solicitude to render his states commercial; and one of the means by which he hoped to effect this purpose, was to form connexions with commercial nations. This was the spirit of his government, and became a standing maxim in his system of policy. Accordingly, having discovered that the United States must speedily become a great commercial nation, he was among the first to form a treaty of commerce with us. Is there not reason to expect, that the same views may be entertained by his successor, now on the throne? And was it not wise to do every thing in our power, for keeping up a good understanding with a monarch, who has it in his power to serve us so essentially? How is this to be done? By sending a minister to his court, renewing our treaty with him, which is about to expire, and holding out to him the prospect of commercial arrangements, not injurious to us, but perhaps highly desirable to him, and sufficient to procure his good offices and interference, in the adjustment of our differences with France. Would this interference be unavailing? I apprehend not; for France has too much interest in keeping well with this monarch, to refuse attention to his mediation. His interference, if he should choose to interfere seriously, would, on the contrary, be more efficacious, in all probability, than fifty ships of the line.

I do not know, Mr. Chairman, that this interference will be obtained, or ought much to be expected; but I am fully persuaded, that it was wise to use the means, to send the minister, and make the attempt; from which I have no idea that we ought to have been deterred, by the paltry consideration of saving nine or ten thousand dollars.

But gentlemen constantly repeat, that we ought to have no political connexions with the nations of Europe. This is about as wise as to say that a man ought never to have a fever. A fever, no doubt, is a very bad thing, and political connexions may also be bad things; but we already have them, and the ques

tion is not whether they are good or bad, but how we shall get rid of them. We not only have political connexions, but disputes of a most disagreeable nature, growing out of those connexions. This is attested by all the papers on the table, by various acts of the House, and more strongly still by the universal capture and condemnation of our property. It is vain and foolish, therefore, to repeat continually, that we ought not to have foreign connexions; but our business is to inquire, how they may be best got rid of. How is this to be done? I answer, by settling our present differences, and avoiding new ones. Unless gentlemen mean to submit, and if they do I have nothing to say to them, having already had opportunities, on former occasions, to say all that seemed necessary on that subject. Unless they now mean to submit, I repeat, that the only method of getting rid of those foreign connexions, about which they so loudly exclaim, is to settle our present differences in the best manner we can, and avoid new ones. For this purpose, we must employ ministers; and none could be more wisely employed than the one to Berlin.

This diplomatic intercourse, therefore, about which gentlemen raise so great an outcry, is perfectly consistent with a wish to get rid, as fast as we can, of foreign connexions; and if gentlemen were sincere in that wish, it appears to me that, instead of opposing these appointments, they would applaud and support them. Gentlemen must excuse me, if I say, that I do not think them sincere; that, in my opinion, foreign relations are merely a stalking horse, behind which they advance to attack the administration, and the system of policy which it has adopted. To foreign relations and foreign intercourse, in my opinion, gentlemen have no objection, provided those relations can be such as they wish, and conducted in the manner which they desire. It is against the nature of these connexions, and not to foreign connexions in themselves, that the hostility of gentlemen is directed. For

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the proof of this position, I appeal to the history of the measures pursued by those gentlemen, since the commencement of this government.

I ask gentlemen, Mr. Chairman, who think with me, that the present attempt ought to be resisted, whether they can separate it from that system of measures, which its supporters have so zealously and perseveringly pursued, since the commencement of the war between France and England? I cannot. I am compelled to view it in connexion with that system, and it is this connexion which makes me dread it. Viewing it in this connexion, the time which is chosen for making the attempt, is to me its most alarming feature. This extension of foreign intercourse, which is made the pretext for the present attempt, is not a measure of this day. It was adopted in May, 1796, and that was the time for opposing it, if the reasons for the opposition were really such as gentlemen allege. But no opposition, or, at least, none of any consequence, was made at that time. I have looked over the debate which took place on that occasion; and I find that although some objections were made, they rested on a ground wholly different from that now taken. They were confined to the expediency of the measure; but not one word was said of the danger of executive influence, of the necessity of checking executive patronage. Among others, I was most struck by the observations of a gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Findley,) which agree precisely with our present doctrines, and appear to me so solid and important, that I cannot forbear presenting them to the committee. They are found in the debate of May 30th, 1796, on the extension of foreign intercourse, and in these words:

"Mr. Findley said, that he had voted against this measure in the committee of the whole, and he thought he was right in doing so; but he was now of opinion, that except the House had information sufficient to convince them that the appropriation was unnecessa

ry, they ought to grant it. He wished as much as any one to save the money of the public; but he be lieved our government was, in some degree, obliged to conform to European practices. If we had ministers plenipotentiary at one court, he did not know where to draw the line. He believed they should do best in leaving the executive to settle this matter."

The committee, Mr. Chairman, will doubtless be struck, as I have been, with the contrast between these sentiments and those which the same gentleman, and those with whom he acts, have expressed on the present occasion. The gentleman, no doubt, has good reasons for his change of opinion, but as I do not know them, I must seek for them in the change of our situation. I should be sorry to say, or believe, that it is to be found there; but the appearance of the thing, to my mind, is so singular and so alarming, that I cannot conceal it. At that time, we had no dispute with France; now we have. At that time, the French government had not declared us to be a people divided from our government; now it has. At that time, we were not on the eve of a conflict, in which it was to be proved whether the people of this country should be governed by France, or themselves; now it is to be feared that we are. In this awful, this momentous situation of our country, when we know that France, in her hostile measures, proceeds on the persuasion, that our people are divided from our government, and this House against the executive; when we see measures here introduced, and prosecuted with unequalled zeal, the plain and direct tendency of which is to set this House at war against the executive, to degrade the President, and hold him up to public view as the enemy of liberty and unworthy of confidence; can we avoid observing, how exactly these attempts are calculated to promote the views of France? Can we avoid the impression of a concert with those on the other side of the water, the impression that gentlemen are playing into the hands of a foreign govern

ment, which is pursuing every hostile measure against this country? This impression I wish to resist; but I fear that the public mind will not resist it; nor can I easily resist it, when I advert to that system of alliance with France and war against England, which was at an early period imported into this country, and has been ever since pursued with so much activity and perseverance, in this House.

When I say, this system of alliance and war was imported into this country, I have no allusion to any member of this House. I have no doubt that it was imported by a member of this government, but not of this House; and it was a part of the system adopted by the revolutionists of France, when they resolved to wage war against all their neighbors, especially England, for the purpose of subverting the government of their own country, and gratifying their own personal ambition. This war we know was resolved on, long before it was declared; and it was then determined that the United States should engage in it, on the part of France. A regular scheme was concerted, according to every appearance, for drawing them into it; the missionary arrived who was to convert us to this new faith, and this missionary was a citizen of our own, who was recalled from a public employment in that country, to fill a high official station here. Not long after, a French minister was sent over to second his efforts, and he came furnished with ample instructions, and fortified with ample means of seduction.

Before this minister arrived, accounts reached us, that the war between England and France was commenced. As we had extensive and important relations, both of a commercial and political nature, with those two nations, it immediately became a question of the greatest importance and solicitude, how we should act in this critical situation. In the deliberations which took place on this subject, in the cabinet of the executive, two very opposite opinions immediately appeared; one, for war on the side of France, and the