not know, nor to my mind does it make the least difference; nor does it make any difference that I may esteem it, as I do, ever so erroneous. It is no part of my duty or right to review that action and purpose in this proceeding. It stands there an unimpeached verity. Upon appeal to the proper tribunal, it of course could be re-examined, but I hardly think that this can be done here. So a direct attack to set aside the levy of the tax after made would, if any course will avail, be more regular and better than this proceeding, which resists, by habeas corpus, a judgment or order made by a tribunal, which I repeat, though ever so erroneous, is none the less binding. The principle is clear enough. It has been settled again and again, almost as long as courts have had an existence. However unwilling, I cannot do otherwise than apply it in this as in other cases, where it is applicable, if its application is involved.

COLE, J.-I think this judgment should be reversed. But the space already occupied by the opinions of my brothers seems to require that I shall only state concisely the leading ground on which my judgment is based.

The writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, under which the court or judge issuing the habeas corpus may correct errors of judgment made by another court or judge. If the court or judge ordering the arrest or commitment of the prisoner had jurisdiction to so order, the error, if any, in making the order, must be corrected by some other proceeding. The only question, then, to be determined is, did the Federal court have jurisdiction to order the arrest of the petitioners in this habeas corpus?

Upon this I remark, it is conceded that the Federal court had rightful and complete jurisdiction over the parties and subject-matter of the suit in the action upon the coupons wherein the judgment was rendered. Nor is it in the least controverted that that court has jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus in proper cases to enforce its judgments; nor that it had jurisdiction to issue the alternative writ of mandamus in this case. The real and precise point upon which the

petitioners were discharged being that, since the State and Federal courts had original concurrent jurisdiction of the subject-matter of ordering a levy of taxes to pay the bonds. and coupons, and the State court having first acquired or exercised its jurisdiction, and prohibited the levy by its judg ment and process of injunction, therefore the Federal court was ousted of its jurisdiction, and this pursuant to the hitherto well-recognized rule that, where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction of the same subject-matter, the court first exercising its jurisdiction thereby excludes the other.

But the Federal court having jurisdiction to issue the alternative writ of mandamus, must, of course, have jurisdiction to hear the return to that writ and to judge of its sufficiency. Now, although that court may err in its judgment as to the sufficiency of the return, such error would not oust it of its jurisdiction. That return to the alternative writ of mandamus having stated, as I understand it, that the State court had first acquired or exercised jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the levy, and enjoined the defendants in the writ (these petitioners) from levying any tax to pay said coupons, it was, in my opinion, the duty of the Federal court to hold such return sufficient, and to refuse to make the writ peremptory. But the court held otherwise. That court had jurisdiction to determine, and it was its duty to determine, the sufficiency or insufficiency of that return; and although, in my opinion, it determined it erroneously, such error could not oust the court of its jurisdiction, nor authorize any other court, except the proper appellate tribunal, to relieve the defendants therein from obedience to its judgment. other words, the Federal court having had jurisdiction to decide the question before it, its decision was final and conclusive upon the defendants, and also upon all other courts, until reversed; and a reversal cannot be obtained under a writ of habeas corpus, but only in the proper appellate tribunal.

In

The question presented by the habeas corpus proceeding is simply one of jurisdiction, and, of course, my opinion is limited to that single question. What may be the rights of

the tax-payers in relation to enjoining the treasurer from collecting the taxes, if any should be levied, or to any other remedy, I do not indicate or decide. But it may be observed that other questions than that of mere incidental jurisdiction may underlie those rights, and exert a controlling influence in their adjudication.

The order discharging the prisoner must be reversed.

CHAPTER XIV.

KANSAS.

Ir appears to be almost unnecessary to present any extended discussion of the law as it obtains in Kansas. The rule in the State is as clear and certain as language could make it, and the constructions are of a very liberal character, asserting unequivocally the most modern views.

The following are the constitutional provisions which åre pertinent:

SECTION 4, ARTICLE VII.-The respective counties of the State shall provide, as may be prescribed by law, for those inhabitants who, by reasons of age, infirmity or other misfortune, may have claims upon the sympathy and aid of society.

SECTION 5, ARTICLE XII. - Provision shall be made by general law for the organization of cities, towns and villages; and their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning their credit shall be so restricted as to prevent the abuse of such power.

Appreciating the great advantages that are necessarily ensured to the public as well as the municipality, the State of Kansas has been the second to adopt a registration law, which in addition contains provisions which amount to an enactment in the nature of a special code. We give the Act in full.

Sections 1 and 2 contain general provisions. Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 relate to election.

Section 10 affects contracts.

Section 11 relates to the subscription.

Sections 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, &c., provide for registration, and define the duties of the officials through whom it is to be effected.

An Act to authorize counties, incorporated cities, and municipal townships to issue bonds for the purpose of building bridges, aiding in the construction of railroads, water-power, or other works of internal improvement, and providing for the registration of such bonds, the registration of other bonds, and the repealing of all laws in conflict therewith.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Kansas: SECTION 1. That the Board of County Commissioners of any county, the Mayor and Common Council of any incorporated city, and the trustee, clerk, and treasurer of any municipal township in this State, are hereby empowered to issue the bonds of such county, city or township, in any sum necessary, not greater than ten per cent., inclusive of all other bonded indebtedness, of the taxable property of such county, city or township, for the purpose of building bridges, free or otherwise, or to aid in the construction of railroads or waterpower by donation thereto, or the taking of stock therein, or for other works of internal improvement. Provided, That all counties may issue, in addition to the amount authorized by this section, bonds not to exceed one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), and all counties having property of an assessed valuation of three million dollars ($3,000,000) or more, may issue in addition thereto two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000). Provided further, That under a proposal for aid to any railroad, any township having less than two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000) taxable property, may issue in addition to the ten (10) per cent. authorized in this section, ten per centum of an amount equal to the number of miles of railroad (agreed under such proposal to be constructed within such township) multiplied by six thousand (6,000); and, Provided further, That to the limit prescribed in this section shall not apply and be considered to restrict or prevent the issuing of any bonds heretofore voted, or vote now pending, in any county or township in this State, and which bonds may not have yet been issued, but that the limit