abuses his power, this abuse does not authorize the subjects to divest him of it; because he did not derive it from them. Each of them, originally, found the society that received him, completely organized, and the sovereign power fully established. If he is treated tyrannically, and can escape from his oppressor, he has a right to withdraw.'

It will probably be asked whether the right of the subject in such a case extends no further than to withdraw from oppression? Where the majority of a nation are oppressed, they would in most cases have recourse to different measures. The author's defence would probably be this: It does not affect my assertion that kings or subjects transgress their duty. My office is to lay down the principles of that duty, not to calculate the course of events.'

The second mode of aggregation is that of conquest. In support of the right of conquest, which the author fully acknowledges, he reasons thus: The parental authority was invested with the powers necessary for the government of the society, whose interests it was to regulate and protect. Among these was necessarily reckoned the power of life and death over the members of the family, to prevent its subversion by their rebellion, and the power of making war against external enemies. In support of the power of life and death over children he cites no authority but the laws of the Romans, the Chinese, and some barbarous nations. But he justifies his assertion upon the same considerations which confer on individuals the right of self-defence. On the same grounds a sovereign prince has the right of making war, and from this naturally arises the right of conquest. He may secure the advantages he has obtained either as an indemnification for actual hostility, or as a defence against meditated aggression. His dominion is justified by the necessity of restraining his enemies from similar attacks in future.

In the third and fourth chapters, the parental authority is considered as the preservative principle of governments, and as the foundation of the right arising from prescription. In the beginning of the fourth chapter a remark occurs which we read with no inconsiderable degree of surprize. In morals no question is insoluble; because morality being the general and common rule laid down for the conduct of all men, rests on principles applicable in all cases.' That there is a line of conduct in all human circumstances and situations, which, had we adequate powers of intellect, might be proved to be the best possible in each respective case, is, we

are persuaded, perfectly true. But to ascertain this point in all cases, or with perfect certainty in almost any case, involves so intimate a knowledge of the essence of morality, as to defy the endeavours, not only of all human, but perhaps of all finite intelligences. Such a knowledge differs not only in degree but in kind from the information which we obtain, and the materials with which we set out in the investigation of what are called moral questions. Morality rests on principles applicable in all cases: yet to us it is so difficult to shape the application of them, that in few cases can we make extensive conclusions; in still fewer are they general; and in the small number of the very plainest universal. But where the question is at all complicated, and such occur every day, it is as much as an individual can do, though never actually beyond his power, to assure himself that he has acted for the best: it is often impossible for him to convince the most candid of his fellow-creatures that he has done so. And after all the anxiety that instances of such difficulty have excited in the minds of wise and good men, are we to be told that in morals no question is insoJuble? Many are not soluble to mortal comprehension; the solation may be possible in the abstract, but utterly im practicable.

On the subject of prescription he remarks, that

"The original authors of a revolution abuse their parental autho rity when they educate their children in their own prejudices. But the authority itself is lawful though misapplied, and therefore the children are guilty in a slighter degree. The next generation are less culpable; the power under which they are born subjects has been established in some measure unknown to them. And thus as generations succeed each other, the ties that attach the subjects to the new government become more natural, and consequently more lawful. This return to subordination and justice operating by the regular and successive action of the moral and physical causes that govern the world, becomes really the order established by the Almighty; and this is what we would wish to be understood when we say that a government legalizes itself by prescription.'

But the operation of the principle of prescription is guarded and limited with much attention, and it is asserted on just grounds that this operation is necessarily slower in a monarchy than under any other form of government.

The concluding chapter, as is usual with French writers, consists principally of recapitulation. Towards the end of it the author addresses himself to those French emigrants.

who returned to France and submitted to the government of Buonaparte. They presumed, he says, to talk of the order established by the Almighty, and the interests of religion. But where, he proceeds, are those features of the revolutionary regime from which they conclude it to be the order established by the Almighty? How are the interests of religion advanced while its ministers are extending its sanc⚫tions to a tyrant and an usurper, and courting with abject flattery his favour and protection?

To the excursive view we have taken of the work in de tail we shall now add,such remarks as appear to us to be generally applicable to the style, the distribution of the parts, and the conduct of the argument. The style is very frequently, and to a considerable extent, deficient in precision. As far as this is imputable to the author it appears in the indiscriminate use of the same words and phrases, where different ideas are intended to be conveyed. Thus we have nature' and 'reason' and' natural laws' used sometimes in the author's sense of them, and sometimes in the seuse attached to them by his opponents, without the accompaniment of any qualifying expression to mark the distinction. When he adopts in a limited sense some of their positions, the propriety of which in a general view it is his main object to combat, he does not prepare the reader by terms sufficiently expressive of contrast. For want of this a vicious position of the publicists before controverted, appears in words at least to be again conceded; and the real difference not being precisely noticed, the effect of the verbal resemblance remains to puzzle the reader. But a considerable share of the confusion thus introduced is the fault of the translator. By a frequent use of the most offensive gallicisms he disfigures the language, and occasionally obscures the sense of the author. The masculine and feminine pronouns repeatedly occur where our language gives no sanction to their introduction: and now and then a bald translation of the original presents us with an assemblage of English words that were never before brought together. In the distribution of the subject the ground is well taken for a successful opposition to the pestilent principles of the opposite party. The natural order is observed of stating the objectionable parts of the respective systeins, and considering the objections seriatim. But in the pursuit of the train of argument here proposed the promised perspicuity is by no means completely accomplished. In very few parts of the discussion do we find the title of each chapter sufficiently adhered to: the point which it professes to treat of is not kept obvi

ously and prominently in view. The distinction is not sufficiently preserved between the principal parts, and those which are subordinate and collateral. Mere assertion is sometimes substituted for argument, and occasionally its place is occupied only by similitude or illustration. Things occur out of their natural order and situation; and repeti tions of what has been already demonstrated, and even of the process by which we were conducted to the demonstration. Omissions are to be supplied, redundancies to be got rid of; and it is only by a series of such exertions that the reader is enabled to maintain his view of the subject unbrok en and unmixed. Here it is hid in obscurity, and there mazed in confusion; it elopes in the disguise of metaphor, or evaporates in the fumes of declamation. But if the perusal be attended with some labour, the importance of the subject deserves even a laborious attention. We hope that such a consideration of it may lead our countrymen to the conviction that there is no comparison between the ordinary weight of natural and moral evil to be found in the world, and the organized mechanism of destruction which has been exhibited in the course of the French revolution. With a view of giving energy and effect to such impressions, the translator has added a preface, in which he enforces the doctrine of the author by adverting to circumstances of our own government, and the occurrences of our history, as well as to the character of the French nation, and the conduct and views of Buonaparte. He has also furnished an appendix copiously illustrative of various parts of the original work, and collected from valuable sources of information.

ART. VIII.-Biographical Memoirs of the late Reverend Joseph Warton, D.D. Master of St. Mary Winton College, &c. To which are added, a Selection from his Works; and a Literary Correspondence between eminent Persons reserved by him for Publication. By the Rev. John Wooll, A. M. &c. Cadell. 1806.

BEFORE we undertake our office of examiners, let us hear what Mr. Wooll says of himself with regard to the motives which induced him to the present publication; only premising that the affection and reverence, with which he seems to be inspired for the subject of it, demand our approbation, and that whatever censure we may find ourselves CRIT. REV. Vol. 9. September, 1806.

F

obliged to pass, will be far distant from an intention to indulge in satire at the expence of a commendable feeling.

A period of more than six years having elapsed since the death of Dr. Warton, and no pen yet employed in rescuing from oblivion the excellence of his moral and intellectual attainments; the editor feels himself acquitted of presumption in attempting what many others might have more successfully accomplished: of these, sume have probably been deterred, by a dread of committing their own fame in the endeavour to perpetuate that of their author: and this fear should perhaps have weighed with the present writer. But if he has succeeded in accurately displaying the extensive and highly endowed mind; if he has given to the world an ampler knowledge and juster ideas of the lively imagination, the classical taste, the didactic qualifications so peculiarly calculated to foster the dawning of juvenile talent; and the thousand warm and benevolent traits of disposition which eminently characterized his revered friend and master; he will rest contented with having performed a duty, though he may not have entitled himself to a reward in a word, if he has not tarnished the reputation or lowered the name of Warton, he will quietly submit to the imputation of not having exalted his own.'

The principal remark suggested to us by this passage that Mr. Wooll seems to have been carried away by an error which (fortunately enough for the trade) is a very general one, and has contributed to deluge the press more largely than any one opinion or set of opinions besides; namely, that the memory of a man must necessarily perish, unless some kind friend preserves it by his biographical memoirs.',

But Horace says only

་

Vixêre Fortes ante Agamemnona, &c.

The soldier or the statesman would soon be forgotten if there were no poets or historians to celebrate his actions. But one whose reputation depends solely on his literary exploits, has erected his own monument, or is worthy of none. His works speak for him; and his fame in the annals of learning can neither be exalted nor depressed by the vain ad file labours of his biographer. Perhaps it is necessary to cxplara ourselves by restraining the universality of this remark. We only mean to say that it is no excuse, when an Author sits deliberately down to spin out a literary life, to plead his intention of erecting a suitable monument to the deceased. The law never admits of private friendship as an excuse for public mischier, and the jaws of sound criticism follow, in this respect, the laws of the land. The life of a man of letters must, in general, be extremely barren of incident.