THE CANADA PAMPHLET. The Interest of Great Britain considered, with regard to her Colonies, and the Acquisitions of Canada and Guadeloupe.*

I HAVE perused with no small pleasure the "Letter addressed to Two Great men," and the Remarks on that letter. It is not merely from the beauty, the force, and perspicuity of expression, or the general elegance of manner conspicuous in both pamphlets, that my pleasure chiefly arises; it is rather from this, that I have lived to see subjects of the greatest importance to this nation publicly discussed without party views, or party heat, with decency and politeness, and with no other warmth, than what a zeal for the honour and happiness of our king and country may inspire; and this by writers, whose understanding (however they may differ from each other) appears not unequal to their candour and the uprightness of

But, as great abilities have not always the

*In the year 1760, upon the prospect of a peace with

France, the Earl of Bath addressed a Letter to Two Great Men (Mr. Pitt and the Duke of Newcastle) on the

terms necessary to be insisted upon in the negotiation. He preferred the acquisition of Canada, to acquisitions in the West Indies. In the same year there appeared

Remarks on the letter addressed to two great men, containing opposite opinions on this and other subjects. At this moment a philosopher stepped into the controversy, and wrote a pamphlet entitled, The Interest of Great Britain considered, with Regard to her Colonies," &c. The arguments he used, appear to have carried

weight with them, for Canada was kept by the peace.

The above piece first appeared in the shape of a pamphlet, printed for Becket, 1761.

In the original, the author had added his observations

concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of Countries, &c (printed in another part of this edition) introduced by the following note. "In confirmation of

the writer's opinion concerning population, manufactures, &c. he has thought it not amiss to add an extract from a piece written some years since in America,

where the facts must be well known, on which the reasonings are founded. It is entitled, Observations, &c."

insist on an indemnification for our expenses; the difficulty the French themselves will be under of restraining their restless subjects in America from encroaching on our limits and disturbing our trade; and the difficulty on our parts of preventing encroachments, that may possibly exist many years without coming to our knowledge.

the sine quibus non of a peace. If the ne- | value of Canada to the French; the right we cessity of our affairs should oblige us to accept have to ask, and the power we may have to of terms less advantageous than our present successes seem to promise us; an intelligent people, as ours is, must see that necessity, and will acquiesce. But as a peace, when it is made, may be made hastily; and as the unhappy continuance of the war affords us time to consider, among several advantages gained or to be gained, which of them may be most for our interest to retain, if some and not all may possibly be retained; I do not blame the public disquisition of these points, as premature or useless. Light often arises from a collision of opinions, as fire from flint and steel; and if we can obtain the benefit of the light, without danger from the heat sometimes produced by controversy, why should we discourage it?

Supposing then, that heaven may still continue to bless his majesty's arms, and that the event of this just war may put it in our power to retain some of our conquests at the making of a peace; let us consider,

1. The security of a dominion, a justifiable and prudent ground upon which to demand cessions from an enemy.

But the remarker does not see why the arguments, employed concerning a security for a peaceable behaviour in Canada, would not be equally cogent for calling for the same security in Europe." On a little farther reflection, he must I think be sensible, that the circumstances of the two cases are widely different.-Here we are separated by the best and clearest of boundaries, the ocean, and we have people in or near every part of our territory. Any attempt to encroach upon us, by building a fort even in the obscurest corner of these islands, must therefore be known and prevented immediately. The aggressors also must be known, and the nation they belong to would be accountable for their aggression. In America it is quite otherwise. A vast wilderness, thinly or scarce at all peopled, Whether we are to confine ourselves to those conceals with ease the march of troops and possessions only that were "the objects for workmen. Important passes may be seized which we began the war." This the remark-within our limits, and forts built in a month, er seems to think right, when the question at a small expense, that may cost us an age, relates to " Canada, properly so called; it and a million, to remove. Dear experience having never been mentioned as one of those has taught this. But what is still worse, the objects, in any of our memorials or declara-wide extended forests between our settletions, or in any national or public act whatsoever." But the gentleman himself will probably agree, that if the cession of Canada would be a real advantage to us; we may demand it under his second head, as an "indemnification for the charges incurred" in recovering our just rights; otherwise, according to his own principles, the demand of Guadaloupe can have no foundation.-That "our claims before the war were large enough for possession and for security too," though it seems a clear point with the ingenious remarker, is, I own, not so with me. I am rather of the contrary opinion, and shall presently give my reasons.

But first let me observe, that we did not make those claims because they were large enough for security, but because we could rightfully claim no more. Advantages gained in the course of this war may increase the extent of our rights. Our claims before the war contained some security; but that is no reason why we should neglect acquiring more, when the demand of more is become reasonable. It may be reasonable in the case of America, to ask for the security recommended by the author of the Letter, though it would be preposterous to do it in many cases. His proposed demand is founded on the little

ments and theirs, are inhabited by barbarous tribes of savages, that delight in war, and take pride in murder; subjects properly neither of the French nor English, but strongly attached to the former by the art and indefatigable industry of priests, similarity of superstitions, and frequent family alliances. These are easily, and have been continually, instigated to fall upon and massacre our planters, even in times of full peace between the two crowns; to the certain diminution of our people and the contraction of our settlements. And though it is known they are supplied by the French, and carry their prisoners to them, we can, by complaining, obtain no redress; as the governors of Canada have a ready excuse, that the Indians are an independent people, over whom they have no power, and for whose actions they are therefore not accountable. Surely circumstances so widely different may reasonably authorize different demands of security in America, from such as are usual or necessary in Europe.

The remarker however thinks, that our real dependence for keeping "France or any other nation true to her engagements, must not be in demanding securities which no nation whilst independent can give; but on our own strength and our own viligance. No

militia, in such a country, we find they can keep an army of ours in full employ for several years. We therefore shall not need to be told by our colonies, that if we leave Canada, however circumscribed, to the French, “we have done nothing;" we shall soon be made sensible ourselves of this truth, and to our cost. I would not be understood to deny, that even if we subdue and retain Canada, some few forts may be of use to secure the goods of the traders, and protect the commerce, in case of any sudden misunderstanding with any tribe of Indians: but these forts will be best under the care of the colonies interested in the Indian trade, and garrisoned by their provincial forces, and at their own expense. Their own interest will then induce the American governments to take care of such forts in proportion to their importance, and see that the officers keep their corps full, and mind their duty. But any troops of ours placed there, and accountable here, would, in such remote and obscure places, and at so great a distance from the eye and inspection of superiors, soon become of little consequence, even though the French were left in possession of Canada. If the four independent com

cept and cut off our convoys, unless guarded continually by great bodies of men.-The second kind of security will not be obtained by such forts, unless they were connected by a wall like that of China, from one end of our settlements to the other. If the Indians, when at war, marched like the Europeans, with great armies, heavy cannon, baggage, and carriages; the passes through which alone such armies could penetrate our country, or receive their supplies, being secured, all might be sufficiently secure; but the case is widely different. They go to war, as they call it, in small parties; from fifty men down to five. Their hunting life has made them acquainted with the whole country, and scarce any part of it is impracticable to such a party. They can travel through the woods even by night, and know how to conceal their tracks. They pass easily between your forts undiscovered; and privately approach the settlements of your frontier inhabitants. They need no convoys of provisions to follow them; for whether they are shifting from place to place in the woods, or lying in wait for an opportunity to strike a blow, every thicket and every stream furnishes so small a number with sufficient subsistence. When they have sur-panies, maintained by the crown in New York prised separately, and murdered and scalped a dozen families, they are gone with inconceivable expedition through unknown ways: and it is very rare that pursuers have any chance of coming up with them. In short, long experience has taught our planters, that they cannot rely upon forts as a security against Indians; the inhabitants of Hackney might as well rely upon the tower of London, to secure them against highwaymen and housebreakers.-As to the third kind of security, that we shall not, in a few years, have all we have done to do over again in America, and be obliged to employ the same number of troops, and ships, at the same immense expense, to defend our possessions there, while we are in proportion weakened here: such Now all the kinds of security we have menforts I think, cannot prevent this. During a tioned are obtained by subduing and retaining peace, it is not to be doubted the French, who Canada. Our present possessions in America are adroit at fortifying, will likewise erect are secured; our planters will no longer be forts in the most advantageous places of the massacred by the Indians, who, depending abcountry we leave them; which will make it solutely on us for what are now become the more difficult than ever to be reduced in case necessaries of life to them (guns, powder, of another war. We know by experience of hatchets, knives, and clothing) and having no this war, how extremely difficult it is to march other Europeans near, that can either supan army through the American woods, with ply them, or instigate them against us; there is its necessary cannon and stores, sufficient to no doubt of their being always disposed, if we reduce a very slight fort. The accounts at treat them with common justice, to live in the treasury will tell you, what amazing perpetual peace with us. And with regard sums we have necessarily spent in the expe- to France, she cannot, in case of another war, ditions against two very trifling forts, Du- put us to the immense expense of defending quesne and Crown Point. While the French that long extended frontier; we shall then, retain their influence over the Indians, they as it were, have our backs against a wall in can easily keep our long extended frontier in America; the sea coast will be easily protectcontinual alarm, by a very few of those peo-ed by our superior naval power: and here ple; and with a small number of regulars and "our own watchfulness and our own strength. VOL. II.... 2 B 17

more than forty years, at a great expensé, consisted, for most part of the time, of faggots chiefly; if their officers enjoyed their places as sinecures, and were only, as a writer of that country styles them, a kind of military monks; if this was the state of troops posted in a populous country, where the imposition could not be so well concealed; what may we expect will be the case of those, that shall be posted two, three, or four hundred miles from the inhabitants, in such obscure and remote places as Crown Point, Oswego. Duquesne, or Niagara? they would scarce be even faggots; they would dwindle to mere names upon paper, and appear no where but on the muster-rolls.

will be properly, and cannot but be successfully employed. In this situation, the force now employed in that part of the world, may be spared for any, other service here or elsewhere; so that both the offensive and defensive strength of the British empire, on the whole, will be greatly increased.

foundation than this have they been supposed the authors of a war, carried on for their advantage only. It is a great mistake to imagine that, the American country in question between Great Britain and France is claimed as the property of any individuals or public body in America; or that the possession of it by Great Britain is likely, in any lucrative view, to redound at all to the advantage of any person there. On the other hand, the the bulk of the inhabitants of North America are land-owners, whose lands are inferior in value to those of Britain, only by the want of an equal number of people. It is true, the accession of the large territory claimed before the war began (especially if that be secured by the possession of Canada) will tend to the increase of the British subjects faster, than if they had been confined within the mountains: yet the increase within the mountains only would evidently make the comparative popu

But to leave the French in possession of Canada, when it is in our power to remove them, and depend (as the remarker proposes) on our own strength and watchfulness" to prevent the mischiefs that may attend it, seems neither safe nor prudent. Happy as we now are, under the best of kings, and in the prospect of a succession promising every felicity a nation was ever blessed with; happy too in the wisdom and vigour of every part of the administration; we cannot, we ought not to promise ourselves the uninterrupted continuance of those blessings. The safety of a considerable part of the state, and the interest of the whole, are not to be trust-lation equal to that of Great Britain much ed to the wisdom and vigour of future administrations; when a security is to be had more effectual, more constant, and much less expensive. They, who can be moved by the apprehension of dangers so remote, as that of the future independence of our colonies (a point I shall hereafter consider) seem scarcely consistent with themselves, when they suppose we may rely on the wisdom and vigour of an administration for their safety.-I should indeed think it less material whether Canada were ceded to us or not, if I had in view only the security of possession in our colonies. 1 entirely agree with the remarker, that we are in North America "a far greater continental as well as naval power;" and that only cowardice or ignorance can subject our colonies there to a French conquest. But for the same reason I disagree with him widely upon another point.

sooner than it can be expected, when our people are spread over a country six times as large. I think this is the only point of light in which this account is to be viewed, and is the only one in which any of the colonies are concerned.-No colony, no possessor of lands in any colony, therefore, wishes for conquests, or can be benefited by them, otherwise than as they may be a means of securing peace on their borders. No considerable advantage has resulted to the colonies by the conquests of this war, or can result from confirming them by the peace, but what they must enjoy in common with the rest of the British people; with this evident drawback from their share of these advantages, that they will necessarily lessen, or at least prevent the increase of the value of what makes the principal part of their private property-their land. A people, spread though the whole tract of country, on this side the Mississippi, and secured by Canada in our hands, would probably for some centuries find employment in agriculture, and thereby free us at home I do not think, that our "blood and trea-effectually from our fears of American manusure has been expended," as he intimates, factures. Unprejudiced men well know, that "in the cause of the colonies," and that we all the penal and prohibitory laws that were åre "making conquests for them;" yet I be-ever thought on will not be sufficient to prelieve this is too common an error. 1 do not say, they are altogether unconcerned in the event. The inhabitants of them are, in common with the other subjects of Great Britain, anxious for the glory of her crown, the extent of her power and commerce, the welfare and future repose of the whole British people. They could not therefore but take a large share in the affronts offered to Britain; and have been animated with a truly British spirit to exert themselves beyond their strength, and against their evident interest. Yet so unfortunate have they been, that their virtue has made against them; for upon no better

3. The blood and treasure spent in the American wars, not spent in the cause of the

colonies alone.

vent manufactures in a country, whose inhabitants surpass the number that can subsist by the husbandry of it. That this will be the case in America soon, if our people remain confined within the mountains, and almost as soon should it be unsafe for them to live beyond, though the country be ceded to us, no man acquainted with political and commercial history can doubt. Manufactures are founded in poverty: it is the multitude of poor without land in a country, and who must work for others at low wages or starve, that enables undertakers to carry on a manufacture, and afford it cheap enough to prevent