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untenable. In the understanding of practical men, this is surely no grievance. grievance. Its manifest object was to lessen the burden of the tax-payer. If the stock should prove worthless, it imposes no additional burden on the holder; it involves him in no further responsibility. But if the stock should prove valuable, such value would be so much taken from the tax."

In the case of Talbot v. Dent, the Supreme Court of Kentucky says: "It is true, it is somewhat an anomaly for the governing power to levy a tax for a particular purpose, and at the same time, in a measure, reimburse him by the transfer of the thing paid for by the tax; still, if the Government were under a valid obligation to pay, and had the right to meet this obligation by a tax upon its citizens, a contribution ratably assessed and levied for this public object, upon all the property of the citizens, would not lose its character of a tax, nor be less obligatory upon individuals, because the payment of it would entitle them respectively to corresponding portions of the thing for which the Government had contracted the debt or obligation, for the discharge of which the contribution was required." These views are so logically and forcibly expressed, and the matter placed in so simple a light, that we deem it a work of supererogation to add to them.

It was further objected at bar that the provision contained in the twenty-second section of the Act of 1855, which authorized the counties to issue bonds for the purpose of raising the money necessary to pay for the stock purchased, was an infraction of the thirteenth clause of the thirteenth Article of the Constitution, which expressly prohibited the General Assembly from pledging the faith and credit of the State to raise funds in aid of any corporation whatsoever. The argument was this, that the letter of the clause confined the prohibition to the State only; yet its spirit made it applicable to and equally binding upon the counties. We have before declined to determine how far a restriction plainly applicable to the exercise of power by the Legislature shall be taken to affect the county, but, for the sake of the argument, are willing to admit the position assumed, viz.: That all the restrictions of the Constitution which are expressly applied

to the legislative power of the State, are equally binding upon the legislative powers of the counties. With the full advantage of this admission, however, we do not see that the objection urged is at all strengthened; for there is nothing in the provisions of the section referred to that authorizes the Board of County Commissioners to "pledge the faith of the county to raise funds in aid of any corporation whatsoever." By an attentive reading of that section, it will be seen that the bonds therein authorized to be issued, are not intended to raise funds "in aid of the corporation," but expressly to provide the means, by a disposal of the same, to pay for the stock so to be purchased. And it is equally apparent that the authority to "pledge the faith and resources of the county," is to give credit to those bonds only, and not for the benefit of the company, or for any other purpose whatsoever. We think, therefore, that the objection, however forcible it might be in the state of the case assumed, does not apply to the law now under consideration."

We have thus, at some length, gone over the several objections alleged in argument against the validity of the particular section of the Act referred to. We have given to the objec tions, and to the arguments in support of them, the most deliberate consideration. We have taxed to the uttermost extent all our powers of discrimination. We have resorted for light to all of the decided cases within our reach. We have scrutinized with anxious care and attention the powerful reasoning of the many able jurists, whose opinions are to be found in the books of reports, to discover, if we might, the great desideratum - the truth; and, after the most laborious investigation, we are constrained to announce the particular section of the Act in question to be perfectly compatible with the provisions of the Constitution, and therefore valid. If we should have erred in this conclusion, it will present an extraordinary instance of a most singular fatality attending the adjudication of a great constitutional question; for may it be not as a pregnant fact, that as often as the questions involved in this case have arisen for adjudication, they have received but one determination, and that in accordance with the conclusion arrived at in this case? The courts of Virginia,

Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi and Louisiana, all hold the same uniform language upon this subject; and if there be a single adjudication in opposition to our conclusion, as announced in this case, we have failed to have it brought to our notice. In the face of such an overwhelming and imposing array of authority, it would indeed have been most extraordinary, even if our own reasoning had tended to conduct us to an opposite conclusion, not to have raised in our minds a serious doubt as to the correctness of that reasoning. And we are taught by the lessons hereinbefore inculcated, in regard to the appropriate function of the judiciary, that whenever, in the examination of a great constitutional question involving the exercise of powers by a co-ordinate branch of the Government, a rational doubt arises as to the validity of any particular act of that department, a proper and respectful regard and deference for the same. would dictate an affirmation of the act. In the beautiful and forcible language of an eminent jurist, already referred to, "If a court, in such a case, were to annul the law while entertaining doubts upon the subject, it would present the absurdity of one department of the Government overturning in doubt what another had established in settled conviction, and to make the dubious constructions of the judiciary outweigh the fixed conclusions of the General Assembly."

In order, however, to break the force and weaken the authority of the decided cases, it was suggested at bar that those causes were adjudicated under Constitutions essentially differing from ours; that the restrictions upon the legislative power to be found in our Constitution are more stringent than those imposed by any of the Constitutions of the several States where those adjudications have been made, and that therefore they ought not to be considered as authority in this

case.

We have carefully examined the several State Constitutions alluded to, and have not found that difference to exist which is contended for. In the majority of them we find the restraints upon the legislative department equally stringent with those imposed by our own; and in several of them they are even more stringent.

Let the decree of the Chancellor be affirmed with costs.

CHAPTER X.

GEORGIA.

THE Constitution of this State at present in force was adopted in the year 1868. It contains only the following provision directly pertinent to the law of Municipal Bonds.

SECTION 28, ARTICLE I.-The General Assembly may grant the power of taxation to county authorities and municipal corporations, to be exercised within their several territorial limits.

The decisions of the State are entirely harmonious. The popular view in respect to legislative discretion, as well as the nature of railroads and similar works, has been several times affirmed; the opinions going as far as those of almost any other State. In the case of Winn v. Bacon, which we print below, it is decided that the city had a right to determine the nature of a railroad and banking company in so far as to pledge the public property of the city to the payment of a subscription thereto. The subscription was held to be within the power of the city, and a supplemental Act, authorizing an additional loan for a like purpose, was held valid. The court, also, gave expression to the view that a railroad is to be classed as a public corporation.

The case is important as illustrating the doctrines herein before laid down touching the discretionary power of municipal corporations to bind the public property.

By an Act passed in 1833, the city was authorized to borrow $200,000, and to pledge the public funds and

property, and the common thereof, for the redemption of the debt, and also to purchase any real or personal estate for the use and benefit of the city. The city subscribed for five hundred shares of the stock of the Monroe Railroad and Banking Company; and in 1838 the Legislature passed another Act, in which, after referring to the fact of the previous loan which had been authorized, and that the same had already been borrowed and invested in stocks for the purposes of internal improvement, they gave power to contract another loan of like sum, and to pledge the public property of the city for the payment of the sums; and it was held that by these Acts the subscription to the stock of the said company was, by necessary implication, recognized and ratified.

We give also the case of Powers v. Inferior Court of Dougherty Co., which is a direct reaffirmance of the validity of a tax in aid of a railroad or public improvement.

The law of the State appears to be so well settled, that any extended observations concerning it appear to be un

necessary.

Winn v. The City Council of Macon.

This was an action of debt brought by John D. Winn, plaintiff, against the Mayor and Council of the city of Macon, defendant, for the recovery of certain bills of the Monroe Railroad and Banking Company, and of which company the defendant was a stockholder, and, as such, liable, as claimed by plaintiff, for the payment and ultimate redemption of its share or proportion of said bank-bills, under the charter of said company.

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The case came up on the following facts agreed upon by counsel representing plaintiff and defendant, viz.:

That plaintiff read his declaration, and the various extracts from the minutes of the City Council of Macon, from 1833 to 1838 inclusive, and hereto attached, marked 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and read in connection therewith the charter of the city of Macon

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