1. Admiralty rules 12 to 20 inclusive allow, in certain cases, a joinder of
ship and freight, or ship and master, or alternative actions against
ship, master or owner alone; but in no case within the rules can ship
and owner be joined in the same libel: whether they may in cases not
falling within the ules is not decided. The Corsair, 335.
2. A District Court sitting in admiralty cannot entertain a libel in rem for
damages incurred by loss of life where, by the local law, a right of
action survives to the administrator or relatives of the deceased, but
no lien is expressly created by the act. Ib.
3. When the collision of two vessels causes great pain and suffering to a
passenger on one of them, followed so closely by death as to be sub-
stantially contemporaneous with it, a libel in rem, where a right of
action exists under a state statute, will not lie for those injuries as
distinguished from death as a cause of action. Ib.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
See PUBLIC LAND, 1.
AMENDMENT.
See LIMITATION, STATUTES of.
BAILMENT.
See CONTRACT, 1;
EVIDENCE, 1.
See PATENT FOR INVENTION, 1, 2, 12.
This case was decided February 29, 1892, 143 U. S. 359, and the decree
withheld in order to enable the parties to agree to the designation of
the boundary between the two States. Such agreement having been
reached a decree is now entered accordingly. Nebraska v. Iowa, 519.
BROKERS' LICENSE.
See CONSTITUtional Law, 1.
The judgment below is reversed upon the authority of The Oregon Railway
and Navigation Company v. The Oregonian Railway Company, Limited,
130 U. S. 1; Oregon Railway Co. v. Oregonian Railway Co., 52.
Crawford v. Neal, 144 U. S. 585, affirmed and applied.
Ferris, 132.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4;
HOT-SPRINGS RESERVATION;
RECEIVER, 3.
CASES DISTINGUISHED OR EXPLAINED.
Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, examined and dis-
tinguished from this case. Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District, 1.
Rector v. Gibbon, 111 U. S. 276, distinguished from this case. McDonald
v. Belding, 492.
See PARTNERSHIP, 2;
PATENT, 18.
CHALLENGES.
See CONSOLIDATION OF ACTIONS, 2.
CONFISCATION.
See REBELLION, 1.
CONSOLIDATION OF ACTIONS.
1. Under Rev. Stat. § 921, a court of the United States may order actions
against several insurers of the same life, in which the defence is the
same, to be consolidated for trial, against their objection. Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Hillman, 285.
2. The consolidation for trial, under Rev. Stat. § 921, of actions against
several defendants does not impair the right of each to three peremp
tory challenges under § 819. Ib.
1. F. and C. & Co. were commercial agents or brokers, having an office in
Shelby County, Tennessee, where they carried on that business. In
1887 they took out licenses for their said business, under the provisions
of the statute of Tennessee of April 4, 1881, (Sess. Laws 1881, 111,
113, c. 96, § 9,) imposing a tax upon factors, brokers, buyers or sellers
on commission, or otherwise, doing business within the State, or, if no
capital be so invested, then upon the gross yearly commissions, charges
or compensation for said business. During the year for which they
took out licenses all the sales negotiated by F. were made on behalf of
principals residing in other States, and the goods so sold were, at the
times of the sales, in other States, to be shipped to Tennessee as sales
should be effected. During the same time a large part of the commis-
sions of C. & Co. were derived from similar sales. They had no capi-
tal invested in their business. At the expiration of the year they
applied for a renewal of their license. As they had made no return
of sales, and no payment of percentage on their commission, the appli-
cation was denied. They filed a bill to restrain the collection of the
percentage tax for the past year, and also to restrain any interference
with their current business, claiming that the tax was a tax on inter-
state commerce. Held, (1) that if the tax could be said to affect inter-
state commerce in any way it did so incidentally, and so remotely as
not to amount to a regulation of such commerce; (2) that under the
circumstances the complainants could not resort to the court, simply
on the ground that the authorities had refused to issue a new license
without the payment of the stipulated tax. Ficklen v. Shelby County
Taxing District, 1.
2. The statute of June 13, 1885, of the State of New York (Sess. Laws
1885, c. 499) requiring companies operating or intending to operate
electrical conductors in any city in the State to file with the Board of
Commissioners of Electrical Subways maps and plans before construct-
ing the conduits, and the statute of that State of May 29, 1886 (Sess.
Laws 1886, c. 503) assessing the salaries and expenses of such board
upon the several companies operating electrical conductors in any city
in the State, are a constitutional exercise of the general police powers
of the State, and are applicable to the New York Electric Lines Com-
pany which, before the passage of either of said acts, was incorporated
under the laws of New York, and had obtained from the municipal
government of the city of New York permission to lay its conductors
in and through the streets and highways of the city, and had filed a
map, diagram and tabular statement indicating the amount, position
and localities of the spaces it proposed to occupy in and under the
streets. New York v. Squire, 175.
3. The said law of 1885 simply transferred the reserve police power of the
State from one set of functionaries to another, and required the com-
pany to submit its plans and specifications to the latter, who would de-
termine whether they were in accordance with the terms of the ordinan-
ces giving it the right to enter and dig up the streets of the city; and,
being so construed, it violates no contract rights of the company which
might grow out of the permission granted by the municipality. Ib.
4. The said act of 1886 comes within the principles settled in Charlotte &c.
Railroad v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386, and is not in conflict with the pro-
vision in the Fourteenth Amendment that no State shall deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
5. A state tax against a railroad corporation, incorporated under its laws
on account of transportation done by it from one point within the
State to another point within it, but passing during the transportation
without the State and through part of another State, is not a tax upon
interstate commerce, and does not infringe the provisions of the Con-
stitution of the United States. Lehigh Valley Railroad v. Pennsyl-
vania, 192.
6. An insolvent law of a State, providing that any conveyance of property
within the State made by a citizen of the State, being insolvent, within
four months before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency,
and containing preferences, shall be void, and shall be a cause for
adjudging him insolvent and appointing an assignee to take and dis-
tribute his property, does not, as applied to a case in which the preferred
creditors are citizens of other States, impair any right of the debtor
under the Constitution of the United States; and such an adjudication,
though made without notice to such creditors, and declaring void the
conveyance made for their benefit, cannot, upon its affirmance by the
highest court of the State, be reviewed by this court on a writ of error
sued out by the debtor only. Brown v. Smart, 454.
7. The act of the legislature of Tennessee of March 26, 1879, c. 141, pro-
viding that "the rents and profits of any property or estate of a
married woman, which she now owns or may hereafter become seized
or possessed of . . . shall in no manner be subject to the debts or
contracts of her husband, except by her consent," does not take away
or infringe upon any vested right of the husband, or any right belong-
ing to his creditors, and does not deny any right or privilege secured
by the Constitution of the United States. Baker v. Kilgore, 487,
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 1, 2.
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE.
See LOCAL LAW, 1.
CONTINUANCE.
See JURISDICTION, A, 4.
1. In a written instrument a corporation declared that it held for the
benefit of C. certain choses in action, stock and bonds, which it de-
scribed, and said: "The proceeds arising from the sale of said securities
and recovered from said choses in action are to be applied to pay off
said notes and interest," and the remainder was to be paid to C. or
his legal representatives, "subject to the repayment of moneys ex-
pended" by the corporation "in prosecuting claims or selling the
securities." The notes were described, and it was stated that C. was
indebted to the corporation in their amount; Held, that the declaration
did not contain or imply any contract whereby the corporation was
bound to prosecute claims or sell securities. Culver v. Wilkinson, 205.
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