FIFTH EPOCH.

PARTIAL ADOPTION OF THE SOCRATIC METHOD.

§ I. THE MEGARIC SCHOOL.-EUCLID.

"SEVERAL philosophers," says Cicero, "drew from the conversations of Socrates very different results; and, according as each adopted views which harmonized with his own, they in their turn became heads of philosophical schools all differing amongst each other." It is one of the peculiarities of a philosophical Method, to adapt itself indiscriminately to all sorts of systems. A scientific Method is confined to one: if various and opposing systems spring from it, they spring from an erroneous or imperfect application of it.

We must not be surprised therefore to find many contradictory systems claiming the parentage of Socrates. But we must be on our guard against supposing that this adaptation to various systems is a proof of the excellence of the Socratic Method. It is only a proof of its vagueness. It may be accepted as a sign of the great influence exercised upon succeeding philosophers; it is no sign that the influence was in the right direction.

As we said, Socrates had no school; he taught no system. He exhibited a Method; and this Method his hearers severally applied. Around him were men of various ages, various temperaments, and various opinions. He discoursed with each upon his own subject with Xenophon on politics; with Theages or Theætetus on science; with Antisthenes on morals; with Ion on poetry. Some were convinced by him; others were merely refuted. The difference between the two is great. Of those who

were convinced, the so-called Socratic Schools were formed; those who were only refuted became his enemies. But, of the former, some were naturally only more or less convinced; that is, were willing to adopt his opinions on some subjects, but remained stubborn on others. These are the imperfect Socratists. Amongst the latter was Euclid of Megara.

EUCLID, who must not be confounded with the great Mathematician, was born at Megara; date probably between 450 and 440 B. C. He had early imbibed a great love of philosophy, and had diligently studied the writings of Parmenides and the other Eleatics. From Zeno he acquired great facility in dialectics; and this continued to be his chief excellence even, after his acquaintance with Socrates, who reproved him for it as sophistical.

His delight in listening to Socrates was so great that he frequently exposed his life to do so. A decree was passed, in consequence of the enmity existing between Athens and Megara, that any inhabitant of Megara found in Athens should forfeit his life; Euclid, however, braved the penalty. He frequently came to Athens at night, disguised as a female. The distance was twenty miles. At the end of his journey he was recompensed by the fascinating conversation of Socrates; and he returned to meditate on the results of their arguments.

Brucker's supposition that a rupture was caused between them in consequence of Socrates having reproved Euclid's disputatious tendency, is wholly without foundation, and seems contradicted by the notorious fact that when, on the death of Socrates, Plato and the majority of the disciples retired to Megara, in fear of some popular outbreak of the Athenians, who were in a state of rage against all the philosopher's friends, Euclid received them. well. Bound by the same ties of friendship towards the illustrious martyr, and sharing some of his opinions, the Socratists made some stay in Megara. Differences however arose, as they will amongst all communities of the kind. Plato and some others returned to Athens, as soon as the state of the public mind admitted their doing so with safety. The rest remained with Euclid.

"The character of the Megaric doctrine," says Ritter, "so far as it is possible to fix it in the defective state of our information, may be briefly given as the Eleatic view enlarged by the Socratic conviction of the moral obligation, and the laws of scientific thought."

We confess our inability to comprehend this. In Euclid we have no hint of “moral obligation;" in Socrates we fail to detect the “laws of scientific thought." If by the former Ritter means, that Euclid gave an Ethical and Socratic meaning to the Eleatic doctrine, he is correct; if by the latter he means, that Euclid adopted the Socratic Method of Induction and Definitions, he is hopelessly wrong; and, if this is not what he means by "laws of scientific thought," we are at a loss to understand him.

Euclid agreed with the Eleatics in maintaining that there was but One unalterable Being, to be known by Reason only. This One Being was not simply The One; neither was it simply Intelligence; it was The Good. This One Being received various names according to its various aspects: thus it was sometimes Wisdom (póvnois); sometimes God (sós); at others Reason (vous); and so forth. This One Good (ev rò άyatóv) is the only Being that really exists; every thing opposed to it has nothing but a phenomenal, transitory existence.

Such is the outline of his doctrine, as presented by Diogenes Laertius. In it the reader will have no difficulty in detecting both the Eleatic and Socratic elements. The conception of God as rò dyadóv-the Good-is purely Socratic; and the denial of any existence to things opposed to the Good is an explanation of that passage in Plato's Republic, where Socrates declares God not to be the author of all things, but only of such as are good.*

The Megaric doctrine is therefore the Eleatic doctrine, with an Ethical tendency borrowed from Socrates, who taught that virtue was not any partial cultivation of the human mind, but constitutes the true and entire essence of the rational man, and

* Μὴ πάντων αἴτιον τὸν θεὸν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν.—ii. 100.

indeed of the whole universe. The identification of Virtue with Wisdom is also Socratic.

With respect to Euclid's dialectics there is one point, often alluded to, variously interpreted, and which is in direct opposition to the Method of Socrates. In refuting his adversaries he did not attack the premises, but the conclusion.* This is certainly not the manner of Socrates, who always managed to draw new conclusions from old premises, and who, as Xenophon says, proceeded from the generally known to the less known. As if to mark this distinction more completely, we are told that Euclid rejected the analogical mode of reasoning (τὸν διὰ παραβολῆς λóyov). If, said he, the things compared are alike, it is better to confine the attention to that originally in question; if the things compared are unlike, there must be error in the conclusion. This precept strikes into the weakness of Socrates' method of induction; which was a species of analogical reasoning not of the highest order.

In dialectics therefore we see Euclid following out the Eleatic tendency, and carrying forward the speculations of Zeno. It was this portion of his doctrine that his immediate followers, Eubulides, Diodorus, and Alexinus, undertook to carry out. The Socratic element was further developed by Stilpo.

"The majority of the later members of the Megaric School," says Ritter, "are famous either for the refutation of opposite doctrines, or for the invention and application of certain fallacies; on which account they were occasionally called Eristici and Dialectici. Still it may be presumed that they did not employ these fallacies for the purposes of delusion, but of instructing rash and hasty thinkers, and exemplifying the superficial vanity of common opinion. At all events, it is certain that they were mainly occupied with the forms of thought, more perhaps with a

* Diog. Laert. ii. 107. This is paraphrased by Enfield into the following contradictory statement:—“ He judged that legitimate argumentation consists in deducing fair conclusions from acknowledged premises."-Hist. of Phil. i. 199.

view to the discovery of particular rules, than to the foundation of a scientific system or method."

§ II. THE CYRENAIC SCHOOL.-ARISTIPPUS.

Among the "imperfect Socratists" we must rank Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic School, which borrowed its name from the birthplace of its founder-Cyrene, in Africa.

Aristippus was descended from wealthy and distinguished parents, and was consequently thrown into the vortex of luxurious debauchery which then characterized the colony of Minyæ. He came over to Greece to attend the Olympic games: there he heard so much of the wisdom of Socrates that he determined on listening to his enchanting discourse. He made Socrates an offer of a large sum of money, which, as usual, was declined. The great Talker did not accept money; but he willingly admitted Aristippus among the number of his disciples. It is commonly asserted that the pupil did not agree well with his master, and that his fondness for pleasure was offensive to Socrates. There is no good authority for such an assertion. He remained with Socrates until the execution of the latter; and there was no bond on either side to have prevented their separation as soon as they disagreed. The impression seems to have originated in the discussion reported by Xenophon,* wherein Aristippus expresses his political indifference, and Socrates, by an exaggerated extension of logic, endeavors to prove his views to be absurd. But this is simply a divergence of opinion, such as must have existed between Socrates and many of his followers. It merely shows that Aristippus thought for himself. Socrates with such men as Aristippus and Alcibiades reminds one of Dr. Johnson with the "young bloods" Topham Beauclerk and Bennet Langton: he was wise enough and tolerant enough not to allow his virtue to be scandalized by their love of pleasure.

From Athens he went to Ægina, where he met with Laïs, the

* Memorabilia, ii. 1.