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that the two houses of Congress have a perfect authority to terminate the Oregon Convention, without offence to any body. This is our specified right, and its exercise can present no just cause of complaint in any quarter. But, though this is an undoubted truth, yet it must be considered in connection with the circumstances which have been made to surround it. The resolution of notice has passed the other house of Congress with a qualification, or addition, or whatever else it should be called, which prevents it in some respects from being a mere naked notice of termination. It comes with that qualification or condition for adoption here. Other propositions are offered in the Senate, and are entertained as fit subjects of consideration. The Senator from Kentucky, in one part of his speech, says that he will leave the entire responsibility of this controversy where the Constitution has placed it, and contends that those who have the power to conduct the foreign diplomacy of the country are responsible to the country and to the world for the manner in which they shall exercise that power. This is certainly very just, but it raises a doubt whether we ought to do more than simply to give, or to refuse to give, the naked notice. But some modification of the mere naked notice has been already attached to it in the other house; and there is, as I believe, a conviction on the part of a large majority of the Senate, that it should, to a certain extent, be qualified. Now, I hold that, under these circumstances, we have a right to know in what point of view the executive himself regards this notice; what are the ends he has in view, and what are the consequences to which, in his judgment, the notice is to lead.

When speaking on this subject some weeks ago, I said it was most obvious that the President could not expect war; because he did not act as the chief magistrate of such a nation as this must be expected to act, if, charged as he is with the defence of the country, he expected any danger of its being assaulted by the most formidable power upon earth. I still say there is nothing in the executive communications to show us that the President does expect a war. He must, then, expect nothing but a continuance of the present controversy, or a settlement of it by negotiation. But how is it to be settled? On what terms? On what basis? All that we hear is, "The whole of Oregon or none." And yet there is to be negotiation. We cannot con

ceal from ourselves or the world the gross inconsistency of such conduct. It is the spirit of the whole negotiation, on our part, that Oregon is ours; there is nothing like admitting even a doubt, on the part of ourselves or others, as to that position; and yet we are to negotiate! What is negotiation? Does any gentleman expect that the administration are, by negotiation, to persuade Great Britain to surrender the whole of what she holds in Oregon? They may do this; I cannot say they will not. If that is their expectation, let them try their hand at it; I wish them success. That is, I wish that we may get "all Oregon" if we can; but let our arguments be fair, and let our demands be reasonable.

But I do not understand the position we are placed in. The executive seems to be for negotiation, and yet is against taking any thing but the whole of Oregon. What, then, is to be the ground of negotiation? What is the basis on which it is to proceed? If the President has made up his mind not to treat for less than the whole, he should say so, and throw himself at once on the two houses of Congress.

I am entitled to make this remark, because it cannot be disguised that the probable effect of this notice is viewed very differently by very intelligent gentlemen, all friends of the administration, on this floor. The Senator from Georgia regards it as a measure tending to peace. He hopes, he expects, peace from it, and he thinks the expression of such opinions as he avows will enable the administration to secure the peace of the country. There are certain other gentlemen, and among them the honorable Senator from Michigan,* who are much less ardent in their hopes of peace. That Senator's impression has been, that, if we pass this notice, there is a possibility and a prospect of war; and so, against the gentleman's own declarations and disavowals, his speeches generally terminate in the expression that war is inevitable.

After an explanation from Mr. Cass, Mr. Webster proceeded as follows:

The gentleman thinks we shall not recede, and that England will not recede; and then what more likely to happen than a

* Mr. Cass.

war? It was the Senator's argument, and not any particular expression he employed, which gave me the idea that such was his impression. I do not charge the gentleman with saying that "war is inevitable"; but what he did say yet rings in my ears, and on every return of the like language I am reminded of the sentence with which the Roman Senator ended all his speeches, "Delenda est Carthago."

I am desirous of expressing the sentiment (without wishing to embarrass the administration: if negotiations are pending I will hold my tongue; my tongue shall be blistered before I will say any thing against our own title so long as negotiations are pending; but the President must see the embarrassment under which we stand; I am willing to aid the administration, and will aid it to obtain all to which we are justly entitled) that I must know something of the views, expectations, end, and ob- · jects of the President in recommending this notice. I cannot much longer be quiet in the existing posture of affairs, when no measures of defence are recommended to us, but negotiation is held out as likely to bring the question to a settlement by England's giving up the whole matter in dispute. My doubt of that is as strong as that expressed by the Senator from Michigan. I say here, so far as my own knowledge goes, that it is not the judgment of this country, that it is not the judgment of this Senate, that the government of the United States shall run the hazard of a war for Oregon, by renouncing as no longer fit for consideration propositions made by ourselves to Great Britain. thirty years ago, and repeated again and again before the world. I do not speak of any specific propositions, but of the general idea, of the general plan, so justly suggested by the Senator from Missouri,* of separating the interests of British subjects and American citizens beyond the Rocky Mountains. I repeat the assertion, that it is not the judgment of this country that we are bound to reject our own propositions, made over and over again, twenty and thirty years ago. I do not believe that such is the judgment of this Senate. I have the fullest belief that the propositions proposed by the gentleman from Georgia concur with the views of a large majority of this body.

(A VOICE. Yes, of two thirds.)

* Mr. Benton.

A gentleman near me says of two thirds of it; and I am willing to try that question immediately. I am ready now to take the question, whether this difficulty shall or shall not be settled by compromise. Compromise I can understand; but negotiation, with a fixed resolution to take and not to give, with a predetermination not to take less than the whole, is what I do not and cannot understand in diplomacy. I wish we could take that question now; not for the purpose of giving information in any quarter, but in order to put an end to the present distressing, distracting state of things. There are many subjects which we should attend to, all of which are greatly and materially embarrassed by the present position of this affair. It is proposed, for example, to remodel the tariff. But with what view? To augment revenue, or reduce revenue? If it is to augment the revenue, then, I ask, is that with a view to war? If it is to re

duce revenue, then, I ask, is that with a view to peace? How can we possibly know how to act, without the least knowledge whether there is a likelihood of the continuance of peace, or whether we are on the eve of a war?

The embarrassment in the private affairs of men is equally pressing. The nation possesses a great commerce. Now it is easy for a gentleman to say, "I disregard commerce on a question of the national honor." So do I, when that is the question. If the honor of my country is attacked, I will say, in the memorable language once used by a member of the other house, "Perish commerce!" But there are interests not to be trifled with. Those great interests of this country, in which is involved the daily bread of thousands and millions of men, are not to be put in jeopardy for objects not in reality connected either with the honor or the substantial interests of the country. I wish, therefore, so soon as it is practicable, to obtain an expression of the opinion of the Senate. If it shall be the opinion of this body that it is best to give the naked notice recommended in the President's message, that will throw the responsibility upon the executive to the fullest extent. I am for taking a question either on the naked notice, or on notice in some modified form, such as shall express what I believe to be the judgment both of the Senate and of the country.

OREGON.*

MR. PRESIDENT,

I shall advise my honorable friend, the member from Delaware, to forbear from pressing this resolution for a few days. There is no doubt that there are letters from Mr. McLane; but as the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations opposes this motion, I am to presume that the execu tive government finds it inconvenient to communicate those letters to the Senate at the present moment. Yet it is obvious, as the Senate is called upon to perform a legislative act, that it ought, before the hour of its decision comes, to be put in possession of every thing likely to influence its judgment; otherwise, it would be required to perform high legislative functions on mere confidence.

There is certainly some embarrassment in the case. If the executive government deems the communication of the correspondence inconvenient, it can only be because negotiation is still going on, or, if suspended, is expected to be resumed. So far as negotiation is concerned, the communication, or publication, of the correspondence may very properly be thought inconvenient. But then the President has recommended the passage of a law, or resolution, by the two houses of Congress. In support of this recommendation, he himself sent us, unasked, at the commencement of the session, the correspondence up to that time. Now, if that was necessary, the rest is necessary. If we are entitled to a part, we are entitled to the whole. In my opinion, the mistake was in calling on Congress to authorize notice

* Remarks made in the Senate of the United States, on the 30th of March, 1846, on a Resolution moved by Mr. Clayton of Delaware, on the 3d instant, calling upon the President for such portions of the Correspondence between the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, as had not already been communicated.

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