banker but held, that where the bill of exchange was taken up by him, he stood in the same relation as if he had never parted with it, and was remitted to his former right of set-off. (8 B. & C. 105.) Collins v. Jones, 10 B. & C. 777. BILL OF LADING.

As between the original parties, the bill of lading is merely a receipt, liable to be opened by evidence of the real facts.

v. Todd, 2 M. & M. 106.

BILL OF EXCHANGE.

Bates

(Form of acceptance.) The drawee of a bill of exchange wrote across it accepted, payable at Messrs. S. & Co., without any signature: Held, that a written acceptance might be valid, since 1 and 2 Geo. 4, c. 78, without signature, but that it was a question for the jury whether it was intended to operate as an acceptance in its present state. Dufaur v. Oxenden, 2 M. & M. 90. (Presentment-Notice.) The holder of a bill called to present it at half past seven o'clock in the morning at the house (a private dwelling-house) of the drawee, and knocked and rang, but received no answer: Held a sufficient presentment (2 Camp. 527.) The defendant having sent a person to the plaintiff two days after maturity of the bill, to say that he had been defrauded of the bill and should defend any action upon it: Held, that further proof of notice of dishonor was unnecessary. Wilkins v.

Jadis, 2 M. & M. 41.

(What Inland.) A bill drawn in Ireland on a person in England, is not an inland bill within 1 and 2 Geo. 4, c. 78, s. 2, and the acceptance need not be in writing. But the statute, as also 9 Geo. 4, c. 24, s. 8, applies to bills drawn in Ireland upon persons residing there. Mahoney v. Ashlin, 2 B. & Adol. 478. (Special presentment.) A bill of exchange made payable in London in the body of it, is accepted at Messrs. J. & Co. London. In an action against the drawer, presentment in London must be proved. (6 B & C. 531)-(in the Exchequer Chamber.) Gibb v. Mather, 8 Bing. 214.

(Consideration.) Indorsee against acceptor of a bill of exchange accepted in part payment of an apprentice fee. The stamp of the indenture was wrong, and the apprentice (the defendant's son) left the master's service at the end of five months: Held, that this was not a total failure of consideration, as the apprentice might have caused the indenture to be properly stamped under 20 Geo. 2, s. 45. The plaintiff recovered. (7 T. R. 121.) Mann v. Lent, 10 B. & C. 877.

BOND. (Void for illegality.) Debt on bond conditioned for the payment to the plaintiff of a certain sum, on his procuring subscribers for 9,000 shares in a company to be formed for becoming as signees of two patents. Plea, that the patents contained a proviso that they should be void if assigned to more than five persons: Held that the bond was void, on the ground that monopolies are illegal, unless allowed by a patent, which is not assignable unless power be given by the Crown. (5 Bing. 248.) Duvergier v. Fellowes, 10 B. & C. 826.

(Presumption of payment.) Payment of a bond was not presumed after twenty years, the money being lent to enable the obligor to go abroad, where he died shortly after, and no assets devolved on his administrators. Elliot v. Elliot, 2 M. & M. 44.

BY-LAWS.

(London.) The common council having the regulation of all

carts working for hire within the city, a by-law made by them, restraining the number to 420 and requiring all such carts to be licensed by the president and governors of Christ's Hospital, was held binding, and the Court refused to inquire whether the number was reasonable. (Sid. 284; Sir J. Raym. 288, 324.) Shaw v. Pope, 2 B. & Adol. 465.

A by-law, the effect of which was to elect a master of a company from amongst other persons than directed by the charter, was held bad. It was also held bad on another ground, namely, that it delegated to a select body the power given by the charter to the corporation at large, on condition that the select body should elect in a particular mode not directed or sanctioned by the charter. (6 T. R. 752; 4 B. & C. 787.)

CHARTER-PARTY.

The defendant having contracted for a voyage with all convenient speed, restraints of princes excepted, the fact of the port to which he was to sail being, at the time of making the charterparty in a state of blockade by a friendly power, is no defence to an action for a neglect to sail; the blockade being known to both parties when the contract was made. (3 B. & P. 291 ; 9 B. & C. 718.) Medeiros v. Hill, 8 Bing. 231.

COGNOVIT.

(Payment.) When a cognovit is given for the payment of a sum generally, the defendant may pay either the plaintiff or his attorney. Anonymous, D. P. R. 173.

COMMON CARRIER. See STAGE COACHMAN.

COMPENSATION.

A company for the formation of a market were empowered to purchase land by an act, by which compensation was provided for all persons, tenants for years or at will included, who should sustain injury, in respect of any interest whatsoever for goodwill, improvements or otherwise, which they now enjoy, by reason of the passing of the act: tenants were to quit upon three months' notice: Held, that a tenant from year to year, who had occupied for sixty years, and laid out money on the landlord's assurance of being continued in the tenancy was entitled under the above provision. (2 B. & Adol. 204.) Exp. Farlow, 2 B. & Adol. 341.

COMPOSITION DEED.

The plaintiff attended a meeting of the defendant's creditors, at which it was agreed that the property should be assigned to trustees, and be disposed of by them for the benefit of the creditors. The plaintiff was put down as a creditor for 1,000l. and signed the resolutions to the above effect. The amount of the plaintiff's debt being subsequently disputed, he was not allowed to come in as a creditor under the deed: Held, that his original right of action against the defendants was not affected by his having signed the resolutions. (3 Camp. 175; 1 B. & A. 46.) Garrard v. Woolner, 8 Bing. 258. CONTRACT.

In the case of a building contract, where the contract was departed from: held, that the employer is not made liable for the additional work merely by the fact of his having been made aware of the departure without dissenting, unless he was also aware (by express notice or from necessary inference) that the departure would occasion additional expense. Lovelock v. King, 2 M. & M. 60.

(Rescinding.) The purchaser of goods paid part of the purchase money, and gave the bill on which the action was brought for the remainder; he had possession of the goods delivered to him, kept them for two months, and was then dispossessed by the vendor Held that this constituted no defence, the remedy for the dispossession being by trespass. Stephens v. Wilkinson, 2 B. & Adol. 320.

COVENANT.

The lessee of a public house covenanted with certain brewers to take all their porter, &c. of them, their executors, administrators, or assigns, or their successors in or their late or (then) present trade. The trade was afterwards assigned, and removed

by the assignees to a place two miles distant from the original brew-house: Held, that the publican was not bound to continue his custom. Doe dem Calvert v. Reid, 10 B. & C. 849. (Trustees.) The defendant, by his marriage settlement, covenanted with the trustees to pay off certain mortgages on the settled estates within a year from the marriage. The mortgages not being paid off, the trustees, ten years after the marriage, brought an action of covenant. No special damage was proved to have resulted from the breach, and all interest had been paid. Judgment was suffered to go by default, and on the execution of a writ of inquiry, nominal damages were found. The court set aside the inquisition, holding that the trustees were entitled to recover damages to the full amount of the unpaid mortgages. Lethbridge v. Mytton, 2 B. & Adol. 772.

CUSTOM.

(Vestry.) A custom that certain persons shall form a vestry for the management of the poor, set out in the return to a mandamus requiring a select vestry to be formed within 59 Geo. 3, c. 12, was held bad, on the ground that the return stated that the ancient vestry performed the duties imposed on select vestries by that statute which could not have existed immemorially. (4 B. & A. 507.) The King v. St. Bartholomew the Great, 2 B. & Adol. 506.

DAMAGES. See COVENANT.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
DEED LOST.

DEVISE.

See COMPOSITION Deed.

See PRODUCTION OF DEED.

(Description of lands.) The lands in question had been purchased by the devisor in October, 1800. The will was made in February, 1801; and the devisor died the same year. The lands were intermixed with the ancient family estate of the testator, and the game keeper of the manor of B. had been in the habit of shooting over them. The devise was of 'all that my manor or reputed manor of B. (the family estate,) with the mansion house called B. Court thereunto belonging, and also all and singular my freehold, messuages, lands, &c. thereunto belonging, situate in the parish of B. M. and B. G.' The lands in question were situate as required, but were not strictly a part of or appurtenant to the manor of B.: Held, that as it appeared from the rest of the will that they were intended to pass, the words thereunto belonging, were sufficient to carry them. The case was decided with peculiar reference to the wording of the will. Doe dem. Gore v. Langton, 2 B. & Adol. 680.

Testator devised certain messuages to trustees, in trust for such son of mine, by my present wife, as shall first attain the age of twenty one years, as and when such son shall attain such an age, and for his heirs; but in case I shall depart this life without leaving a son, or leaving such, none shall live to attain the age of twenty one years, then in trust for my daughter if she shall live to attain the age of twenty one years, and her heirs. But should I depart this life without leaving issue, then I give and devise the same in trust for N. L. and his heirs.' The testator left one child, a daughter, who died, without issue, under the age of twenty one; Held, that N. L. took nothing under the devise. Doe dem Rew v. Lucraft, 8 Bing. 386. The testator, after some pecuniary legacies, devised as follows: "The rest of my estate, the two houses, situate, &c., I give to my loving wife, and after her decease, the one to my daughter, the other between my two sons:' Held, that the daughter took an estate in fee in the house devised to her. Gall v. Esdaile, 8 Bing. 323.

B. devised to his only son E. for life, remainder to E's. first and other sons successively in tail male. Remainder to the daughters of his said son; and in case of his son's death without issue, to any other sons the testator might have in tail male. Remainder to his daughters in tail, and ultimately to his own right heirs. The estates were charged with sums to his daughters. The daughters suffered recoveries to the use of E., and by a subsequent act of parliament, reciting the will and the recoveries, and that E. had no issue, the trustees were empowered to sell the estates devised, and lay out the money in other estates, to be settled to such of the uses in the will as should be existing, undetermined or capable of taking effect at the time of the sale. The trustees sold, and purchased an estate, which was conveyed to them to such uses as last mentioned: Held, that they took a fee by conveyance. Wortham v. Mackinnon, 8 Bing. 564. (Parol evidence to explain.) The testator devised 'all his freehold and real estate whatsoever, situate in the county of L. and in the city of L.' to trustees. He had no real estate in the county of L. and only a small estate, inadequate to the trust, in the city of L.; but he had considerable estates in the county of C.: Held, that parol evidence was not admissible to show that the words in the county of C. had been inserted in the draft of the will, and afterward struck out by mistake. (This judgment was delivered by Tindal, J. as joint assistant, with the Chief Baron, to the Lord Chancellor.) Miller v. Travers, 8 Bing. 244.