letter, stating his intention not to call in the principal before a certain day, provided the interest was regularly paid: this was held to be a binding undertaking. Payments of interest accepted after the days on which they became due, and not objected to by the obligee, were not a defeasance of the undertaking. Norton v. Wood, R. & M. 178.

UNDUE INFLUENCE.

M. a barrister, becoming acquainted with a widow possessed of some property of her own, and having large expectations from an aunt, acquires her confidence, engages in the management of her affairs, and persuades her to give him a deed of gift of a third of the aunt's property. When that property comes into possession, he persuades her to transfer one half of it for himself, and also the other half to be managed by him on her account. He makes misrepresentations to her about her son, and as to other matters, and prevails upon her to execute a release to him. She at length calls for an account, offering him a full discharge if he would pay her the two thirds of her property, calculated by her at £21,000, but which he refuses to do or to give an account: held, that the deed of gift and release having been obtained by undue influence and imposition, should be set aside, and M. be ordered to refund what should be found due upon taking the accounts. Maccabe v. Hussey, D. & R. 440. VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

The decision of the Vice Chancellor in Dalby v. Pullen was affirmed (3 Sim. 29.)—6 L. M. 214. Upon a sale in the master's office, C. was declared the purchaser, but he having discovered that the decree under which the sale took place was a decree nisi only, objected to the title, and under an order from the Vice Chancellor was discharged from his purchase. Notice was immediately given of an application to be made to the Lord Chancellor to discharge this order, but that motion having stood over, the decree was made absolute; held, that the case should be decided upon the facts as they stood when the motion was originally made, and the purchaser could not be compelled to take the title in consequence of its subsequent completion. Lechmere v. Brazier, 2 J. M. 287. Coster v. Turnor, R. & M. 311.

A person having contracted for the purchase of an estate in fee simple in possession, free from incumbrances, died intestate before the completion of the purchase, it subsequently appeared that a good title could not be made, in consequence of an outstanding lease for life. On a bill by the heir at law for the

completion of the contract; with an abatement as a compensation for the life estate, and that the contract might be completed out of the personal assets of the intestate: held, that as the purchaser could not have been compelled to perform the contract, the heir was not entitled to have it completed for his benefit. Buckminster v. Harrop, 7 Ves. 341. Collier v. Jenkins, Y. 295.

WILL.

(Remoteness.) A testatrix gave the interest of her residuary estate to her four sisters during their lives, and on their deaths to be applied at the discretion of her executor to the maintenance and education, or accumulated for the benefit of the children of each of them so dying until the children should attain the age of twenty-two respectively, when they were to be entitled to their mother's share of the principal; with limitations over in case of the decease of any of them under that age: held, that the children took a vested interest at twenty-two; and that all the gifts over were void for remoteness. Leak v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363. Vaudry v. Geddes, R. & M. 203. A testatrix gave £6000 to her son for life, remainder, as to one moiety, to his eldest male child living at her decease, and as to the other moiety to his other children; she also gave a like sum to her daughters for their respective lives in equal shares, remainder to their children; and she further gave a sum to her three children equally during their lives, and the share of each was at his or her death to revert to their issue equally. By a codicil, she desired that her grandchildren's shares should be settled upon them for their lives, and afterwards upon their children held, that the moiety of the £6000 being given to the eldest male child of the testatrix's son living at her decease, a life interest might be well limited to him with remainder to his unborn children: that the other limitations to great-grandchildren were void: that the absolute interests given by the will to the children were not, under the circumstances, destroyed by the codicil. Hodges v. Middleton, Doug. 431; Tothill v. Pitt, 1 Mod. 488. Arnold v. Congreave, R. M. 209. (Construction.) A testator gave £12,500, 4 per cent. annuities. At the date of this will, the new 4 per cents, in which he had a small sum, were in existence, and also the 4 per cent. consuls, in which he had a very large sum. Before his death the latter were reduced to 3 per cent., and another 4 per cent. stock created: held, that the legacy should be invested in an existing

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4 per cent. stock, and not in one which had been reduced to 31 per cent. Bank v. Sladen, R. & M. 216. (Executor.) Where a trust is clearly intended by a testator, but is too uncertain for the court to execute, the next of kin are entitled; as where A bequeathed the residue of her property to her executors, in trust to dispose of the same at such times, in such manner, and for such purposes, as they should think fit; it being her will that the distribution thereof should be left entirely to their discretion: they were held to be trustees for her next of kin. Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 299; James v. Allen, 3 Mer. 17; Vesey v. Jameson, 1 S. & S. 62. Fowler v. Garlike, R. & R. 232. (Alienation-gift over.) A testator bequeathed the dividends of certain stock to his nephew, solely for the maintenance of himself and his family, declaring that such dividends should not be capable of being charged with his debts or engagements, and that he should have no power to charge, assign, anticipate, or encumber them; but that if he should attempt so to do, or if the dividends by bankruptcy, insolvency, or otherwise, should be assigned, or become payable to any other person, or be, or become applicable to any other purpose than for the maintenance of the nephew and his family, his interest therein should cease, and the stock be held upon trust for his children. Long subsequently to the date of the will, and a few weeks prior to a codicil confirming it, the nephew took the benefit of the Lord's Act (1 G. 4, c. 119,) in the usual way, and some years after the testator died held, that the dividends by the nephew's insolvency became applicable to the payment of his debts, and his life interest was consequently forfeited. Dommett v. Bedford, 3 Ves. 149. Cooper v. Wyatt, 5 Mod. 482.

:

(Charge.) A testator gave, by his will, one moiety of an estate

to his sister and her children, and subsequently by a codicil, which gave them the whole of the estate if he should possess it at his death, he charged it with the payment of £15,000 to certain legatees. At the date of the will and codicil he was possessed of only one moiety of the estate, but afterwards he acquired the other: held, that although the devise was void as to one moiety, the charge of £15,000 took effect, and was payable out of the other. Sheddon v. Goodrich, 8 Ves. 481. Lushington v. Sewell, R. & M. 169. S. C. 1 Pmy. 435. (Children.) A. by his will bequeathed a sum of stock in certain events to his grandchildren, being children of his sons W. and J. whether born in wedlock or not. And, after certain specific bequests, he gave the residue of his personal estate to his sons

W. and J. as tenants in common: but if either of them should die in the testator's lifetime, the moiety of such deceased son should go to his children; but if both his sons should die in his lifetime, then he gave such residue to and among all their children as tenants in common. The testator's two sons died in his lifetime, J. leaving legitimate and illegitimate children, W. illegitimate children only. Held that the legitimate children of J. and the children of W. took the residue to the exclusion of the illegitimate children of the former. Cartwright v. Vawdry, 5 Ves. 530. Fraser v. Pigott, G. 354.

A, a native of Montrose in Scotland, residing in England, by his will gave the residue of his real and personal estate to trustees, upon trust to be laid out in the purchase of lands or rents of inheritance in fee simple, for certain charitable purposes at Montrose; held, that the testator, from the expression fee simple and other circumstances, did not contemplate the purchase of land in Scotland, and therefore the bequest was void by the statute of Mortmain. Curtis v. Hatton, 14 Ves. 537. Attorney General v. Mill, D. & C. 394.

(Power.) A testatrix being entitled, under the residuary clause in her brother's will, to £7000 bank stock, with power to appoint the same, by her will appointed all such moneys as then constituted the residue of her brother's estate, consisting of £7000 bank stock, to certain persons. Subsequently to her brother's death, and shortly before the date of the will of the testatrix, the £7000 had been increased by act of parliament, (56 Geo. 3, c. 96,) to £8750; held, that the £8750 passed, the testatrix having evidently intended to dispose of all the residuary property of her brother. Milner v. Milner, 1 Ves. sen. 1071. Matthews v. Maule, R. & M. 397.

(Survivors.) A testator gave one third of his estate to his

daughter for life, with remainder to her children equally, and the respective heirs of their bodies, and in case of the death of any of the children without issue, their shares should go to the survivors or survivor, and others or other of them, and the respective heirs of the bodies of such survivors or survivor and other or others of them. He gave the other two thirds in the same way to his daughters B and C, and their children; and then directed, that if one or more of his daughters should die without such issue, their shares should go to the survivors or survivor for life, with remainder to the children of the bodies of the survivors or survivor of them (per stirpes and not per capita;) and in case any of such children should die without issue of their bodies, their shares should go to the survivors or survivor and others

or other of them equally, and the heirs of the bodies of such survivors or survivor, and others or other of them, and in default of such issue to D and E. B died leaving children, and C died without issue; held, that though 'survivors' sometimes might be construed to mean others in order to effectuate the intention of a testator, no such intentions could be imputed in this case, and that the children of a deceased daughter could not, as to her third share, stand in the place of their parent, so that A was entitled for life to the share of C, to the exclusion of B's children. Wilmot v. Wilmot, 8 Ves. 10; Davidson v. Dallas, 14 Ves. 578; Crowder v. Stone, 3 Russ. 223. Craufurd v. Winterton, R. & M. 407.

(Power of sale.) A testator devised a farm to his two sons, with permission to dispose of it to A, if they should think proper; and if it should not be sold he devised the same, after the decease of either of his sons, to the survivor; and after the decease of both, to be sold by auction, and the purchase-money to be equally shared between their children; held, that the words of the will imported an absolute power of sale, and that the brothers consequently could give an efficient discharge for the purchasemoney; that they were joint tenants for life of the purchasemoney with benefit of survivorship; with remainders over, according to the provisions of the will, in case the estate was not sold. Sowarsby v. Lacy, 4 Mod. 142. Breedon v. Breedon, R. & M. 413.

(Absolute interest.) A testator bequeathed £2000 to A, subject to a life interest in two other persons: and added words conferring a power of disposition in A during the continuance of the prior life interests: held, that as A under the first words took an absolute interest, which subsequent words were evidently intended to enlarge, he was not thereby precluded from assigning his legacy by deed inter vivos executed while the two other persons were still alive. Hales v. Margesum, 3 Ves. 299; Hixon v. Oliver, 13 Ves. 108. Comber v. Graham, R. & M. 450. (Exoneration.) A testator devised lands to A in fee, and reciting that he had executed a bond for the payment of an annuity, he charged the lands so devised, and also A, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, with the payment of it. He also gave several pecuniary legacies and the residue of his personal estate to A and B; held, that the annuity was charged upon the real estate, and upon A personally, in exoneration of the personal estate. Brown v. Groomridge, 4 Mod. 495. Welby v. Rockcliffe, R. & M. 571.