The introduction generally notices the opinions of a large portion of the publicists, of which the most objectionable is the doctrine of a social compact between men equal and independent.

Throughout the world,' the author observes, mankind form communities whose members are mutually independent. From this general and established fact, prevalent in all ages, the publicists would have been warranted in supposing that society, and the authority which is essential to its very existence, are coeval with creation itself, and enter, as Ferguson judiciously remarks, into the very constitution of nature, They have however deviated into a system of thinking diametrically opposite. As far as they can carry their views, and extend their researches, they discover man existing in society. When they find his history enveloped in obscurity, they suppose him abandoned to himself, and wandering in forests in a state of absolute independence. These philosophers produce society from the midst of anarchy, and they found it in formal stipulations entered into between men as yet unenlightened and barbarous. The consequences of their doctrine are these. If independence was originally with regard to man the state of nature, it follows that he is independent by natural right; that soriety has been formed, and still subsists but by his free consent and choice; that if the chiefs whom he has selected abuse some of the powers intrusted to them, he is entitled to depose them, and to deprive them of these powers; that he is the judge of their conduct, and consequently sovereign.'

Yet he contends that if the notion of an original compact be admitted, these consequences necessarily flow from it; and therefore those writers who have admitted the principle, and yet endeavour to make a different deduction from it, have utterly failed in their object, and have contributed to extend and confirm the mischief which the publicists have produced.' At the first appearance of the social compact this kind of refutation had its weight. But when the revolution took place, these writers discovered that the social compact was conditional and revocable. They are then obliged to proceed with Rousseau, and are at length led into the conclusion that the best established governments' may be subverted by every rebellious subject under the specious mask of supporting the pretended rights of the people. Every fortunate usurper becomes the anointed of the Lord, and second only to the Divine Majesty on high,

Alarmed at the progress of so strange a doctrine, we have diligently investigated the subject, to ascertain whether civil society arose from a primitive convention between men independent of all restraint of authority; whether this state of natural independence has ever

existed; whether such a state is even possible; and we feel the most positive conviction, that this hypothesis is as false in principle, as it is pernicious in its consequences to the peace of nations, and to the security of empires. We shall prove, in the first part of this work, 1st, that from this noxious and empoisoned source, spring systems the most destructive both to society, and to the interests of religion; 2dly, that the hypothesis is not supported by any historical facts; 3dly, that it is atheistical, reflecting on Divine Providence, and contrary to revealed truths; 4thly, that it is repugnant to reason unenlightened by revelation."

The design of the second part is then generally noticed. The author disclaims the character of an apologist for ar bitrary power. He suggests that if the New Testament has not spoken more explicitly to reprobate tyranny and slavery, it is because the gospel in this as in most instances has left human institutions untouched: that a reasonable liberty can be secured only by submission to authority; that if the people have a right to discuss the title by which their rulers hold the power they exercise, both rulers and people will be jealous of each other, and mankind will be continually suffering either from anarchy or oppression. He observes that the abuse of power by a legitimate monarch is not to be compared in the evils it produces with the excesses which are the natural and probable consequence of power in the hands of an usurper.

The first chapter gives the following account of the dif ferent states of nature which the publicists suppose anterior to the formation of their social compact. Some say the condition of nature is a state of peace; according to others it is a state of hostility; but all make it a state of absoJute independence. The first represent the evil dispositions which set men at variance with each other, as the consequence of the interfering interests of society. The Jatter consider man as ill-disposed by nature, and that this evil disposition in the natural state being unrestrained by authority, acts without any interruption: these make him enter into society from fear, and those from the love of his kind. But these two inclinations act upon man in every state, exist in him always, and are always ready to operate in their turns when objects and motives occur that are proper to excite them. Either view of the case is therefore inadequate, and to discover truth we must have recourse to scripture, which experience itself sanctions; and both conjointly lead to conclusions very different from the opinions of these writers. The scriptures represent man from the beginning as social and corrupt, as influenced by love and fear, as drawn towards his kind by feelings of affection, and yet occasionally sti

mulated by malignant passions to reject their influence.. Hobbes asserts that the condition of man in a state of nature supposes perpetual warfare, because all have a right to all things; that man from the necessity of his nature is obliged to relinquish this state of misery, in which he cannot comply with the laws of nature, and that fear induces him to enter into society. He makes the maintenance of peace the fundamental law of nature. To provide for this, men delegate their rights to a sovereign, from whose authority there lies thenceforward no appeal. His error is not in supposing men hostile to each other by nature, but in supposing that mankind have ever lived out of society in a state where this disposition operated without controul or qualification. Montesquieu places man in a state of mature anterior to society, and uninfluenced, materially at least, by malignant dispositions. By explaining away philosophically', says the author, the corruption of man, he shews that he is ignorant of man's nature and of the true relations between natural and political law. On the doctrine of Montesquieu, that there are three different principles of government, we shall make the fallowing extract:

When, on his authority, it is received as a fixed opinion, however false, that monarchy of which he is the eulogist, is not founded on virtue, the interests of kings are no longer inseparable from inte grity, honesty, and justice. The most criminal stretches of autho rity have been justified, in coolly asserting that the moral reasoning of individuals, and the influence of it on private conduct, are not binding on the sovereign. This impious and detestable doctrine has shared the fate it merited, when acted on. The people possessed too much good sense to swallow it. Forced, thus, to reason, they have said, if there is but one species of government that may bave virtue for its principle, there is but one which the Almighty approves of, one only which is legitimate, and that is democracy. The throne, no longer surrounded by the religious and political sound sense which supported it, falls to the ground. The modern philosophers, who in dissolving the sacred bonds of religion, have preached a political independence, have found but too many unprincipled proselytes: and all books, and all public meetings, and speaking institutions, have resounded the praises of republics, and of the sovereignty of the people.'

Rousseau holds with Hobbes that sovereignty is composed of rights possessed by man in a state of nature, and which are transmitted to the society he has formed. With Montesquieu he denies that men have by nature dispositions hostile to each other. He says that men unite and form society not from necessity, but from choice, and with a view to obtain

advantages which they had not before; that the conditions? of the compact by which society is formed, are void, if in their execution they are found to be detrimental. But the people are not always competent to judge of their own happiness, and therefore Locke, who before Rousseau had adopted the same doctrine, refuses the people the right of insurrection, except when the prince who governs, evidently abuses the trust reposed in him. But Rousseau says, if the people chuse to destroy themselves and their own welfare, who has any right to prevent them? To avoid, however, the absurdities into which the extent of this doctrine would carry him, he has assigned as a regulator to sovereignty what he calls the general will, always, according to him, just and impartial. The two fundamental ideas of the social contract are, 1st, that the principle and origin of sovereign power are inherent in the people; 2dly, that the acts emanating from the people are not of sovereign authority, but when they express the general will.' The discussion of these two propositions leads to the conclusion that in the world there is only one legitimate sovereign, and that this sovereign is every where inefficient and paralyzed; and that in such a forlorn state no other alternative remains for man, but to submit to usurped power or return to the woods, and enjoy his original independence.' These various systems are then compared, and the chapter concludes with some observations on those writers who, acknowledging that all power is from God, do yet derive society through the medi um of a social compact. But if the contract be ratified by the divine will, it is ratified with all its conditions, and one of these is its revocability. They are therefore obliged, according to circumstances, to argue in direct opposition to themselves.

If they oppose the sovereignty of the people, they will not, in this case, admit that the social compact may be conditional If, again, it is their object to justify the oaths extorted by an usurper, during a revolution, in this case, they are ready to grant that conditions may enter into the social compact. They assert, that as the people have elected a sovereign, merely to secure their interests, they can acknowledge an usurper, when the legitimate prince can, no longer, protect them.'

The second chapter adduces the testimony of history, and principally of scripture as the most ancient and authentic history, against the above doctrines.

The scriptures always represent society as governed by chiefs,

and originally these were patriarchs, or heads of families. In the second generation Cain built a city. The useful and polite arts cultivated before the deluge shew that society was already civilized. As we advance in the history of great nations, society, and consequently social regulations, assume a more complicated form. But these ameliorations in the state of civilized society are gradual and progressive. The further we look back towards the primitive times the less are we able to discover that original state of anarchy which the publicists suppose in order to support their visionary theories.'

Profane history agrees in this respect with the sacred writings. We hear indeed of stipulations and conventions for the establishment and improvement of particular forms of government; but they were always transacted by authorities already constituted, with whom the right and office of sovereignty already existed.

It is taking an unfair, and deceiving view of the subject, to term a constitutional charter, a Magna Charta, or a bill of rights, which among some nations originated in conventions that expressed the public will in a formal manner, a primitive compact. The origin of sovereignty is by no means to be found in such conventions: for they exhibit nations who had already been subject to laws. These, conventions could not have been legitimate and regular, but by the concurrence of a pre-existing authority that directs men's minds to that particular object of reform or political change, which it may be expedient to introduce into the state. Lycurgus was a king, before he became a legislator. Athens had laws before the times of Solon,'

If a man should undertake to legislate for the savages of America, he could not be said to introduce society among them. However simple the form of their government, they have one; and he would accordingly entrust to the members of that government, the care of enforcing his improvements, and providing for the execution of his laws.

In the third chapter the hypothesis of a state of nature and a social compact, is represented as atheistical, and a reHexion on the providence of God; because in such a state, to use the author's words, God is not represented upon earth: that is, anarchy being considered as an evil of the most destructive consequences, and which can only be remedied by established authority, God has left man exposed to a moral evil without furnishing him with its appropriate moral remedy.

In the revolutions that have changed the face of empires, Providence has not been culpable. In permitting evil, she condemns those who commitit. By the wise direction she gives to events arig