to the Governor a petition, expressing his name, country, and religion, and
describing as distinctly as possible, by means of a map, the land asked
for. 3d. The Governor shall proceed to obtain the necessary informa-
tion, whether the petition contains the proper conditions required by the
law of the 18th August, 1824, both as regards the land and the petitioner,
in order that the application may be at once attended to; or, if it be
preferred, the municipal authority may be consulted, whether there be
any objection to the making of the grant. 4th. This being done, the Gov-
ernor will accede or not to such petition, in conformity to the laws on
the subject. 5th. The definitive grant asked for being made, a document,
signed by the Governor, shall be given, to serve as a title to the party
interested, wherein it must be stated that the grant is made in exact
conformity with the provisions of the law; in virtue of which, possession
shall be given. 6th. The necessary record shall be kept, in a book pro-
vided for the purpose, of all the petitions presented and grants made,
with maps of the lands granted, and a circumstantial report shall be
forwarded quarterly to the Supreme Government. United States v. Cam-
buston, 59.
2. Where there was no evidence, with respect to a grant of land in California,
that any one of these preliminary steps had been taken, this court cannot
confirm the claim. Ibid.
3. The decisions of this court in cases of claims to land in Louisiana and
Florida are not applicable where precise and recent regulations exist,
directing the manner in which land shall be granted. Ibid.
4. There are also strong grounds of suspicion with respect to the bona fides
of the grant in question; but as the claimant may not have had an oppor-
tunity of producing evidence in the court below, the case will be re-
manded to that court for further proceedings. Ibid.
5. As the act of Congress passed on the 3d of March, 1851, does not specify the
time within which an appeal must be made to this court from the District
Courts of California, the subject must be regulated by the general law
respecting writs of error and appeals. Either party is at liberty, there-
fore, to appeal from such a decree within five years from the time of its
rendition. United States v. Pacheco, 261
6. Under the sixty-third rule of this court, an appellee in a case from California
may docket and dismiss according to that rule; but a new appeal may
be taken at any time within five years, or it may be that the record may
be filed by the appellant at the same term at which a certificate or record
had been filed by the appellee, and the case dismissed. Ibid.
7. After a case has been thus docketed and dismissed at the instance of an
appellee who is a claimant of land, if a patent should be taken out, it will
still be subject to be reviewed by this court at any time within the five
years above mentioned. Ibid.
8. Where a petitioner files a claim to land in California before the board of
commissioners created by Congress, the intervention of rival claimants is
a practice not to be encouraged. United States v. Fossat, 413.
9. Where there is no natural boundary or descriptive call for the termination of
lines of a tract of land, and the quantity of land called for in the grant is
"one league of the larger size, a little more or less," the survey must only
include a league. The words "a little more or less" must be rejected. Ibid.
10. The grant is for one league of land, to be taken within the southern, western,
and eastern boundaries designated therein, and to be located at the
election of the grantee or his assigns, under the restrictions established
for the location and survey of private land claims in California by
the Executive department of this Government. Ibid.
1. The ancient English doctrines respecting maintenance or champerty have not
found favor in the United States; and in Michigan (where the land lies
which is involved in the present controversy) its application to sales, by
one out of possession, has been annulled. Roberts v. Cooper, 467.
2. Although, in that State, an agreement to carry on a suit upon condition of
receiving a share of the proceeds might be void, yet the rule would not
apply to a transfer of the legal estate to one, in trust for himself and the
other stockholders in a corporation. Ibid.
1. When a transcript of a record of another court was attached to the answer
as an exhibit, and portions of it particularly referred to, and the record
of the entire case pleaded, a decree, certified by the clerk, which had
been executed by the parties, must be considered as part of the record,
although it had not the signature of the judge. The signature of the
judge is not the only evidence by which a decree can be authenticated.
Secombe v. Steele, 94.
2. Property was agreed to be sold, and the payment was to be made by a
deposit of the price in one of two banks, in Boston, and a certificate de-
livered to the vendor. The vendee made the deposit in another bank,
in Boston, and tendered the certificate to the vendor, within the time
limited, and the vendor having refused to receive it, he tendered the pur-
chase-money and interest, and that being refused, he filed his bill for a
specific performance, and paid the money into court. Held, under the
circumstances, to be sufficient. Ibid.
3. Creditors of the vendor, who recovered judgments and sold the property,
pending a suit for a specific performance, in which the purchase-money
had been paid into court, are not necessary parties to the suit, nor are
the purchasers at the sheriff's sale under such judgments. Ibid.
4. Under a statute of Minnesota, the court of chancery might divest the title
of the defendant in the land, without requiring him to make a convey-
ance. Ibid.
5. Where a bill in chancery was filed for the purpose of enjoining a judgment
at law, obtained upon a promissory note, and the bill did not allege that
adequate relief could not be had at law, and did not contain any charges
of fraud; neither did it aver that it was owing to the contrivance or un-
fairness of the defendant that an adequate remedy could not be had at
law, nor did it show the necessity of interference by a court of equity to
obtain a discovery, the bill must be dismissed. Hungerford v. Sigerson, 156.
6. Where the master of a vessel was also part owner, and made a contract of
affreightment with a lumber company, of which he was also a member,
and the cargo was consigned to the master, the case is not within admi-
ralty jurisdiction, but appropriate to that of a court of chancery. Grant
v. Pouillon, 162.
7. Where there was a covenant to sell land upon condition that the purchase-
money should be paid in instalments, and other acts done by the cov-
enantee, in failure to perform which, rent was to be charged, and the
covenantee failed to execute his contract, the rent was justly chargeable.
Stinson v. Dousman, 461.
8. The Territory of Minnesota having abolished the court of chancery, the
excuses of the defendant must be judged of as if it was a case in chan-
cery, the statute having so directed. But in this case, time would be
held to be an essential consideration in the contract by a court of equity,
and the excuses for non-performance are insufficient. Ibid.
9. Where there were proceedings in a State court between a bank, one of its
creditors, and one of its debtors, and the bank having failed, assigned its
assets to trustees, who intervened in the dispute between the other two
parties, the judgment of the State court against the intervenors must be
considered final, and a bill filed by thera in the Circuit Court of the
United States must be dismissed. Ingraham v. Dawson, 486.
10. If there were irregularities in the proceedings of the State court, it was for
that court to correct them, had complaint been made at the proper time.
Ibid.
il. A person dealing with an unlettered man who can neither read nor write,
and taking from him a promissory note for the payment of money and
a deed for property, in trust, to secure the payment, is bound to show,
when he seeks to enforce them, that they, or the material parts of them,
were read and fully explained to the party before they were executed,
and that he fully understood their meaning and effect. Selden v. Myers, 506.
12. If this fact is established by positive and unimpeached testimony, parol
evidence cannot be received, to show that the contract was different from
that expressed in the writings, or that nothing was at that time due from
the party who executed the instruments. Ibid.
13. Where there was a contract for the sale of a lot of ground, partly on time,
and the vendee entered into possession; and the vendor did not formally
demand the payment of the balance when due, but merely said he was
ready to make a deed when the money was paid; and after the time of
payment had elapsed, the vendee made a tender of the sum due, which
the vendor refused to receive; these and other circumstances show that
time was not of the essence of the contract, and the rendee was entitled
to relief upon a bill for a specific performance of the contract. Ahl v.
Johnson, 511.
14. Where the defendant appeared to a bill in chancery, and defended the suit,
and no want of jurisdiction appeared in the record, and then the com-
plainant died, an objection that the defendants were citizens of another
State comes too late when made to a bill of revivor, which is only a con-
tinuance of the suit. Whyte v. Gibbes, 541.
15. Moreover, a plea to the jurisdiction comes too late after a mandate has gone
down from this court to the court below. Ibid.
COMMERCIAL LAW.
For the LAW OF GARNISHEE see GARNISHEE.
1. Where the question before the jury was, whether or not one of the defend-
ants was a partner in a commercial firm, it was proper for the court to
exclude the declarations made by the defendant in the absence of the
plaintiffs. Teller v. Patten, 126.
2. It was also proper not to confine the attention of the jury to declarations
made at one particular time in the presence of one of the plaintiffs, but
to allow all similar declarations to be given in evidence, so that the
jury could judge of the entire question of the existence of the partnership.
Ibid.
3 Where an accepted and endorsed bill of exchange was placed by the drawer
as collateral security for his own debt in the hands of his creditor, and
when the creditor came to sue the acceptor, the court instructed the jury,
"that if such facts and circumstances were known to the plaintiff as
caused him to suspect, or that would have caused one of ordinary pru-
dence to suspect, that the drawer had no interest in the bill, and no
authority to use the same for his own benefit, and by ordinary diligence
he could have ascertained these facts," then the jury would find for
the defendant-this instruction was erroneous. Goodman v. Simonds,
4 The facts of the case examined, to ascertain whether or not there was suffi-
cient evidence to go to the jury upon these points. Ibid.
5. This court again says, that a bona fide holder of a negotiable instrument for
a valuable consideration, without notice of facts which impeach its
validity between the antecedent parties, if he takes it under an endorse-
ment made before the same becomes due, holds the title unaffected by
these facts, and may recover thereon, although as between the antecedent
parties the transaction may be without any legal validity. Ibid.
6. Where a party is in possession of a negotiable instrument, the presumption
is that he holds it for value, and the burden of proof is upon him who
disputes it; an exception being where the defect appears on the face of
the instrument. Ibid.
7. It is a question of fact for the jury, whether or not the holder had knowl-
edge of defects existing antecedently to the transfer to him. Ibid.
8. The English and American cases examined. Ibid.
9. Surrendering collateral securities previously given, and affording increased
indulgence as to time, furnish a sufficient consideration for the transfer
of new collaterals. Ibid.
10. Where a bill of exchange was drawn in proper form and protested for non-
acceptance, parol evidence of an understanding between the drawer and
COMMERCIAL LAW, (Continued.)
the party in whose favor the bill was drawn, calculated to vary the terms
of the instrument was not admissible. Brown v. Wiley, 442.
11. Where the endorser of a promissory note, in conversation with the agent
of the holder, before its maturity, dispensed with a presentation of the
note and demand of payment, and promised to pay it, or provide for its
payment, at maturity, he could not, when sued, set up as a defence that
the note was not presented for payment, and demand made therefor when
it was due, and that no notice of its dishonor was given. Sigerson v.
Mathews, 496.
12. If, after the maturity of the note, the endorser promised the agent of the
holder to pay the same, having, at the time of making such promise,
knowledge of the fact that the note had not been presented for payment,
and no demand made therefor, or notice of non-payment, he could not,
when sued, set up as a defence a want of such demand or notice. Ibid.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
1. Where the Circuit Court adopted the construction of a State statute which
was placed upon it by the Supreme Court of the State, the decision was
correct; and a different construction of the statute subsequently placed
upon it by the Supreme Court of the State will not authorize this court
to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court as having been erroneously
given. Morgan v. Curtenius, 1. -
2. Where it does not appear either by express averment or by a necessary in-
tendment from any matter stated in the case, nor does any entry on the
record of the cause in the Supreme Court of the State show, that any of
the questions of which this court is entitled to take cognizance under
the terms of the 25th section of the judiciary act, arose in the cause and
were actually decided by that court, the writ of error must be dismissed,
for the want of jurisdiction. Christ Church v. County of Philadelphia, 26.
3. The Constitution of the United States gives to Congress the power to pro-
vide and maintain a navy, and to make rules for i'3 government. Dynes v.
Hoover, 65.
4. In the exercise of this power, Congress provided for the punishment of
desertion and of other crimes not specified in the articles, which should
be punished according to the laws and customs in such cases at sea. Ibid.
5. Where a seaman was charged with deserting, and the court martial found
him guilty of attempting to desert, the court had jurisdiction over the
subject-matter, and an action of trespass for false imprisonment will not
lie against the ministerial officer who executes the sentence for attempting
to desert. Ibid.
6. It is only where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, or,
having such jurisdiction, is bound to adopt certain rules in its proceed-
ings, from which it deviates, whereby the proceedings are rendered coram
non judice, that an action will lie against the officer who executes its
judgment. Ibid.
7. The authorities upon this point examined, and also the legal powers of
courts martial. Ibid.
8. This court has no jurisdiction, under the 25th section of the judiciary act of
1789, of the question whether or not a law of a State is in opposition to
the Constitution of that State. Withers v. Buckley, 84.
9. Therefore, where it is alleged that the Constitution of a State declares that
private property shall not be taken for public uses, and that the highest
court of the State has sustained the validity of a law which violates this
constitutional provision, this court has no power to review that decision.
Ibid.
10. The fifth article of the amendments of the Constitution of the United States
was intended to prevent the Government of the United States from taking
private property for public uses without just compensation, and was not
intended as a restraint upon the State Governments. Ibid.
11. A law of the State of Mississippi, for improving the navigation of a river
which empties itself into the Mississippi, is not in conflict with the act
of Congress providing for the admission of that State into the Union,
which act guaranties the free navigation of the Mississippi river. Ibid.
VOL. XX.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (Continued.)
12. Being admitted upon a footing of equality with the other States, the State
of Mississippi had the rightful power to change the channels or courses
of rivers within the interior of the State, for purposes of internal im-
provement. Ibid.
13. And, moreover, the law in question does not propose to affect the naviga-
tion of the Mississippi river, but only a small stream running into it. Ibid
14. Where a suit was brought upon a bill of exchange in one of the State
courts of Louisiana, and by that court was transferred to another State
court for the purpose of being connected with certain proceedings in
insolvency, and this transfer was pleaded in bar in the Circuit Court of
the United States to the prosecution of the suit in that court upon the
bill, the plea was not good. Hyde v. Stone, 170.
15. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States over controversies
between citizens of different States cannot be impaired by the laws of the
States, which prescribe the modes of redress in their own courts, or
which regulate the distribution of their judicial power. Ibid.
16. The insertion of the bill amongst the debts of the insolvent upon his sched-
ule, is evidence of the fact of notice; and the sufficiency of the evidence
was a question for the jury, and is not subject to review in this court. Ibid
17. When New Mexico was conquered by the United States, it was only the
allegiance of the people that was changed; their relation to each other,
and their rights of property, remained undisturbed. Leitensdorfer v. Webb
176.
18. The executive authority of the United States properly established a pro-
visional Government, which ordained laws and instituted a judicial sys-
tem; all of which continued in force after the termination of the war,
and until modified by the direct legislation of Congress, or by the Terri-
torial Government established by its authority. Ibid.
19. A suit brought in a court established by the provisional Government was
properly transferred to a court created by the act of Congress establish-
ing the Territory of New Mexico, the jurisdiction of which was fixed by
a Territorial statute. Ibid.
20. Under the Constitution of the State of Arkansas, the Legislature passed a
law allowing the State to be sued. Beers v. State of Arkansas, 527.
21. According to this law, a suit was brought upon some of the State bonds;
and whilst the suit was going on, the Legislature passed another law,
requiring the bonds to be filed in court, or the suit to be dismissed. Ibid.
22. The suitor refusing to file his bonds, the suit was dismissed; and the case
was carried to the Supreme Court of the State, where the judgment was
affirmed. Ibid.
23. The case, being brought to this court'under the twenty-fifth section of the
judiciary act, must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Ibid.
24. The permission to bring the suit was not a contract whose obligations were
impaired by the passage of the subsequent law. Ibid.
25. Where property has been levied upon under a State law, it is not liable to
be seized by the marshal under process from the District Court of the
United States upon a libel for mariners' wages. Taylor v. Carryl, 583.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
1. Where the Circuit Court adopted the construction of a State statute which
was placed upon it by the Supreme Court of the State, the decision was
correct; and a different construction of the statute subsequently placed
upon it by the Supreme Court of the State will not authorize this court
to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court as having been erroneously
given. Morgan v. Curtenius, 1.
2. The power granted by Congress to the corporation of the city of Washing-
ton, "to open and keep in repair streets, avenues, lanes, alleys, &c., agree-
ably to the plan of the city," includes the power to alter the grade or
change the level of the land on which the streets by the plan of the city
are laid out. Smith v. Corporation of Washington, 135.
3. If, in the exercise of this power, an individual proprietor suffers inconvenience
or is put to expense, the corporation are not liable in damages. Ibid.
4. In May, 1830, Congress passed an act (4 Stat. at L., 420) which gave the right
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