injunction to restrain the company from erecting an arch of less than a certain size was granted, although they were directed by the act to give compensation to persons whose property might sustain damage by their operations. Coats v. Clarence Railway Company, R. & M. 181.

Where a person had got into possession of property by forcible means during a suit to establish his equitable title, the Court refused to stay proceedings against him for recovery of possession. Grafton v. Griffin, R. & M. 336.

LACHES.

Where a vendor, having had notice from the purchaser of abandonment of the contract, neglected to file his bill for a specific performance, until a year afterwards, the bill was dismissed with costs, on the ground of unreasonable delay.

Reid, R. & M. 236.

LEASING.

Watson v.

Devisees in trust to pay annuities, and subject thereto to permit A, and after him his wife, to take the profits for life, and, after the decease of the survivor, for their children, has power to make a lease for ten years. Naylor v. Arnitt, R. & M. 501. (Creation.) In a partnership between A & B it was stipulated, that in the event of A's dying before the expiration of the term, his interest should go to such person as he should by will name and appoint, and in default of such appointment to his wife, or, in case of her death, to his children equally, A, by will, not in any way referring to the power, gave all his estate and effects' to one of his children. He survived his wife, and died leaving three children: held, that notwithstanding the words 'name and appoint' there was no intention to create a power in its technical sense, and to limit the testator's power of disposition, but that his interest in the partnership passed under the words in the will. Ponton v. Dunn, R. & M. 402.

LEGACY.

A testator bequeathed a legacy to a person on condition that he executed a release of all claims upon the estate. The release was executed, but it subsequently appeared that the assets were insufficient to pay all the legacies, and that no debt was due: held, that the legatee could not, under these circumstances, be considered as a purchaser of his legacy, so as to avoid an abatement with the other legatees. Davies v. Bush, Y. 341.

See INFANT; LUNATIC.

LUNATIC.

A mother, whose only daughter, a lunatic, was entitled to a large

real and personal estate under her father's will, bequeathed the residue of her estate and effects to trustees, upon trust to apply the interest, amounting to about £1600 a year, towards the maintenance and support of her daughter, and otherwise for her comfort and advantage as they should think proper, without being liable to account; and after her decease, to pay the principal, and also such interest as should not have actually been so applied, to the testator's nieces: held, that the charge of maintaining the daughter should be borne entirely by the maternal estate, as that was not inconsistent with the intention of the will, and in the event of the lunatic's recovery, would be most beneficial to her. Foljambe v. Willoughby, 2 S. & S. 165. In re Ashley, R. & M. 373.

MORTGAGE.

On a suit for the administration of the assets of a deceased mortgagor, the mortgagee can only prove against the common fund for so much of his debt as remains after sale of the mortgaged premises. Tooke v. Wartley, 2 Dick. 785; 2 B. & C. 125. Greenwood v. Taylor, R. & M. 185.

A, entitled to the equity of redemption of an estate, conveyed the same to B, the mortgagee, for a sum made up of the mortgage debt and an additional sum. B afterwards demised the estate to A for ninety-nine years, determinable upon lives, and on the lease was indorsed an agreement, that if the rent reserved was regularly paid, A should be at liberty to repurchase the premises within five years. A failed in payment of the rent, for which distresses had been levied, but within the five years he tendered the arrears, and applied to repurchase, which B refused to permit. Held, that though in cases of payment of money when penalty or forfeiture is introduced for the purpose of security, the court will relieve upon the ground of full compensation by giving interest; yet where there is no stipulation for penalty or forfeiture, but a privilege is conferred upon payment of the money within a stated period, the privilege is lost by non payment within the period. Davis v. Thomas, R. M. 506. PARTNERSHIP.

Declarations of one partner subsequent to a dissolution, are admissible as against the other, to prove payment of a partnership debt. Whitcomb v. Whiting, Doug. 652. Britchar v. Draper,

R. & M. 191.

Where one partner, after dissolution, having received the rents of a debtor to the partnership, and retained the amount of the debt, stated that he did so on the understanding that the debtor

should have credit for the sum retained, and that he considered the sum to have been satisfied, but no account had been settled; it was held the debt was not satisfied as between the partners. Jeffs v. Wood, 2 P. N. 129; Heath v. Percival, 1 P. N. 683. S. C.

PARTIES.

Devise to A for life, then to B for life, then to the sons of B in tail

male. During the tenancy of A, a bill was filed by a creditor of the testator for a sale of a part of the estates. No inquiry into the incumbrances affecting the estates was directed; and the trustees for the tenants in tail were not made parties to the suit. The lands were sold, and a conveyance executed by the officer of the court, and by A, and subsequently (though not till after a compromise had been effected) by B, and the residue of the purchase money was ordered to be invested for the benefit of A: held, that they were not proper parties; that there ought to have been an account of incumbrances, and that the surplus ought not to have been paid over; that the whole transaction was properly set aside after the death of the two tenants for life, and at the suit of the first surviving tenant in tail; and that the accounts were properly directed to be taken from the death of second tenant for life. Mullins v. Townsend, D. & C. 430.

PLEADING.

(Disclaimer.) One of two persons named executors having disclaimed and renounced, afterwards took an active part in the conversion of the assets into money, but merely as the agent of the other to whom he accounted: held, that he had not acted as trustee and executor, and ought not to have been made a party to a suit for the administration of the estate. Dove v. Everard, R. & M. 231.

(Account.) Residuary legatees may file a bill for an account against the executor and the surviving partner of a testator, although no collusion is charged or proved. Bousher v. Watkings, R. & M. 277.

(Account stated.) Where an answer set up an account stated, which was proved in evidence, and not impeached by the plaintiff, the bill is dismissed with costs, as of course. Kinsmans v. Barker, 14 Ves. 579. Endo v. Caleham, Y. 306. (Decree.) Plea in the Exchequer of a former suit and decree, signed and enrolled in the Court of Chancery, in respect of the same matters. This bill had been dismissed not on the merits, but for want of evidence. Plea nevertheless allowed. King v. Brownlow, 1 Ch. Ca. 233. Jones v. Nixon, Y. 359.

POWER. A feme covert having an interest in a fund for her separate use for life, with a power to appoint after her death, assigned her life interest and appointed the fund after her death to trustees, upon trust to purchase an annuity for her life. The court ordered a transfer of the fund to the new trustees, considering that, by the union of the life estate with the remainder, there was no scintilla of interest left in any other person. Sturgis v. Corp, 13 Ves. 191. Lynn v. Ashton, R. & M. 181. (Execution.) Land was devised to a trustee and his heirs to the use of A for life, without impeachment of waste, with divers remainders over; and a power was given to the trustee, at the request of the tenant for life in possession, to sell the land, and for that purpose to revoke the original and appoint new uses. The land having been sold exclusive of the timber, which was to be taken at a valuation, and it being conceived that the tenant for life was entitled to the value of the timber; by indenture of the 12th of May, 1783, A conveyed the timber, and the trustee the land to the purchaser. Under the power, the produce of any sale was to be laid out in other land, and in the mean time to be invested. Some years afterwards A, having discovered that he was not entitled to the amount of the valuation of the timber, transferred to the trustee as much stock as it would have purchased at the time of the sale. After A's death in 1822, B, the next in remainder, although he was aware of these facts, and had concurred in proceedings in which the fund produced by the sale was treated as applicable to the purposes of the testator's will, brought a writ of formedon, and obtained judgment, on the ground that the power of sale was not duly executed. This judgment was affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber, from which a writ of error to the House of Lords was depending. The bill was filed, amongst other objects, to have the defect in the execution of the power supplied, and the indenture of the 12th of May, 1783 reformed and amended held, that the plaintiffs in equity were bound to elect, either to have the bill dismissed or abandon the writ of error; that equity relieves against the defective execution of a power only when the defect consists in a want of some circumstance required in the manner of execution, as the want of a seal or of a sufficient number of witnesses, or where it has been exercised by a deed instead of a will; that equity will reform a deed which, by mistake of the drawer, does not effectuate the intention of the parties, but not where their intention is clear,

VOL. IX.NO. XVII.

16

but they are ignorant of the law; that a party cannot be held by any act to confirm a title, unless he was fully aware at the time, not only of the fact upon which the defect depends, but of the consequence in point of law. The bill was dismissed. Cockerell v. Cholmeley, R. & M. 418. (Extinguishment.) By marriage settlement lands were limited to the use of A for life, remainder to the use of his wife for life, remainder to trustees for a term to commence from the death of the survivor of A and his wife, remainder to the heirs of the body of the wife by A, remainder to the heirs of A. The trusts of the term were, to raise portions for younger children as A and his wife should appoint, and, in default of such appointment, as the survivor should appoint. The wife died without joining in any appointment. A conceiving himself to be tenant in tail, levied a fine with proclamations to the use of himself in fee, and afterwards made a will in execution of his power; held, that the power was destroyed by the fine.

Semble, that every power reserved by a grantor may be released or extinguished, although he reserves no interest in the estate; (Bird v. Christopher, Styles, 389;) and that every grantee for life, with a power in gross, may in like manner release or extinguish. West v. Berney, Bickley v. Guest, R. & M. 431, 440. PRACTICE.

(Motion.) If a motion, after having been refused with costs in the court below, be renewed before the Lord Chancellor upon new facts, it is substantially an original motion, and may be granted with costs. In the matter of Joseph and Webster, R. & M. 498.

(Title.) Where, upon a question of title, the Master was satisfied with the evidence produced, but upon an exception to his report, the court differed from him, it was, upon the suggestion of the vendor's counsel that further evidence could be obtained, referred back to the Master to review his report. Andrew v. Andrew, Sim. 390.

(Title.) Upon the allowance of exceptions to a report in favor of a title, the court will, on the application of the vendor, refer it back to the Master to review his report, in order that evidence to remove the objection may be produced. Egerton v. Jones, Sim. 393. (Production of documents.) The court will not order a defendant to produce letters which passed between him and his solicitor. in the progress of the cause, or with reference to it previously to its being instituted, or which contain legal advice. Preston