secondly, under the statutes of Maryland, and thirdly, under the Constitution of the United States.

First. -As to the common law, it may be doubtful whether, according to early authorities, the pardoning power can be used so as to bar or divest any legal interest, benefit, or advantage, vested in a private individual. It is broadly stated by English writers, that it cannot be so used. (2 Hawkins, P. C. 392, cap. 37, sec. 34; 17 Viner's Abridgment; 39 Prerogative of King JJ., art. 7.) But this principle does not seem to be sustained by practical cases in the United States, except in the instances of informers and qui tam actions, while, on one occasion, in a leading case in Kentucky, it was rejected. (Routt v. Flemster, 7 J. J. Marshall, 132.)

But it is clearly established that, where the fine is allotted to a public body or a public officer, for a public purpose, it may be remitted by a pardon. This may be illustrated by several cases.

1. As where in Pennsylvania, the fine was for the benefit of the county. In this case, the court said, "Until the money is collected and paid into the treasury, the constitutional right of the Governor to pardon the offender, and remit the fine or forfeiture, remains in full force. They can have no more vested interest in the money than the Commonwealth, under the same circumstances, would have had; and it cannot be doubted that, until the money reaches the treasury, the Governor has the power to remit. In the case of costs, private persons are interested in them; but as to fines and forfeitures, they are imposed upon principles of public policy. The latter, therefore, are under the exclusive control of the Governor." (Com

monwealth v. Denniston, 9 Watts, 142.) The same point is also illustrated by a case in Indiana. (Holliday v. The People, 5 Gilman, 214, 217.)

2. As where, in Georgia, the fine was to be paid to an inferior court, for county purposes. (Johns v.

Georgia, 1 Kelly, 606, 610.)

3. As where, in South Carolina, the fine was to be paid to the Commissioners of Public Buildings, for public purposes. (The State v. Simpson, 1 Bailey, 378.) Or the Commissioners of Public Roads. (The State v. Williams, 1 Nott & McCord, 26. See also Rowe v. State, 2 Bay, 565.)

According to these authorities, the portion of the fine allotted to the county, or to the school, may be remitted. Of this there can be no doubt.

Secondly. The Statutes of Maryland, anterior to the organization of the District of Columbia, may also be regarded as an independent source of light on this question, since these statutes have been made the law of the District. And here the conclusion seems to be easy.

By the Constitution of Maryland, adopted 14th August, 1776, it was declared "The Governor may grant reprieves or pardons for any crime, except in such. cases where the law shall otherwise direct." Notwithstanding these strong words of grant, which seem to be as broad as the common law, it was further declared, as if to remove all doubt, by the Legislature, in 1782, (chap. 42,) "That the Governor, with the advice of the Council, be authorized to remit the whole or any part of any fine, penalty, or forfeitures, heretofore imposed, or hereafter to be imposed, in any court of law." Here is no exception or limitation of any kind. By

express words, the Governor is authorized to remit the whole or any part of any fine. Of course, under this clause he cannot remit a private debt; but he may remit any fine. The question is not whether the fine be payable to the United States or other parties, but whether it is a fine. If it be a fine, it is in the power of the Governor.

This view is strengthened by the circumstance that in Maryland, according to several statutes, fines were allotted to parties other than the government. The very statute of 1796, under which these proceedings were had, was passed subsequent to this provision respecting the remission of fines. It must be interpreted in harmony with the earlier statute; and since all these statutes are now the law of the District of Columbia, the power of the President, under these laws, to remit these fines, seems established without special reference to the common law or to the Constitution of the United States.

If this were not the case, two different hardships would ensue; first, the statute of 1782 would be despoiled of its natural efficacy; and, secondly, the minor offence of "transporting" a single slave would be punishable, on non-payment of the fine, with imprisonment for life, while the higher offence of "stealing" a slave is punishable with imprisonment for a specific term, and the other offence of "enticing" a slave is punishable with a fine larger than that for transporting a slave, and on non-payment thereof, imprisonment for one year only. Thirdly. Look at the case under the Constitution of the United States.

By the Constitution, the President has power “to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the

United States, except in case of impeachment." According to a familiar rule of interpretation, the single specified exception leaves the power of the President applicable to all other cases. Expressio unius exclusio est alterius. Mr. Berrien, in one of his opinions as Attorney-General, recognizes "the pardoning power as co-extensive with the power to punish ;" and he quotes with approbation the words of another writer, that "the power is general and unqualified, and that the remission of fines, penalties, and forfeitures, under the revenue laws, is included in it." (Opinions of Attorney-General, vol. ii. p. 756.)

On this power, Mr. Justice Story thus remarks: "The power of remission of fines, penalties and forfeitures, is also included in it; and may, in the last resort, be exercised by the Executive, although it is in many cases, by our laws confined to the Treasury Department. No law can abridge the constitutional powers of the Executive Department, or interrupt its right to interfere by pardon in such cases. Instances of the exercise of this power by the President, in remitting fines and penalties, in cases not within the scope of the laws, giving authority to the Treasury Department, have repeatedly occurred; and their obli gatory force has never been questioned." (Story, Com. on Constitution, vol. ii. § 1504.)

It has been decided by the Supreme Court, after elaborate argument, that the Secretary of the Treasury has authority, under the Remission Act of the 3d March, 1797, cap. 361, "to remit a forfeiture or penalty accruing under the revenue laws, at any time, before or after a final sentence of condemnation or judgment for the penalty, until the money is actually

paid over to the Collector for distribution; and such permission extends to the shares of the forfeiture or penalty to which the office of the customs is entitled, as well as to the interest of the United States." In giving his opinion in this case, Mr. Justice Johnson, of South Carolina, made use of language much in point. "Mercy and justice," he said, "could only have been administered by halves, if collectors could have hurried causes to judgment, and then clung to the one-half of the forfeiture, in contempt of the cries of distress, or the mandates of the Secretary." (United States v. Morris, 10 Wheaton, 303.)

A case has occurred in Kentucky, to which reference has been already made, in which it is confidently and broadly assumed that the pardoning power (under the Constitution) extends even to the penalties due to informers. The following passage occurs in the opinion of the Court: "The act of 1823 says that any prosecuting attorney, who shall prosecute any person to conviction under it, shall be entitled to twenty-five per cent. of the amount of such fine as shall be collected. The act gives the prosecuting attorney one-fourth of the money when collected, but vests him with no interest in the fine or sentence, separate and distinct from that of the Commonwealth, that would screen his share from the effect of any legal operation which should, before collection, abrogate the whole or a part of it. It would require language of the strongest and most explicit character to authorize a presumption that the Legislature intended to confer any such right. We could never presume an intention to control the Governor's constitutional power to remit fines and forfeitures. If he can, in this way, be restrained in the