to maintain our posts, and keep the army from dispersing.

The resolution of Congress to appoint ministers of war, foreign affairs, and finance, gave, as far as I was able to learn the sentiments of men in and out of the army, universal satisfaction. Postponing the first, delaying the second, and disagreeing about the third, have had the directly contrary effect; and I can venture to assure you, not from random guess or vague information, that the want of an able financier, and of a proper plan for the disposition of foreign loans, will be a greater bar to the obtaining of them than perhaps Congress are aware. I could say more on this subject, were I at liberty; but I shall only add, that there is not in my opinion a moment to be lost in placing a proper character at the head of our finance, that he may as soon as possible enter upon the duties of his office. I am, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL LINCOLN.

DEAR SIR,

Head-Quarters, New Windsor, 11 May, 1781.

I am pleased to hear so flattering accounts of the prospects of obtaining men and some kinds of supplies; but so great are my apprehensions, on the score of provisions, that I am sending General Heath purposely to the eastern States to represent our distresses, and to endeavour to fix a plan for our regular supply in future. I refer you to him for particulars, which I do not choose to trust to paper. After General Heath has finished this business, his fairs will detain him some time at home;

private af

and, as he

will be able at the same time to attend to what you

have at present in charge, you may, upon his return from New Hampshire to Boston, come to the army. You will have my warmest thanks for the zeal, with which you have promoted and forwarded every measure tending to the good of the service. I am, &c.

onet

SIR,

TO COUNT DE BARRAS.

New Windsor, 14 May, 1781.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 11th instant. Give me leave to congratulate you on your safe arrival, and your appointment to the command of his Most Christian Majesty's fleet and sea forces upon these coasts. It affords me no small degree of pleasure to find the command devolve upon an officer of your Excellency's distinguished character. mag am Ites. I have appointed Monday, the 21st of this month, for 1584, p.255

is. March

the time of our interview at Weathersfield; and I shall very impatiently wait for the opportunity of convincing you personally, that I am, &c.*

* From the letter of Count de Barras. -"I have the honor to announce to your Excellency my arrival at Boston, on the 6th of this month, in the frigate Concord; the King having appointed me to the command of his squadron in these seas. I arrived here yesterday. The Count de Rochambeau has communicated to me the letter, which he had the honor to write to your Excellency, requesting an interview. When he shall receive your answer, we will conform to your decision. I am very impatient to have the honor of making an acquaintance with you, and to assure you that I have nothing so much at heart as to render myself serviceable to the King and to the United States." — Newport, May 11th.

Count de Rochambeau had written, in communicating the intelligence of the arrival of Count de Barras at Boston;-"I believe it will be necessary, as soon as we have received our despatches, that we should have a conference with your Excellency. By the next express I shall inform you of it. Your Excellency may, however, fix upon the place for our meeting. The Commodore is about sixty years of age, a particular friend

DEAR SIR,

TO PHILIP SCHUYLER.

New Windsor, 14 May, 1781.

I am glad to find, that you have received the necessary papers, and are entering upon the measures for intercepting the enemy's communications. I hope you will be enabled, by the assistance of the person proposed, if he is found sufficiently faithful and intelligent, to prosecute those measures to good effect; because I think the intelligence obtained through that channel

of Count d'Estaing, and commanded his vanguard when he forced the entrance of this harbour."- Newport, May 8th.

The following is an extract from the instructions sent by the Minister of War to Count de Rochambeau, dated Versailles, March 7th.

"1. It is the intention of his Majesty, that you do not abandon Rhode Island, if the squadron destined to act in concert with you for its defence cannot retire to Boston without hazard, or before it shall be relieved from its defensive position at Rhode Island by a superior naval force.

"2. I will inform you, that, in the month of July or August, the superior naval force of which you have just received notice, will withdraw the squadron of M. de Barras from the harbour of Rhode Island; and you will carefully reserve to yourself the knowledge of this arrangement, which may be accelerated.

"3. If, by unforeseen events, or any cause whatever, the army of Washington should be broken up and dispersed, it is the intention of the King, that, under these circumstances, you should decline acceding to any orders or requests of that general to penetrate into the interior of the continent; as in that case it would be prudent to reserve yourself, and to retire to the Antilles if possible, or to St. Domingo, according to the season.

"4. If, on the contrary, the American army remains in its present state, and yet without being able to undertake any combined operation with the squadron; and if this latter should attempt any other enterprise, where the concurrence of a certain number of land forces would be required, the King leaves it in your power to furnish them, provided that the plan be concerted with the American general.

"5. Should there be an opportunity for the squadron at Rhode Island to act independently of the American army, you are aware that the naval forces of the King should concur in all operations, which are considered advantageous to the common cause.

❝6. You are also aware, that, as long as the King's troops occupy VOL. VIII. D*

6

may be depended upon, and will eventually be of very great consequence to us. Much, I apprehend, is to be dreaded from the predatory incursions of the enemy this campaign. To be apprized of their designs, and guarded against them at all points, as far as possible, will tend most essentially to disconcert their plans and protect our frontiers. As to the As to the disposition of the Vermontese, I know nothing of it, but from report. At present they are at least a dead weight upon us. It is greatly to be regretted, that they are not by some means or other added to our scale, as their numbers, strength, and resources, would certainly aid us very considerably, and make the enemy extremely cautious how they advanced far in that quarter. The bulk of the people, I am persuaded, must be well affected. Should it be otherwise with any of the individuals, I ardently wish they may be detected in their villany, and brought to the punishment they deserve.*

Rhode Island, the transports destined to receive the troops are to be kept there; when, on the contrary, the army under your command shall penetrate into the country, and the squadron abandons Rhode Island, this squadron will proceed to Boston, and take with it the transports, that have been retained.

"7. If, from the different causes mentioned, you should remain in your position at Rhode Island, and a superior naval force of the King should withdraw the squadron which is in that port, I give you notice, that the Count de Grasse has orders to leave with you two vessels to defend the port, and the transports necessary for your army."

* The British had come up Lake Champlain from Canada, and threatened an invasion of the frontiers of New York in that direction. At the same time there seemed to be an understanding of some sort between the leaders in Vermont and the British officers, which excited a suspicion that the former were acting under disguise, and fostering an improper intercourse with the enemy. General Schuyler had said in his letter;

"The conduct of the Vermontese is mysterious, and if the reports which generally prevail are well founded, their measures will certainly be attended with dangerous consequences to this and the other United States. I cannot however believe that the bulk of the people are in the secret. I rather conjecture that the person whom we suspected last year to have been in New York, and some others, are the only culpable ones,

I have been exceedingly distressed by the repeated accounts I have received of the sufferings of the troops on the frontier, and the terrible consequences which must ensue, unless they were speedily supplied. What gave a particular poignancy to the sting I felt on the occasion was my inability to afford relief. Such partial supplies as were on hand, to the very last barrel of meat, I ordered instantly to be sent, and have promised General Clinton what further succour the States will enable me to give. Major-General Heath has gone to the several eastern States, to enforce my pointed representations, to rouse them to more vigorous exertions, and to make arrangements for supplies during the

and that they amuse the people with making them believe that the whole of their negotiation with General Haldimand is merely calculated to give Congress and this State the alarm, that the independence of Vermont may be acknowledged.

"I was anxious for ceding the jurisdiction beyond a twenty-mile line from Hudson's River, that their independence might be immediately acknowledged, and they made useful to the common cause; but the governor put a stop to the business, as the affair was referred to the decision of Congress.' I sincerely wish they would speedily decide, acknowledge them independent, and admit them into the union. If this was instantly done, the measures of their leaders would be brought to the test, and we should know if they had only tended to bring about their independence, or to connect themselves with the enemy. But, unless Congress are pushed to a decision, I believe they will do nothing in it; but who is to urge them, I know not. The governor cannot do it officially, and our delegates, I believe, will not, unless they believe that the decision will go against the Vermontese." -MS. Letter, Saratoga, May 4th. The old feuds between the inhabitants of the New Hampshire Grants and New York had been kept alive by the refusal of New York to assent to the independence of the territory embracing those Grants, which had been recently called Vermont. The party dissensions in Congress had prevented a decision by that body, and in the mean time the people of Vermont set up a government of their own, and the leaders were determined not to submit on any terms to the domination of New York. In this state of mind the enemy tampered with them, and hoped for a time to bring them over. The attempt failed, and it appeared in the end, that there was never any serious intention on the part of the Vermontese to listen to the British proposals. The subject is explained in SPARKS's Life of Ethan Allen.