I observe that, although the Judge has thought proper to decide against the claim, he leaves the ground of his decree open for further discussion.

'Availing myself, therefore, of this permission, and considering the opinion so published, to be a fair subject of examination to every citizen who feels himself interested in, or aggrieved by its operation, I beg leave to point the attention of the public to some of the principal errors, which I think that I have discovered in it. In doing so, I shall confine myself to little more than an enumeration of those errors, without entering into any demonstration or developed reasoning on the subject. This would require more space than a newspaper allows, and besides, is not (as regards most of the points) absolutely necessary.

Judge Peck, in this opinion, seems to me to have erred in the following assumptions, as well of fact as of doctrine :

1st. That, by the ordinance 1754, a sub-delegate was prohibited from making a grant in consideration of services rendered or to be rendered.

'2d. That a sub-delegate in Louisiana was not a sub-delegate as contemplated by the above ordinance.

'3d. That O'Reilly's regulations, made in February, 1770, can be considered as demonstrative of the extent of the granting power of either the Governor General or the sub-delegates under the royal order of August, 1770.

4th. That the royal order of August, 1770, (as recited or referred to in the preamble to the regulations of Morales, of July, 1799,) related exclusively to the Governor General.

'5th. That the word "mercedes," in the ordinance of 1754, which in the Spanish language means "gifts," can be narrowed by any thing in that ordinance or in any other law, to the idea of a grant to an Indian, or a reward to an informer, and much less to a mere sale for money.'

It is unnecessary to cite the other alleged errors, as it would be impossible within any reasonable limits to make our readers understand the precise grounds of the controversy between Judge Peck and Mr. Lawless. It is sufficient to observe that the remaining objections of Mr. Lawless are not, in manner, more disrespectful to Judge Peck than those which we have cited. The article concludes:

'In addition to the above, a number of other errors, consequential on those indicated, might be stated. The Judge's doctrine as to the forfeiture, which he contends is inflicted by Morales'

regulations, seems to me to be peculiarly pregnant with grievous consequences. I shall, however, not tire the reader with any further enumeration, and shall detain him, only to observe, by way of conclusion, that the Judge's recollection of the argument of the counsel for the petitioner, as delivered at the bar, differs materially from what I can remember who also heard it. In justice to the counsel, I beg to observe, that all that I have now submitted to the public, has been suggested by that argument as spoken, and by the printed report of it, which is even now before me.'

Soon after the opening of the Court on Monday, April, 17, 1826, Judge Peck having produced a copy of the paper which contained the article signed 'A Citizen,' inquired who the edtor of the paper was. Being informed that Stephen W. Foreman was the editor, he issued a rule requiring Foreman to show cause on the next morning, why an attachment should not issue against him, for a contempt of court in publishing the article referred to, which the rule dictated by the judge to the clerk, calls a 'false statement tending to bring odium on the court, and to impair the confidence of the public in the purity of its decisions.'

The next morning Foreman appeared with Lawless as his counsel, who with Mr. Geyer, another member of the bar, argued the case for the printer. The grounds taken by Lawless in the argument were that the article contained no misrepresentation of the opinion, that the publication was not in its terms or character contemptuous or libellous; and that if it were, it was punishable only by indictment.' The argument was long, taking up the greater part of two days. Lawless, in order to show that there was no misrepresentation of the opinion, compared the article with the opinion. A conversation ensued between him and the judge, the judge calling his attention to different parts of the article, and he pointing out the parts of the opinion which he considered to justify them, and the judge again directing his notice to other parts of the opinion which he thought inconsistent with his conclusions. In this discussion Lawless, much to the amusement of the audience, inadvertently disclosed himself as the author of the piece, by using expressions like this: this is what the judge said, now here I say so and so.' The judge, in the course of the conversation, in adverting to different passages in the article, said, 'in this you are mistaken,''this has no authority,'-'it is not true,'-'it is false,''that is a clear misrepresentation,' &c.

After Lawless had concluded, Mr. Geyer followed on the same side. He contended that the publication, not having reference to a cause then pending before the court, could not be construed into a contempt, or punished as such,' even if it misrepresented the opinion. He insisted that the published opinion of a judge is at all times a fair subject for animadversion or criticism, and that if the article signed "A Citizen" was of such a nature as to amount to a libel, it could only be punished in the ordinary form by indictment;' and adverted in the course of his remarks to the constitutional guaranties of the freedom of the press, the freedom of speech, and the trial by jury, and endeavored to impress the judge with the danger of exercising by implication a power not strictly necessary, and which seemed to be so directly against the letter of the constitution.'

After the argument in the case against the printer was concluded, he gave up Mr. Lawless as the author of the piece, and having purged himself on oath of any intention of committing a contempt, was discharged.

A rule was immediately issued against Lawless, to show cause forthwith, why an attachment should not issue against him for the false and malicious statements' contained in the article signed A Citizen, 'in relation to a judicial decision of this court in the case of Julia Soulard,' &c. 'lately pending and determined therein, with intent to impair the public confidence in the upright intentions of the said court, and to bring odium upon the court, and especially with intent to impress the public mind, and particularly many litigants in this court, that they are not to expect justice in the causes now pending therein, and with intent further to awaken hostile and angry feelings on the part of the said litigants against the said court; and that he also show cause why he should not be suspended from practising in this court as an attorney and counsellor therein, for the said contempt and evil intent.'

Mr. Magennis and Mr. Geyer argued the case at considerable length on behalf of Lawless. Mr. Magennis, before commencing his argument, inquired of the court, if the question as to the article's being a misrepresentation was still open to argument; but was informed by the court that that point had been settled in the case of the printer. He then argued 'that even

admitting the matter was libellous, or was a misrepresentation, or was published in terms which would authorize a process for contempt, were the cause still pending, yet as the cause had been decided, and had passed away, the court had now no jurisdiction in the case, as for a contempt.'

Mr. Geyer gives the following account of his argument. 'When I arose to address the court, I avowed it to be my intention, with the permission of the judge, to argue again the question I had discussed before. I felt myself then much better prepared to do so, than on the first occasion, and I entertained a hope that the judge might be induced to change his opinion. But, in consequence of an intimation from the judge, that the question as to a contempt was a decided point, and that he did not wish it re-argued, I turned my attention to another point, arising out of the phraseology of the rule, which, according to my recollection, required Mr. Lawless to show cause why he should not be punished for a contempt of court;and, among other things, why he should not be suspended from practice as attorney and counsellor for a certain time. My object now was, to show, that if Mr. Lawless was punishable at all, he should be punished in the same way as any other individual not a member of the bar, committing a like offence; and that what he had done ought not to be treated as a professional offence. I contended that the appropriate punishment for a contempt was fine or imprisonment, or both. Whereas the rule indicated a punishment for a professional misdemeanor, with which Mr. Lawless was not charged, and so far as I know, it had never been pretended he had committed.'

Mr. Strother followed Mr. Geyer on the same side, but as he seemed to admit that the article was a contempt of court and was rather apologizing for it, he was stopped by Lawless, or at his request, as he was unwilling to place his case on that ground.

After the argument was concluded, Judge Peck delivered his opinion. He began by disclaiming all personal feeling in regard to the case before him. He spoke of the law of contempts, and seemed fully satisfied that the power to punish them was possessed by the court. He then answered the arguments of counsel, very much at length; and after some time, requested that some gentleman would read for him the article signed

"A Citizen," (his eyes being bandaged at the time.) No one volunteered to comply with this request, and he then called upon Mr. Bates; observing, that as he was the attorney for the government, he supposed he had a right to call upon him to read the article. Mr. Bates, accordingly, read it, paragraph by paragraph. The judge took up the article, and examined it; referring, as he went on, to those parts of the opinion on which he relied to show that the representation in the article was not correct. The judge commenced in a very mild way, but became excited as he went on, and much animated; and appeared, at times, to be indignant at the conduct of Mr. Lawless. He compared the opinion with the publication, saying, "this specification is false," and then referred to the opinion to prove what he had said.' He also, it appears, used the terms 'false,' ' malicious,' 'calumnious,' and 'slanderous,' in commenting on the article; and used expressions of this kind, 'This is clearly false, and without foundation except in the malice of the writer.' 'When he had gotten through, he adverted to the general doctrine of contempts, the necessity, and the reason there was, why the court should possess this power; adverting particularly to the case in hand; - the great amount of claims; and number of claimants; the suits which were yet to be brought; and the necessity that the intelligence and respectability of the tribunal should not be abused and destroyed, in the manner to which the article seemed to tend.' 'He spoke at large on the doctrine of contempts, and the doctrine of libels, declaring the article to be libellous, and contemptuous, both; and insisting that it might be punished as a contempt. He continued to speak for about two hours.' The judge, in the course of his opinion, alluded to a law of China, by which the house of a calumniator is blacked as a fit emblem of his heart. The witnesses do not seem agreed as to the precise connexion in which this allusion was introduced.

During the course of the delivery of the opinion, Lawless inquired of Mr. Geyer, whether he should commit a contempt by leaving the court before the judge had concluded. To which Geyer replied, Certainly not: you are not in custody, and, I suppose, are not obliged to stay and hear yourself abused.' Accordingly Lawless left the room before the delivery of the opinion was finished.