, as might transport troops and artillery along the shores, notwithstanding the vigilance of the Turkish fleets; and thus effect an invafion, without hazarding an army in the impracticable defiles of Mount Hemus.

However eligible the poffeffion of this place might have been, and however well laid the defign, it failed of fuccefs in the execution. The Ruffian accounts fay, that they were mifinformed both as to the ftrength of the place and of the garrison, and that from a confidence of not meeting with any great oppofition, only an inconfiderable number of troops had been detached to make the attempt; that though these found the Nov. 11th. enemy much fuperior to themselves, their bravery induced them to make the affault, which they did with the greatest courage; but that finding all their efforts ineffectual, they retired with a very trifling lofs. On the other hand it is faid, that a principal part of the Ruffian army was prefent at the affair of Varna; that their greatest effort was made on the day which we have mentioned, when ten regiments of foot (which, if full, fhould amount to 2000 men each) attacked the Turkish entrenchments with great fury, and gained fome confiderable advantages in the beginning; but that after a long and bloody engagement they were obliged to retire with great lofs, [B]

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