his own, a mind endowed with the various faculties that pertain to mental existence, such as consciousness, affections, will, &c., in distinction from the mind, affections, will, &c. of the Father? In a word, is the literal construction of these expressions the true and proper one, or are we to regard them as tropical, in some sense, and used by way of adaptation to our conceptions and modes of thought and speech?

Certain it is that in order to express the idea of a distinction in the divine nature, we are under the necessity of employing expressions like these. Such is the poverty of human language and of human thought, that we can in no other way approach themes so far above us, than by appropriating to them expressions borrowed from material objects, and the range of human observation. On the supposition then that the Son has not originally a proper individuality, a distinct being and existence, but that the divine essence is strictly one and undivided, still it would be natural, almost inevitable indeed, that the sacred writers should speak as they do in the passages under consideration. On the contrary, if the Son in his preexistent state has a distinct existence, a proper individuality, separate from that of the Father, and if the Spirit is individually distinct from both, if in other words, Father, Son and Spirit, are three distinct divine minds, nothing could be easier than to express that idea plainly and positively in the language which men ordinarily employ. This certainly the Scriptures have not done. Where, unless in the passages under consideration, is any such idea conveyed? That it is not necessarily and positively conveyed in these passages is plain, since, as we have just observed, the language is precisely such as would naturally be employed, on the supposition that simply a distinction existing in the nature of the Godhead, and not separate individuality in the strict and proper sense, had been intended.

When Christ speaks of the glory which he had with the Father before the world was, and of the Father as having then loved him, are we necessarily to understand him as implying any thing more than a participation in the divine nature and dignity in that preexistent state? Is it not the God-man, Christ Jesus, addressing the Father, and speaking of himself as he was before he assumed humanity? And how else in human language could he speak of himself, as he was in that former state, except in the way he does, as if possessing individual existence?

And when John speaks of the word as with God, is it not under the same restriction and necessity of speech; an approximation such as human language and the human mind will admit of, to that which in all its length and breadth lies far above our reach and comprehension. Is there not, in all these cases, present to the mind of the writer or speaker, the proper individuality of Jesus, as he existed among men, serving as the basis and ground

work of the language used to denote that higher and preëxistent state-the starting point from which the mind sets out; and if so, will not this account for the nature of the expressions and illustrations employed?

In fine, whatever view we take of these expressions, when we come to place them beside and weigh them against the numerous passages in which the unity of God is stated in the most positive terms, the latter certainly preponderate. If we follow the guidance of Scripture, we are to conceive of God as one-one being, or existence-one mind, creating, directing, controlling all things -possessing the faculties and attributes essential to all mental or spiritual existence, as consciousness, understanding, will, affections, &c. We cannot modify this idea of the divine unity in any essential point without departing from the track of revelation. The moment we conceive of the Deity as consisting of three distinct individuals, each possessing consciousness, affections, will, of his own, we contradict and virtually abandon the true scriptural simple idea of one God. Whatever guard we may throw about our language, we do, in fact, from that moment, believe not in one God, but in three. It is plain then that we must either adopt a modified view of the divine unity, abandoning the strict and proper sense of the term, and suffering the different divine persons-Father, Son and Spirit-to be one, in no other sense than as Peter, John and James are one, i. e., specifically so, one in disposition, purpose, heart, aim, nature; or else we must modify our idea of the individuality of the Son and Spirit so as not to conceive of them as separate existences or beings, separate minds, thinking, devising, willing, &c., in distinction from the one divine mind. Our choice is between the two-either this or tritheism. This, and not tritheism we are compelled to say; for such is the decision at once of revelation and of reason.

Do we then, in so saying, reject the personality of the Son and of the Spirit? By no means. In the true sense of that word, as used with reference to the Deity, in the only sense in which the word ought ever to be used in such connection, we do not reject it. In every other sense we do. As denoting a distinction existing eternally in the divine nature, a distinction not understood or capable of being comprehended fully by us, mysterious to us, as are many other things respecting Deity, a distinction however, which lays the foundation for a development in the history of our world of God as Father, as Son and as Spirit,in this sense the term personality may be employed conveniently in place and for want of some better term. And this is all that the Scriptures seem on the whole to convey respecting the matter, and all that we can admit consistently with the cardinal doctrine of the divine unity of essence or being.

That many trinitarians ancient and modern go farther than this, is to be conceded: they use the word person in reference to the Deity, in a much broader sense, meaning by it much the same thing as when they apply it to three different men. That such writers are in reality, not so much trinitarians as tritheists, is also to be conceded. For what can constitute three Gods, if three Divine existences, each possessing strict and proper individuality, three Divine minds, each acting, feeling, willing, of itself, are not? What is personality in the ordinary and strict sense, more than this? In what sense, other than this, are any three men, three persons?

This method of stating the doctrine of the Trinity is particularly unfortunate, since it not only leads the mind that adopts it into unnecessary confusion, and even error, but by coming into direct and unavoidable collision with one of the plainest truths of revelation, the divine unity, it brings the doctrine itself into disrepute, and in many instances occasions its entire rejection. It is a sad fact, yet one with which he who is conversant with the history of doctrines in the church is but too familiar, that in many cases the first sources of the error and essential heresy which have arisen in the world, to the no small detriment of truth and the human mind, are to be found in the injudicious and unreasonable statements and opinions of those who have held the very opposite extreme. Thus unquestionably has it been in the present instance. Not a few have been led to reject the divinity of Christ and the doctrine of the Trinity in toto, as the only way of avoiding the really irreconcilable contradictions involved in the method of statement now under consideration. And this state of things must continue, so long as they who hold the doctrine allow themselves to use terms in this loose and incorrect manner; applying to the distinctions in the divine nature, the term person in nearly or quite, the ordinary sense of the word; speaking and thinking of the Father, Son and Spirit, as if they were three distinct beings, who together constitute the Deity, who consult together, and enjoy each other's society and converse; thus virtually abandoning the doctrine of the simple undivided unity of the Godhead, and, when pressed with the conflicting nature of these two things, taking refuge as a last resort behind the broad shield of acknowledged mystery.

A leading New England divine, not long deceased, and whose writings are destined to exert for years to come no inconsiderable influence upon theological science, thus discourses upon the mode of the divine existence. "We find no difficulty in conceiving of three divine persons. It is just as easy to conceive of three divine persons, as of three human persons. . . . The only difficulty in this case lies in conceiving these three persons to be but one." (Emmons, vol. iv, p. 111.) The same sentiment frequently

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recurs.

"We have as clear an idea of these three divine persons as of three human persons. There is no mystery in the personality of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, though there is a profound mystery in their being one God." (do., iv, 125.)

Using the term personality in this sense, conceiving of the three divine persons as we do of three human persons, we are quite ready to admit, with the author, that there is both a difficulty and a profound mystery, nay, we should certainly add an utter impossibility, in conceiving of these three as one being.

It does not remove the difficulty to say that "being may signify something different from person in respect to deity," and therefore" we may easily conceive that God should be but one being, and yet exist in three persons." For being and person signify different things as respects man also, yet it is not easy to conceive of three human persons constituting one human being. Nor is it any advance towards the removal of this difficulty to say, what is doubtless true, that "the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are three in respect to their personality, and but one in respect to their nature and essence." (do., iv, 110.) Personality is here supposed to be something distinct from nature and essence, so that what pertains to the one, does not pertain to the other. Very true. But the personality of the Father, Son and Spirit, according to the author, consists in this, that each "is able to understand, to will and to act, of himself," and to do so "as a free, voluntary, almighty agent." (do., iv, 107, 108.) But do not understanding, will, and free voluntary action, pertain, we ask, to the very nature and essence of deity? Can we conceive of deity as essentially and in his original nature, destitute of these properties? If not, then as personality consists in these things, what becomes of the distinction just made, and how is it that a three-fold personality, in this human sense, does not also involve a three-fold nature and essence?

Indeed the author in a subsequent passage, virtually admits that this explanation is unsatisfactory. "It is as easy," he repeats, "to conceive of three divine persons, as to conceive of one divine person; the only difficulty is to conceive how three divine persons should be but one divine being. But this is the mystery of the doctrine, which it is neither possible nor necessary for us to understand." (do., iv, 130.) If it is neither possible nor necessary for us to conceive how these three persons can be one being, -and we are perfectly ready to admit that it is even so, in the sense now attached to the word person,-then what avails any explanation, or any attempt to explain; and what moreover becomes of the assertion that "we can easily conceive that God should be but one being, and yet exist in three persons."

If the doctrine of the divine unity be not essentially swept away and abandoned by these and the like representations, then

we are at a loss to conceive what idea can be attached in any man's mind to that word unity. It is replied, the Scriptures no where teach that the unity of God is just like our unity. True. But what, we ask again, is the proper and primitive meaning of that word unity? Are there several kinds of unity, as there are several shades of a color, or several races of men? Strictly speaking is there any other unity but numerical unity? And when we think of a thing as being one, or as more than one, is not this one of the simplest ideas that the human mind can form, one of its elementary conceptions? Is it not evident that when we speak of three or more personal, individual, distinct agents, each willing and acting for himself, as being one, we use the term in a secondary, and not in its proper and primitive sense? We mean they are one in sentiment, one in heart, one in purpose and action, &c. In this sense any three men, or any number of men may be one. And is the glorious, the cardinal doctrine of the divine unity reduced to this, a mere figurative oneness, a specific unity merely? In this sense, one may ask, why were not the gods of heathen mythology one, partaking as they were supposed to do of the same nature, the same spirit, the same attributes? When we read that the Lord our God is one Lord, when we hear Jehovah assert in the plainest manner his undivided unity of existence and of dominion against the multiplicity of heathen and false gods, when we read that "God is one," that "there is one God and Father of all," "the king eternal," "the only wise God," is there, we ask, in all this no assertion of simple, strict, and proper unity as respects the being to whom these solemn and repeated asseverations refer? What language could more explicitly have affirmed such an idea, supposing this to have been intended?

It devolves on those who conceive of the three divine, as they do of three human, persons, not merely to admit that it is a mysterious thing how these three are one being, but to show that in any intelligible sense, or any proper use of terms, they can be one; that three conscious, intelligent, voluntary agents, thinking, feeling, willing, acting, each for himself, distinct from each other, do or can in any proper sense constitute one being; and that when the Scriptures speak of God as one they mean only such unity as this. This is more than can be shown.

Accordingly we find that those who take this view usually place the doctrine of the divine unity quite in the back-ground. It has ceased to mean much, or to be of much importance. The distinguished divine, from whom we have just quoted, sums up his argument respecting the personal distinction in the Godhead, with this remark-" We know, therefore, that they are three distinct persons. Their personality is plainly and intelligibly revealed; though their unity is not, and can not be revealed.