frontier settlements. They once, when driven to despair by a large seizure of cattle, made an attack on Graham's Town, which was obstinately continued, and nearly proved successful. But the period of oppression is now past, never, I trust, to return; for the present policy pursued towards the natives is humane and honourable.'-pp. 74-77.

These observations are well expressed; the spirit which they breathe is humane, and highly creditable to the writer; and in their general purport we cordially concur. But we must, nevertheless, not allow one most fallacious assumption to pass unquestioned. What does Mr. Rose mean by asserting that "at no period since the English have been in possession has wanton cruelty been committed?" Although his visit to the frontier, his hunting excursions, and his gallops through Cafferland, occupied only a few hurried weeks, during which he was probably too much engrossed by the scenes immediately before him to acquire accurate information in regard to past transactions, yet during his "four years residence" in the colony, he ought to have been better informed than to put into his book a statement so utterly and deplorably untrue. What was the whole series of lord Charles Somerset's frontier policy-the bloody Commandoes (hostile incursions) that slaughtered the Caffers in their own territories, without mercy, and frequently without provocation-that burned their villages and their crops, carried off their cattle, and left their women and children to perish of famine-that proclaimed their favourite leaders outlaws, and set a price on their heads,-and when they surrendered themselves as hostages, sent them to work in irons in the slatequarries of Robben Island, with the condemned felons of the colony? Was this not wanton cruelty? But Mr. Rose is a military man-and has military notions, perhaps, of murder and treachery, when perpetrated on a large dashing scale, and boasted of as notable exploits in a government gazette. "The duty," he tells us, " of a commando was to destroy, to burn the habitations, and to seize the cattle; and they did their duty!" They did so with a vengeance! And be it added, that those by whose orders such deeds were done, whatever were their motives or pretences, have thrown a stigma upon the British name in South Africa which will not be readily effaced. But if these transactions are to be excepted from the charge of "wanton cruelty," and ranked as "military" or "political" exploits, what are we to call such doings as the following? In 1821, twentyfive harmless Caffer females, who had ventured over the new frontier line which had been proclaimed in the Cape Gazette, merely to dig some red clay on the banks of the Great Fish

River for painting their bodies, after their national fashion, were seized and placed in bondage among the colonists. In 1824 three Caffer envoys, who were sent into the colony by the chief Macomo, to carry back a runaway slave woman, and some strayed or plundered cattle, were fired upon by the functionary to whom they delivered their chief's friendly message, and two of them shot dead, in cold blood, and without the slightest provocation. This transaction, though reported to the government, was passed over without redress, or the infliction of any punishment whatever on the guilty persons. These are but two out of numerous recent incidents of a similar character, several of which occurred during Mr. Rose's residence at the Cape, and of which it appears strange that he should be entirely ignorant; for, even if he had not heard of such deeds of" wanton cruelty" in the colony, which is barely possible, he might have found them, since his return, stated in more than one English publication, and accompanied by the unquestioned evidence of their authenticity. Britain has in truth had as yet but little cause to boast of her justice or humanity to the natives of Southern Africa.

"But," says Mr. Rose, "the period of oppression is now passed, never, I trust, to return; for the present policy pursued towards the natives is humane and honourable.' The system has indeed been recently changed for the better; and the order in Council passed last Spring, by which the equality of the coloured races within the colony, with the European settlers, in every civil right and privilege, has been fully established, is a monument of pure and noble renown to the philanthropic individuals who so ably struggled to obtain it, and to sir George Murray who so frankly and liberally conferred it. Yet much, very much still remains to be done. It is one thing to enact good laws and another to enforce their execution. Caffer and Bushman commandoes are still going on, as formerly, with but little mitigation, as we perceive from the Cape newspapers now before us, up to the close of September last. And independently of this, the whole system of our policy towards the uncivilized tribes beyond our colonial boundaries, both in South Africa and elsewhere, is fundamentally vicious, and ought to be reformed intus et in cute. But this is a subject of far too great importance and complexity to be duly discussed in this slight notice of a light and pleasant book.

Mr. Rose has not taken the trouble to investigate the real condition and prospects of his emigrant countrymen. A sensible and succinct chapter on this subject will be found in Mr. Thompson's travels. Mr. Rose's remarks on the progress and

effects of the missionaries among the native tribes are also superficial and unsatisfactory.* But we will not part with him on unfriendly terms. He professes only to describe what fell under his own immediate observation, and to aim at no higher object than amusement. This aim he has more than realized. His descriptions of natural scenery are in many instances extremely beautiful and striking, and evince his possession of no inconsiderable share of graphic taste and poetical feeling. His sentiments too are generally, especially as regards the treatment of the coloured races, liberal and humane; and his style, though rather diffuse, and at times too ambitious, is on the whole easy, elegant and perspicuous.

ART. XIV.-Edinburgh Review (XCIX. Art. 6.) on The Utilitarian Theory of Government, and the Greatest Happiness Principle.' THE conductors of the Westminster Review were desirous of

an opportunity of making some additional remarks upon the principle they have in two preceding numbers had the good fortune to defend. A controversy, whatever may be its effects in approving the defensibleness of particular branches of a system, is not always the best adapted for the orderly statement of its substance. It is possible therefore that their design may have its use; though at some risk of incurring the scandal of repetition, and the disgrace of presenting what every body knows. The article in the last number of the Edinburgh Review has afforded them the opportunity desired; without materially altering the execution of their plan.

They therefore state,--for the edification of those who may be disposed to be edified by it, and without the slightest desire to interfere with the right of any body to prefer the keen and searching scepticism of the second Academy,'-that the substance of what they have endeavoured to maintain, when presented with more attention to order than a controversy would admit, is as follows.

First, That Morality, as applied to the conduct of individuals, is reducible to being the rule, the general observation of which would produce the greatest sum or aggregate of happiness

*The best account of the progress of the Missionaries in promoting civilization in South Africa, is to be found in Dr. Philip's "Researches". in many respects a very valuable publication. For an able condensation of its most interesting contents, and of all the authentic information respecting Africa up to a very recent date, the reader may be referred to that very cheap, and very meritorious, work, "The Modern Traveller."

among those who are to be affected by the consequences. That though moral precepts may have been uttered without any reference made to this principle, and many of them may have been right,-it is a reference to this principle which in disputed cases distinguishes the true from the pseudo-morality; which establishes, for example, that it is not a meritorious action for a man to eat his father, as in some countries has been inculcated as a duty, and that it is not criminal per se to drink wine, which in others has been accounted an offence. If they are asked how they know that morality is reducible to this rule, they reply, Because on comparison with any of the systems of morality which have attained to extensive acceptance among mankind, it is palpable that in by far the largest portion of their extent the rules coincide; and that in respect of that portion in which they do not, the contest, with one solitary species of exception, has always been rested upon the effects in some shape of suffering or the contrary, on the sentient creatures that were concerned. If, for example, it was ever contended that it was a moral act for a man to kill and eat his father, it was supported on the ground that it was for the happiness of society and of themselves, that men on arriving at a certain stage of decrepitude should be put out of pain, and that it was a mark of respect for their sons to eat them. There may be doubt whether the reasoning was good; but there is none that this was the reasoning. And the same in other cases. The solitary exception remarked, is where on the ground of some asserted supernatural sanction or authority, actions have been defended as consonant with the moral rule, which have been hostile to the increase of the temporal happiness of men in the aggregate. On which peculiar description of cases it is sufficient to reply, that to make them of any weight it is requisite that it should be proved, not only that the authority referred to is unimpeachable, but that the interpretation of those who make the reference is unimpeachable also; and that none of those who have at any time brought forward a precept of the nature described, have established their title upon both these points. The Vedas, for example, may be considered as having failed upon the first point, and the Inquisition on the other. And further, that even in these cases, there has always been a virtual_reference to some final advantage, which either through the influence of a supernatural power or otherwise, was to be the result of obedience.

Secondly, That though for any thing they have to say to the contrary there may be a hundred different reasons why men should be moral, one reason which to a certain extent may dispense with the production of the other ninety-nine, is that the

circumstances in which man is placed are such, that the habitual observance of the rule asserted to be the rule of morality, is in the long run and taking all chances together, the safest and most likely guide to the happiness of the individual. It may not be accordant with experience that in every individual case the man who lives in the breach of moral rules shall, in exteriors at least, be less happy than some other;-any more than it is accordant with experience that every man of eighty will die before every man of twenty-five. On the contrary it may be allowed to be certain, that in some instances the contrary will happen. But what is urged is, that in the same way as it is proveable by experience that a man would be a simpleton, who with all the chances before him, should chuse an annuity on the life of an average man of eighty in preference to one of twenty-five,-so it is proveable that a man commits an error and a folly, who with all the chances to encounter, chuses the quantity of happiness which shall be consequent on a course of immorality, in preference to the quantity he might have obtained by another course. The way in which each of these propositions must be established, is by individual attention to the evidence, that though now and then a man of eighty sees the funeral of a man of twenty-five, and a man of immoral conduct is (in outward appearance at least) more fortunate and happy than some one of opposite character, this does not destroy the general inference that nine times out of ten the event is of a contrary description, and that the man is a blockhead who makes his election the wrong way. If indeed any body says he sees reason to believe, that men of eighty are on the whole better lives than those of twenty-five, or that immoral men do upon the whole lead happier lives than moral ones, he is at perfect liberty to retain his own opinion. All that is insisted on is, that there are reasons sufficient to induce the greatest part of mankind to come to a contrary conclusion.

Thirdly, That the principle after being elucidated and established in the simpler case of individuals, is transferable to the operations of masses or combinations of men,-as for example, notably, to the conduct of those collections of influential persons who regulate the affairs of others under the title of governments, and to the conduct of independent nations in their behaviour towards each other. The interest of those who are in these cases to be acted upon, in receiving the greatest happiness, it seems unnecessary to go about to prove; the point in question relates to the happiness of the actors. And here the object is to establish as in accordance with the dictates of a sound and enlightened experience, that though there is no certainty that in any individual case the rule which would produce the greatest aggregate of happiness will be attended with the